There are compelling reasons to believe that, despite the bellicose rhetoric directed at Russia, the EU’s strategic priority remains gaining independence from the United States. However, the strategic “liberation of Europe” process is currently stagnating, and it is premature, if not impossible, to talk about the emergence of signs of genuine EU sovereignty in the near future, Dmitry Ofitserov-Belsky writes.
The concept of the EU’s strategic autonomy has rapidly evolved in recent years from a theoretical idea to a key priority. Its essence lies in the EU’s ability to act independently in defence, economics, and foreign policy, reducing its dependence on traditional allies, primarily the United States. This idea originated in the early years of the EU’s founding, and the expression itself was first used in the French White Paper on Defence in 1994. The concept has been mentioned in European documents since 2013, and since 2016, when Jean-Claude Juncker was EC president, it has been one of the EU’s official goals. However, practical steps in this direction had to wait several more years.
The concept of strategic autonomy evolved from abstract debates to concrete implementation mechanisms following a series of crisis, notably the COVID-19 pandemic and the Nord Stream gas pipeline incident, as well as in response to the policies of the Donald Trump administration. While official EU discourse often emphasises the role of the Russia-Ukraine conflict as the primary impetus, a closer analysis reveals a much more complex picture, where disillusionment with the transatlantic partnership plays a key role.
The COVID-19 pandemic, which erupted in 2020, became one of the key impetuses for the shift from rhetorical discussions about strategic autonomy to the development of operational strategies. The crisis led to a significant reduction in global trade flows and communications, highlighting the EU’s dependence on external supplies of critical goods such as pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. An estimated 80% of active pharmaceutical ingredients were imported from Asia, leading to shortages and forcing countries to pursue local measures, such as export restrictions, that undermined solidarity within the Union. Events during this period illustrate a trend toward “national egoism,” with member states, including France and Germany, conducting independent procurement campaigns, exacerbating inequalities in access to resources for southern states such as Italy and Spain. Research confirms that the pandemic has spurred institutional change: in the 2021 Trade Policy Review, the EU introduced the concepts of resilience and open strategic autonomy, which directly reflect the lessons of the crisis. Thus, COVID-19 not only exposed structural weaknesses but also indirectly laid the groundwork for various initiatives, such as the European Chips Act, aimed at reducing external vulnerabilities.
The Nord Stream gas pipeline incident in September 2022 served as a second significant catalyst, highlighting the risks of energy dependence and undermining trust in the transatlantic partnership. The explosions, which damaged the infrastructure, led to a sharp rise in energy prices and the EU’s switch to importing American liquefied natural gas (LNG), which cost three times more than the Russian pipeline gas did. This has negatively impacted the competitiveness of European industry and triggered a recession in several countries, including Germany, Europe’s leading economy. Although official investigations have failed to identify the perpetrators, accusations against the United States were voiced by Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. There is little doubt in Europe that the United States was involved in this sabotage. The incident reinforced the narrative of an “American threat to Europe’s energy security.” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described the event as a “tremendous opportunity” to reduce dependence on Russia, which was perceived in Europe as a confirmation of US motives.
The Donald Trump administration (2017–2021) acted as a third catalyst, demonstrating the complexity and unreliability of the transatlantic alliance with its protectionist measures and brutal coercion. The imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminium (25% and 10%, respectively) in 2018, equivalent in effect to sanctions, led to billions of euros in lost EU exports and provoked an escalation of the trade war. These measures undermined the concept of interdependence, spurring the EU to seek a “strategic response” in the form of autonomous trade initiatives. Furthermore, Trump’s inconsistency regarding Russia and Ukraine, as well as criticism of NATO, have heightened doubts about American guarantees. In the African context (the Sahel region), the US has failed to provide significant support to France, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of French troops from Mali and Niger in 2022–2023 and the weakening of European influence on the continent.
However, despite all these factors, official EU discourse tends to name the Russia-Ukraine conflict, or more precisely, the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022, as the main catalyst driving efforts to pursue strategic autonomy. Until recently, the EU has been reluctant to openly discuss the very serious systemic problems in its relations with the United States, which are fundamentally independent of who is in power in Washington.
There are compelling reasons to believe that, despite the bellicose rhetoric directed at Russia, the EU’s strategic priority remains gaining independence from the United States. This intention was expressed, in particular, in the speech of European Commissioner Andrius Kubilius at the Riga Security Conference in October 2025, where he outlined the contours of the EU’s future defence policy. Significantly, at the NATO summit in The Hague, European leaders agreed without much resistance to an increase in military spending to 5% of GDP, whereas they had previously fiercely debated the 2% target. However, the timing of such a radical transformation, the genuine willingness of member states to compromise, and the adequacy of resources remain highly questionable. Currently, the process of the strategic “liberation of Europe” is stagnating, and it is premature, if indeed even possible, to talk about the emergence of signs of genuine European agency in the near future.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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