In Russian, the Arctic is often called the “kitchen of the world’s weather”. Indeed, climate processes in the polar latitudes have a significant impact on weather patterns across the planet. In global politics, at first glance, the situation looks exactly the opposite: international relations in the Arctic seem to reflect global international political dynamics, and interstate relations at the high latitudes are merely a projection of their interactions beyond the region, Nikita Lipunov writes. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
But is this really so? The history of international Arctic politics over at least four decades has accumulated intriguing empirical material for international relations scholars. What can it tell us about relations between Russia and the West, between the West and the East, within the West itself, and between the Arctic states as a whole?
The first summit between the leaders of Russia and the US in four years took place on August 15 in Alaska. The choice of location was deliberate, elegant, and symbolic. Among other things, it is a reminder that in the Arctic, the two great powers share not only a border but also interests. Moscow and Washington should renew high-level dialogue in the Arctic, which since the 1990s has been proclaimed a “zone of peace” and a “territory of dialogue”—although the Arctic countries have experienced some difficulties with this in recent years. Military-political and, for some time now, diplomatic dynamics in the Arctic have reflected global trends in relations between Russia and the West, but in the polar latitudes, they have a special “refractory”.
Since the end of the Cold War, regional relations between the Arctic powers have been based on mutual trust and a special responsibility for the region’s fate. It is precisely the convergence of these two components that has determined the cooperative nature of interstate relations in the Arctic, beginning in the 1990s, when Russia and Western countries created common institutions for regional cooperation: the Arctic Council, the International Arctic Science Committee, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the Northern Dimension. Following several crises in relations between Russia and the Western countries, experts began to talk about “Arctic exceptionalism”, whereby Arctic powers continued regional non-military cooperation despite disagreements on non-Arctic issues.
As the confrontation between Russia and the West intensified in the 2010s, mutual trust began to fade, creating a “security dilemma” and triggering the creeping militarisation of the Arctic. The escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022—with the near-complete severing of Western ties with Russia and the virtual paralysis of the Arctic Council—called Arctic “exceptionalism” into question. Nevertheless, three and a half years into the conflict, all states in the region continue to advocate for the preservation of the Arctic Council as a key and unique international forum for Arctic issues, hoping for its resumption and continued cooperation on non-military security, and declaring their commitment to maintaining “peace and stability” in the Arctic. This is happening despite the “brain death” of most of the shared institutions of Russia and the West in the post-bipolar era.
The key to understanding this dynamic—and the uniqueness of the Arctic—lies in the special responsibility of the Arctic states for the fate of the region, its fragile ecosystems, and the indigenous peoples of the North. The five Arctic coastal states—Russia, the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark—recognised this in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration as a “unique position” to respond to regional security challenges through the “responsible management” of the Arctic Ocean, in which the Arctic states were given a “leading role”. The declaration served as a reminder of the sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction of coastal states in the Arctic Ocean and a response to the growing interest in the Arctic and its resources on the part of non-regional powers, particularly Asian ones. It is precisely this special responsibility and awareness of a shared Arctic identity, in contrast to non-regional players, that serves as a safeguard against the complete collapse of the framework for Arctic dialogue between Russia and the West.
Of course, given the near-total loss of mutual trust, it’s premature to talk about restoring full-fledged political interaction within the Arctic Council, despite the gradual reactivation of its working groups. At the same time, some prospects for a “thaw” are emerging between the two leading regional powers.
Since the resumption of Russian-American contacts in February, the Arctic has remained high on the agenda, demonstrating the readiness of Moscow and Washington to return to cooperation in the high latitudes. This primarily concerns energy projects, which clearly interest Donald Trump more than polar scientific research, which the US president has almost completely cut off funding for. At the same time, the potential for Russian-American Arctic cooperation is greater: in addition to science in the broad sense, it includes ensuring shipping safety, navigation, search and rescue, fisheries, and high technology. Despite the positive prospects, one should maintain no illusions here.
First, Donald Trump is exclusively defending American interests and pursuing national gain. For the American president, cooperation with Moscow in the Arctic is simply an additional opportunity to strengthen his own position in the region through access to Russian resources. Furthermore, it is also an attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and “near-Arctic” China, which have significantly increased their cooperation at the high latitudes over the past several years amid the “Arctic pause”. By “squeezing” Beijing out of the Russian Arctic, Washington will seek to “secure” one flank of the confrontation in order to concentrate resources on the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the Arctic will remain a zone of mutual strategic nuclear deterrence between Moscow and Washington, so both powers will maintain a military presence there and demonstrate force. We should also not forget the disagreements over the legal status of the Russian straits on the Northern Sea Route, which the US considers international.
Second, a possible resumption of Russian-American cooperation in the Arctic will not automatically lead to the rehabilitation of the Arctic Council, where the value-laden countries of Northern Europe and Canada hold strong positions. It was precisely the peculiarities of the Northern European political worldview that led to the hopeless crisis of another regional structure, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, which Russia was forced to leave in 2023. The leadership of Denmark, which chairs the Arctic Council for the next two years, maintains an openly anti-Russian stance, while Canada’s new prime minister, Mark Carney, has stated that he does not intend to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic.
Amid a potential rapprochement between Moscow and Washington in the high latitudes, a new fragmentation has emerged – this time within the Western bloc. Disagreements between the Trump administration and its allies have accelerated Canada’s rapprochement with Europe, including in the Arctic context. In 2024, Ottawa launched a strategic dialogue with Nordic countries, where, among other things, Arctic security issues are discussed, and in June 2025, it signed a security and defence cooperation pact with the EU, which also has Arctic ambitions.
In the new paradigm of Arctic policy, Russia emphasises its self-sufficiency and is open to cooperation in the high latitudes with anyone willing to respect its interests – including the United States. While a possible resumption of Russian-American cooperation won’t stop the “Arctic capabilities race”—military, icebreaker, satellite—between Russia and the West, it could be the first step toward restoring mutual trust. This would allow the two leading Arctic powers to somewhat reduce military and political tensions in the region, which they desire to see as a “zone of peace and stability”.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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