The concentration of US military forces in the Persian Gulf has sparked discussions about the possibility of a new military operation against Iran. International relations are difficult to predict. However, the development of the situation can be viewed as a set of alternative scenarios. A military operation is one of them.
A number of arguments can be made in favour of a military scenario being likely. First of all, the US has very specific motives for conducting an operation at this particular moment. Iran has been one of Washington’s key and consistent adversaries for over forty years. Iran’s relations with Israel, a key US ally in the region, are even more acrimonious. The two allies assume that Iran has been pursuing nuclear weapons for many years. The successful example of North Korea, which has become a de facto nuclear power, is an important example for Iran. On the other hand, there are numerous negative examples of non-nuclear countries being attacked, and their political systems (regimes) destroyed or transformed by force: Iraq, Libya, Syria and Venezuela. Iran itself was attacked in 2025. Tehran has made impressive progress in developing its missile programme, which is also recognised by US authorities as a threat. This threat was practically realised in the counterattacks against Israel during last year’s military conflict.
Protests in Iran could serve as an additional incentive for the US to use force. They are likely seen as a sign of weakness in the Iranian government, and the development of protest activity as a prerequisite for a revolutionary change of power. Military intervention in such a case could potentially act as a factor supporting the protest movement, leading to the collapse of the political system or a civil war similar to the Syrian model. Furthermore, the US has experience with a number of successful military operations that have led to the reformation of the political systems of target countries. An exception might be Afghanistan, where American troops were forced to withdraw. But even there, the US-backed government held out for nearly twenty years.
In the end, American authorities may view the current situation as a window of opportunity for resolving the complex security problems associated with Iran with a single military strike. In this case, the most likely option would be an air strike on Iranian targets, combined with targeted operations by special forces and a focus on arming and organising the opposition. A full-scale US ground operation appears less likely, given its significantly higher costs.
This scenario also carries a number of risks. The first is the specific nature of Iran’s military organisation. The country is vulnerable to concentrated air strikes, but an air operation alone is unlikely to undermine the stability of the Iranian army and the IRGC. They retain the capacity for launching missile counterattacks and the potential for protracted resistance on the ground. Second, the lack of an elite split in Iran, without which reforming the political system is difficult. Third, the public’s readiness for armed struggle against the government with US support is questionable. Mass protests are one thing. Civil war is quite another. External intervention could temporarily strengthen the government’s position and enhance the legitimacy of their emergency measures. Fourth, there are the economic risks of the operation, including shipping in the Persian Gulf and the reliability of oil supplies from the region. Fifth, there are risks to the reputation of the US Administration, should the operation fail.
An alternative scenario is a continued economic blockade of Iran, with the expectation that protests will continue to mount, the government’s legitimacy will be eroded, and the political structure will collapse due to the cumulative effect of accumulated problems. The problem is that such an approach has almost never worked in the past. The likelihood that the Iranian political system will adapt to the protests and “accommodate” them is far from zero. The same is true for progress in the nuclear missile programme. Both the US and Israel have nuclear deterrent capabilities against Iran, but its emergence as a nuclear power fundamentally changes the threat level. Any revolutionary changes in a nuclear power become extremely undesirable and dangerous – the big questions become where and into whose hands nuclear weapons will end up, how they will be used, etc.
Apparently, the most rational course of action for the United States may be a “hit and see” approach. An air campaign would be conducted against Iran, testing the real capabilities of its political system, the potential for protests to develop amid a US military operation, and the resilience of the country’s armed forces. If Iran withstands this, and the system remains stable, Washington may retreat and return to the blockade and sanctions approach. Moreover, Iran lacks the real ability to deliver a significant blow to the United States itself, and a military operation would in any case undermine Iran’s military potential and its military-industrial complex. The United States could then wait for another opportunity for another operation. Thus, another US air campaign against Iran appears quite realistic.
Iran itself also has two options. The first is to balance US military and political pressure. If a strike follows, it will withstand it, as happened last year. Tehran will likely try to maximise losses for the United States and its allies, depriving them of incentives to repeat similar operations in the future, although the options here are limited. The second option is to try to negotiate with the United States. However, this scenario is perhaps even riskier for Tehran. Washington will impose maximum demands on both the nuclear missile programme and other areas, including domestic political change. Iran risks falling into a trap of negotiating pressure, which ultimately hardly rules out military action. The prospects for such an operation are entirely realistic, with all the attendant threats to third countries.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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