Instead of megaproject headlines used in the previous TICADs, TICAD 9’s signature is the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA) scale-up with the African Development Bank, up to US$5.5 billion (2026–28), paired with a stronger emphasis on concessionality and covering risks. That pivots the narrative from “how much” to “on what terms,” aligning with debt-sustainability concerns that were less central in earlier cycles.
TICAD has always prized “quality infrastructure,” but TICAD 9 showcased how Japan intends to finance it affordably. On the side-lines, Kenya
secured up to ¥25 billion in Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI)-backed Samurai financing to cut borrowing costs and tackle grid losses, an operational example of de-risked yen funding. Weeks earlier, Côte d’Ivoire became the first sub-Saharan sovereign to issue a ¥50 billion ESG-labelled Samurai bond with a Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) guarantee, broadening African access to Japan’s investor base. Earlier TICADs rarely produced such visible, market-structure breakthroughs; TICAD 9 leans into them as a core instrument of delivery.
TICAD 9 also elevated its human capital cooperation with a Japanese commitment to train 30,000
AI specialists within a broader 300,000-person skills drive over the next three years. That gives TICAD 9 a sharper innovation edge than prior editions – linking digital public infrastructure and industry partnerships to concrete talent pipelines, whereas TICAD 7 framed technology broadly and TICAD 8 balanced it with pandemic recovery and climate.
Given a rewiring world, the hedging logic in Africa is stark. Beijing’s expansive influences in the continent are increasingly visible, anchored in the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road. Most recently in 2025, China announced
it would remove all tariffs on exports from the 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic ties, an offer that lowers the friction of selling into a giant market and that no other partner presently matches at comparable breadth. This, perhaps, undercuts the very leverage of the current US tariff threats and the US market. Nevertheless, debt workouts and risk controls have also become more prominent than they were a decade ago.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has pivoted to a “trade, not aid” posture, grading
ambassadors on deal-making, pushing Development Finance Corporation (DFC)-backed corridors like Lobito, and reviewing the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) ahead of its 2025 expiration, signals that inject uncertainty for exporters. Russia consolidates
security footprints while advancing nuclear megaprojects. In this crowd, TICAD’s multilateral, debt-sensitive tack stands out as an alternative that many governments might want in their portfolio.
America First, paradoxically, creates space for Japanese leadership. If Washington’s priority set narrows to deal-closure metrics, minerals logistics, and tariff reciprocity, someone else has to carry the FOIP-meets-Africa banner that stresses standards, interoperability, and debt sustainability. Japan signalled precisely that at Yokohama: a co-creation platform – still UN and Africa Union-anchored – that folds African priorities into Indo-Pacific supply chains without forcing binary choices. In effect, Tokyo might become the convening centre of gravity for so-called rules-based connectivity in Africa while the US perhaps could focus on selective, de-risked projects.
Yet leadership does not mean excluding competitors, and here China’s deep sediment in Africa matters. From 2000–2023, Chinese lenders issued
about $182.3 billion across 1,306 loans to 49 African governments and seven regional borrowers, along with building industrial parks, engaging in digital cooperation, and introducing policy toolkits like the Nine Programmes
that were launched since 2021, ranging from healthcare to poverty alleviation, people-to-people exchanges, innovation, green development, digitalisation, and peace and security. With the 2025 zero-tariff move, Beijing further tilts trade incentives in its favour. African policymakers will not scrap functioning Chinese projects to satisfy a new alignment; they will seek marginal gains: cheaper financing here, better standards there, more predictable Operations and Maintenance (O&M). They’ll achieve this by layering partners. That reality nudges Japan toward selective, rules-focused cooperation with Chinese-touch assets rather than blanket exclusion.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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