On December 22, 2025, the Valdai Club hosted an expert discussion titled “(Non)strategic Stability – 2025: A Year in International Security”. Moderator Fyodor Lukyanov described 2025 as a watershed year in many ways. The erosion of the previous global order and the crisis of institutions have been discussed at length, but now a qualitative leap has occurred. While previously the main players had merely offered little resistance to the crisis of the global order, in 2025 the United States began to deliberately destroy that order.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov gave a brief overview of the situation in terms of strategic stability. According to him, in late 2024 and early 2025, the Biden administration, with the support of several NATO members, including nuclear-armed Great Britain and France, took a series of escalatory steps. As a result, the world, according to Ryabkov, “approached the brink of an abyss,” that is, a direct armed conflict between nuclear powers. The NATO countries had effectively contravened the political commitments enshrined in the January 2022 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Nuclear Five. Russia, for its part, consistently sent warning signals to its opponents about the strategic risks they posed and its readiness to defend its national security interests. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration came to power in the United States, reconsidered some of the anti-Russian elements of Washington’s policy and took steps to initiate a substantive dialogue on resolving the Ukrainian crisis. “This does not mean that we do not have serious questions for the American side, but it would be unfair not to acknowledge significant steps in the right direction,” the diplomat stated. He added that the success of the dialogue is not predetermined and that normalising relations will require considerable time, mutual commitment, and tremendous effort. Washington’s genuine willingness to engage on an equal basis must be the key to progress.
Speaking about relations with Europe, Ryabkov noted that many EU countries are complicating matters, seeking to prevent an improvement in Russian-American relations. Europe, under the influence of delusions about the threat posed by Russia, is systematically remilitarising. Russia does not pursue aggressive goals and is prepared to legally enshrine this, Ryabkov emphasised. However, few EU countries would be willing to build an indivisible security space not against Russia, but jointly with it. Inappropriate hostile actions by European countries have created significant risks of a clash between Russia and NATO, even given a more restrained US policy toward Russia.
Ryabkov also pointed to the danger of Western countries, including the US, progressively implementing destabilising military-technical programmes, the development of which is provoking retaliatory measures from Russia.
“Russia is objectively prepared to guarantee its national security, primarily through further enhancing the reliability and effectiveness of deterrence and, accordingly, maintaining a strategic balance through military-technical countermeasures,” he concluded, noting that Russia continues to maintain an open window of opportunity for political and diplomatic efforts to ensure predictability and restraint in the strategic sphere.
Commenting on the US position, Anatol Lieven, a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, pointed out the impossibility of talking about a single American approach, citing the profound differences in the foreign policy approaches of the two main American political parties. Furthermore, analysing Trump’s policies specifically, Lieven emphasised the personal factor: the president’s “attention span” is short, and various factions compete for this attention, as in the court of a medieval monarch. According to Lieven, in general, members of the current administration, such as Vice President J.D. Vance, understand how a multipolar world works and recognise the need to deal with both Russia and China. These people see the liberal elite, both American and European, as their main enemies. This generates hostility toward what’s happening in Europe and reduces their hostility toward Russia.
Lieven also added that Trump seeks US dominance in the Western Hemisphere, but is reluctant to make serious commitments in Europe, limiting himself to vague promises. Thus, we are dealing with a multitude of competing trends that have not yet crystallised into a clear policy line and are facing resistance from the old foreign policy establishment, he believes.
Wang Huiyao, founder and chairman of the Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG), believes that the security system that emerged after World War II is now weakened and not functioning properly. This is due to the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world. The new system is still fragmented and unstable, the researcher argues. It needs to be stabilised and a certain balance should be found. This is necessary for everyone – China, Russia, the US, Europe, and the Global South. Wang sees some grounds for optimism, including in the context of the Ukraine crisis, in the fact that Trump is more pragmatic than Biden. However, in his opinion, a unilateral approach will not work. Ending the conflict requires disinterested parties, so it would be useful to involve BRICS countries and the Global South in the resolution.
Noting the interconnectedness of the modern world, Wang emphasised the futility of trade wars and sanctions and the need to jointly create a better future for all. Among other things, he believes it is necessary to reform the UN, WTO, and other institutions, as well as transform the G7 into the G10 by including Russia, China, and India.
Prokhor Tebin, Director of the Centre for Military-Economic Studies at the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, urged caution against deceiving ourselves with improvements compared to the situation a year ago.
“Yes, a year ago we felt we were on the brink of nuclear balance, but today the situation is much more positive and optimistic,” he noted. However, in his opinion, few significant qualitative changes have occurred over the past year. Processes have evolved quantitatively – and generally not for the better. In the area of strategic stability, the New START Treaty continues to draw to an end. In the West, doctrinal developments continue to advance ideas for the militarisation of space. Escalation risks have likely diminished somewhat, but have not been eliminated. The rigid, ideological positions of European leaders have also remained unchanged. The main positive changes so far are primarily due to Donald Trump’s actions, which are also far from unambiguous.
Tebin believes that the situation will remain tense in 2026, but not all opportunities will be realised and not all hopes will be fulfilled. However, a better future is entirely achievable and worth working for.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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