The ire directed at Belgrade for not “harmonising” its policies with the EU underscores the fact that in the era of multi-polarisation, particularly in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, Brussels is unwilling to tolerate geopolitical dissonance, writes Aleksandar Mitić, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for the Belt and Road Studies at the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade, Serbia.
Every Westerner who visits Chinese railway stations in Xi’an or Chongqing, key starting points of the China-Europe Railway Express, probably wonders: how come did I not know about the magnitude of this project?
Indeed, the China-Europe Railway Express is one of the most under-reported stories in the West. It is an uncomfortable story, as it suggests that large-scale, cheaper, faster and more secure China-Europe trade via the Russian Federation – as the main transit hub – is not only possible, but already fully operational and highly profitable.
Many more in the West have, however, heard about the China-Europe Railway Express only recently, during the September blockage of the Poland-Belarus border, which stranded Europe-bound convoys of Chinese goods for two weeks. What prompted both the temporary closure and the media hype around it was Warsaw’s securitisation of the border issue, invoking the vicinity of Russia-Belarus military exercises and drone incidents. However, it also served as an opportunity for Poland to try to drive wedges between Beijing and Moscow, by directing Chinese ire at Russia’s responsibility, as well as attempting to motivate Chinese authorities to move away from their positions on the conflict in Ukraine.
While Beijing did not budge, and Warsaw was finally urged to reopen the border by its own traders, the issue also prompted analysts and officials to redirect their attention to the alternative railway route, the Middle Corridor Route bypassing the Russian Federation. At the mid-October “Dialogues on China” conference in Belgrade, Serbia, this alternative was analysed on several occasions by experts on China and transport corridors. Their conclusion, in the geopolitical sense, was that ramping up the alternative route would be a boost for US and Turkish interests, and a loss for Russia and Iran.
Driving wedges to gain strategic advantage in the transport and energy infrastructure has also been a feature of attempts to curb Serbia’s foreign policy independence and diversification. This is neither new nor surprising: as an EU candidate facing stalled negotiations, Serbia has firmly stood by its military neutrality, rejecting NATO membership, Western sanctions against Moscow, and in addition, in 2024, elevating bilateral relations with Beijing to the highest level, where it is being called the “Community of China and Serbia for the Shared Future in the New Era”. Such eastward hedging is considered unacceptable among Western governments for a country surrounded by EU and NATO members.
Along with Hungary, Serbia has been a key proponent of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Europe. Beyond bilateral projects with China, a milestone trilateral project and a flagship for China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe has been the construction of the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway. Since 2014, this project has faced numerous obstacles – often stemming from Brussels targeting the Hungarian side. Yet, the Serbian portion of the railway – constructed by Russian and Chinese companies – was completed and launched in October 2025, with the Hungarian part to follow in the first part of 2026. The railway is considered as an important portion of China’s “belt” connectivity strategy – as it is ultimately aimed to connect with the Mediterranean port of Piraeus, near Athens, owned by China’s COSCO and a major entry point for Chinese goods into Europe. However, the EU, which for a long time has stayed away from major investments in regional infrastructure, recently stepped in to offer loans and grants for a key portion of the Serbian railway heading south from Belgrade to the city of Niš. Optimists would look at this initiative as a logical move by Brussels to connect two EU candidate countries – Greece and Hungary through the Pan-European Corridor X (Athens-Belgrade-Budapest). Yet, sceptics could point to possible dangers of Brussels actually stalling the construction of the high-speed railway with political conditionality in order to slow down the establishment of the Piraeus connection with Budapest and Central Europe, thus obstructing China’s trade. In addition, the US recently launched a renewed attempt to curb China’s control of the Piraeus port as part of its wider strategy aimed against Chinese investments in global ports. Washington has also promoted the IMEC trade corridor – the India-Middle East Economic Corridor – as an alternative to the BRI. The Greek port of Alexandroupolis has been seen as a US military and LNG hub against Russia’s interests, as well as a possible port gateway for the IMEC in countering China and the BRI.
Serbia’s energy connectivity, primarily with Russia, has also been targeted. Before exiting the White House in January 2025, the administration of US President Joseph Biden set in motion a mechanism aimed at sanctioning the petroleum company NIS, which owns of the country’s oil refinery and is the largest contributor to Serbia’s state budget. The aim of the mechanism was to eliminate the majority ownership of the company by Russia’s Gazpromneft. Despite intense negotiations within the US-Serbia-Russia triangle, the sanctions entered into force in October 2025. In the meantime, Serbia and Hungary set in motion the building of a new Hungary-Serbia pipeline, connecting it to Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline. As Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó argued : “We’re moving forward with Serbian and Russian partners to build a new oil pipeline between Hungary and Serbia. While Brussels is banning Russian energy, cutting links and blocking routes, we need more sources, more routes.” Yet, in late October 2025, the main connectivity hub of the proposed new pipeline – the MOL oil refinery in Százhalombatta, near Budapest – was hit by an explosion and a fire. The attack occurred as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk argued in an interview with the British press that Ukraine had a right to attack Russia-linked targets anywhere in Europe.
Also in October, the European Council agreed on its negotiating position on the draft regulation to phase out imports of Russian natural gas, a move with potentially dramatic long-term consequences for Serbia, as it is fully reliant on its import of Russian gas through the Turkish/Balkan stream transiting through Bulgaria. This decision, in addition to targeting Moscow, can also be seen as part of a long-planned, well-thought-out and precisely targeted plan to remove the comparative advantage Serbia’s economy has had thanks to its favourable gas arrangement with the Russian Federation.
The ire directed at Belgrade for not harmonising its policies with the EU points to the fact that in the era of multi-polarisation, particularly in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, Brussels is unwilling to tolerate geopolitical dissonance. Such a position is unlikely to change in the light of Brussels’ securitisation narrative and militarisation over the “Russian threat”, just as the US strategic narrative and statecraft repertoire will not shy away from driving new wedges between China and its key partners in Europe and elsewhere.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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