Belgrade’s reluctant move to comply with American sanctions and force Russia out of its energy industry exposes the real limits of national sovereignty in a world where the United States is asserting its will with increasing disregard for established norms and rules, writes Milan Lazović, Programme Manager at the Russian International Affairs Council
The fate of the Serbian company Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) already turned into an extremely complex political puzzle last year, in 2025. The crisis surrounding Serbia’s key energy asset—accounting for up to 5% of GDP and around a tenth of budget revenues—demonstrated that it is impossible to manoeuvre indefinitely amid the global confrontation between great powers. Taking into account the events of 2025, statements by American politicians, the shutdown of the Pančevo refinery and the deal to sell the Russian majority stake, it is now possible to speak of a fundamental transformation in Serbia’s energy security model.
Good Old America: Sanctions, Threats and Coercion
In January 2025, the administration of former US President Joe Biden imposed sanctions on the Serbian oil company NIS, justifying the decision by the presence of Russian capital in its ownership structure. Indeed, a controlling stake of 56.15% did belong to Gazprom Neft and affiliated entities; however, Serbia—which owned less than 30% of the company—remained quite comfortable with this arrangement. Since its establishment in 1991, NIS has been of strategic importance to the country. Sanctions pressure on a company that operates the country’s only oil refinery in Pančevo and an extensive network of filling stations could not but affect Serbia’s economic stability.
The looming energy crisis forced Belgrade to take active steps. Aware of Serbia’s vulnerable position, the United States granted NIS waivers seven times, while insisting on the urgent sale of the Russian stake—by the end of 2025, however, it proved impossible to reach further compromises. In October 2025, the sanctions came into force, blocking the company’s access to international financial operations and logistics chains. The most severe consequence came in the form of an inability to purchase crude oil for processing. By early December 2025, NIS was forced to completely
shut down the Pančevo refinery due to a lack of feedstock, creating the threat of fuel shortages across the country. A short-term reprieve came at the end of December 2025, when NIS received a temporary licence from the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), allowing oil supplies to resume via the Croatian JANAF pipeline. Simultaneously, the process of a forced sale of the Russian shareholders’ stake was launched. According to Western media, Hungary’s MOL and the Emirati company ADNOC became the main contenders. Serbia, in turn, earmarked €1.4 billion in the state budget in the event of temporary nationalisation becoming a necessity, and announced plans to increase its stake to 35% in order to strengthen control over the energy sector.
Those events served as yet another vivid example of the United States using extraterritorial sanctions as a tool of geopolitical coercion. Serbia was presented with an ultimatum: either sever ties with Russian capital or face the collapse of a key economic sector. Belgrade’s choice in favour of selling the assets was effectively predetermined—as even a temporary blocking of operations quickly paralysed the refinery, demonstrating the critical vulnerability of national sovereignty under such pressure. Nevertheless, President Aleksandar Vučić still retains some room for manoeuvre. The fact that MOL and ADNOC in particular are being considered as potential buyers suggests that certain calculations of political nature may be present. The first option, one implying partnership with Hungary, would make it possible to formally satisfy US demands while maintaining relations with the EU country most friendly towards Moscow. The second option implies seeking alternative economic centres and diversifying investment policy, which would soften the perception of capitulation in the face of the collective West and help prevent the establishment of external control over the country’s economy.
The likely completion of the asset sale in early 2026 will allow Serbia to lift the sanctions and minimise damage, but it will not restore the former stability. NIS will find itself under fundamentally different conditions and will face the need to reorganise its production system—either integrating into the Central European sector alongside MOL or adapting to ADNOC’s logistics and standards. For Serbia and the wider region, this precedent has clearly outlined the limits of sovereignty for small states amidst hybrid confrontation between global centres of power. It was expected that assets with significant Russian capital involvement could become targets of forced redistribution, but other countries will now be compelled to assess the risks of strategic partnership with Moscow with twice as much scrutiny.
Thus, the NIS crisis has not resolved the fundamental contradiction between Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy and Western pressure; rather, it has shifted it into a new, more complex phase, requiring Belgrade to accelerate the diversification of both energy sources and economic partnerships.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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