In 2025, the new government in Syria failed to demonstrate an ability to create stable institutions, ensure public security, or establish mechanisms for social consensus. Competition between armed groups has made the country vulnerable to localised outbreaks of violence, ethno-confessional conflicts, and new waves of destabilisation, writes Nikolay Sukhov.
For Syria, 2025 was a year of transition from open war to a state of managed instability. The conflict is not over: the country remains divided, the institutional structure is fragile, the social fabric is destroyed, and external players, including Israel, the United States, Turkey, the Arab states, and Russia, continue to shape internal processes. This post-conflict stagnation creates the risk that protracted instability will prove more destructive than the war itself.
Political Transformation and Legitimacy of Power
The key political event of 2025 was the dismantling of the old regime’s structures and the formation of a new government. Ahmed al-Sharaa (better known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, a terrorist organisation banned in Russia) became president after the traditional oath of allegiance, or bay’ah, was taken by HTS field commanders (emirs). The change of power was accompanied by staged parliamentary elections, a purge of the government apparatus, and attempts to integrate the northeastern regions under Damascus’s jurisdiction. Instead of an inclusive policy, a power system based on a balance of armed groups and clans emerged, making the political space closed and prone to conflict. Attempts to integrate the northeast of the country through negotiations with the Syrian Democratic Forces were frequently interrupted by armed clashes, demonstrating the inability of the new centre of power to offer all parties an acceptable governance model.
In terms of institutional sustainability, 2025 has demonstrated the need for a new social contract, without which the formal legitimacy of power remains extremely limited.
Conflict and Security: Ongoing Instability
Despite the de facto cessation of large-scale hostilities in the central and western provinces, internal security remains a critical issue:
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Local armed conflicts persist, particularly on the borders of Damascus-controlled areas;
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Mass killings and abductions of Alawites were observed in the provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and Homs, as well as armed attacks against Druze and Christians in the southern and central regions;
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The activities of the new regime’s security forces and field commanders often go beyond the law, hindering the restoration of trust in state structures.
The lack of unified control and competition between armed groups make security dependent on local agreements.
The Economy: Survival in a Crisis
Syria’s economy remained mired in crisis in 2025. Limited sanctions relief and moderate interest from foreign investors have failed to restore the industrial base or create jobs. Industry is in a barely functioning state, domestic consumption remains low, and infrastructure has been destroyed or has severely deteriorated.
The economy survives on external ties and cross-border trade, rather than domestic production or services. The main activity has shifted to the import and export of goods through Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, as well as private financial transfers. Many of these flows occur illegally or through complex transit schemes.
The country’s reconstruction needs are colossal. According to the World Bank, the total cost of rebuilding Syria after more than thirteen years of conflict is approximately $216 billion, including the restoration of housing, commercial properties, and critical infrastructure.
Its public finances are in crisis mode: the budget is in deficit, the national currency is unstable, and inflation is high. Under these conditions, long-term investment and industrial recovery are impossible without external support and institutional reforms.
Economic stagnation has exacerbated social vulnerability: a shortage of jobs and income opportunities keeps a significant portion of the population struggling to survive rather than develop. Poverty levels are critical, and social support from the state is absent. This, in turn, affects the country’s demographic and social structure, increasing emigration, internal displacement, and dependence on foreign aid.
Social and demographic changes perpetuate societal breakdown: Syria has witnessed massive population dispersion, a loss of human capital, a deteriorating age structure, and an identity crisis. The state is increasingly perceived as an external entity and less as a protector, undermining trust in the government and the consolidation of society.
Humanitarian and Food Situation
2025 demonstrated that the humanitarian crisis remains acute:
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Nine out of ten Syrians live below the poverty line,
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The population experiences chronic food and water shortages,
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Millions of internally displaced persons and returning refugees require housing, medical care, and education.
Syrian society has become chronically vulnerable: the fight for survival has supplanted long-term strategies, and social mobility is being replaced by primitive coping strategies. Humanitarian programmes remain critical, but their effectiveness has been limited by structural fragmentation and corruption in resource allocation.
International Recognition and Foreign Policy
The external situation adds to the complexity. Israel continued its operations in southern Syria and in the buffer zones of the Golan Heights, Quneitra Province, and Damascus Province. These actions have violated the country’s territorial integrity and created new flashpoints of tension, particularly among the Druze communities caught between the Syrian government and Israeli forces.
The United States has maintained a dual role. On the one hand, the Donald Trump administration opened a dialogue with Damascus, including hosting President Al-Sharaa at the White House and partially easing sanctions. On the other hand, the US has maintained its military presence in the northeast of the country in order to contain the resurgence of the Islamic State (a terrorist organisation banned in Russia) and ensure the security of Kurdish forces. Moreover, Washington offered Damascus coordination with the international anti-terrorism coalition to combat ISIS, which has exacerbated the ideological crisis within HTS itself. The Mufti of Azaz, Sheikh Abu Malik, accused Al-Sharaa of colluding with the Americans, labelled as “infidels.” Several field commanders have refused to follow orders from the centre, isolated uprisings have broken out, and HTS militants are rapidly losing their motivation to fight their former “brothers in faith” in ISIS, especially in areas where anti-American sentiment remains strong.
Turkey is strengthening its influence in the north of the country, transforming its military presence into long-term political and economic influence. Arab states have become more active through economic and humanitarian projects, without directly interfering in politics. Russia maintains military bases and a significant presence as a mediator in foreign policy dialogue.
Foreign Policy: Attempts at International Integration and Strategic Visits
The most notable outcome of 2025 was the legitimisation of Syria’s new leadership on the international stage, accompanied by a series of visits, negotiations, and diplomatic contacts at various levels.
President al-Sharaa made a number of important trips abroad. He visited the United States, becoming the first Syrian leader to be received at the White House in many years, after American authorities removed him from the list of individuals associated with terrorism. American officials described the move as a reflection of “the progress made by the Syrian leadership” and an opportunity to “begin normalising relations” between the countries.
As part of these contacts, al-Sharaa has also participated in regular high-level meetings, including a speech at the UN General Assembly, where he addressed the international community and voiced calls for the lifting of sanctions and the return of Syria “to the full international community.”
The Syrian leader’s visit to Moscow in the fall of 2025 marked a significant milestone. His meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin included discussions on strengthening bilateral cooperation in the political, economic, and military spheres. Despite the regime change, Russian-Syrian relations have retained their importance as a pillar of Damascus’s foreign policy.
Furthermore, the Syrian president participated in meetings with Arab leaders. High-ranking Saudi Arabian officials visited Damascus on numerous occasions, developing the dialogue on sanctions relief, economic recovery, and overall stabilisation. Arab countries, including the Gulf states, have opened channels for business visits, facilitating travel for entrepreneurs, and economic cooperation, including through mechanisms for investors and trading partners.
At international forums, particularly the Doha Summit, al-Sharaa met with regional leaders, including the Prime Minister of Lebanon and the Emir of Qatar, strengthening ties and discussing economic and strategic cooperation.
Turkey also took concrete steps: the Turkish Foreign Minister and other high-ranking Ankara officials made working visits to Syria to discuss security, reconstruction, counterterrorism, and deepening bilateral relations.
This diplomatic activity was accompanied by visits of Western officials, including EU delegations, who visited Damascus throughout 2025, expressing their readiness to expand cooperation and support the country’s reconstruction.
Taken together, these visits reflect Damascus’s desire to emerge from international isolation and build the network of external relations necessary for political and economic reintegration. However, they also highlight the complexity of the balance: Syria simultaneously seeks to restore relations with the West, deepen its partnership with Russia, strengthen strategic ties with Arab countries, and consider the interests of its main sponsors – Qatar and Turkey.
Conclusions and Forecast
In 2025, the new government in Syria failed to demonstrate an ability to create stable institutions, ensure public security, or establish mechanisms for social consensus. Competition between armed groups has made the country vulnerable to localised outbreaks of violence, ethno-confessional conflicts, and new waves of destabilisation, writes Nikolay Sukhov.
Competition between armed groups has left the country vulnerable to localised outbreaks of violence, ethno-religious conflicts, and new waves of destabilisation.
The economy remains in critical condition. Dilapidated infrastructure, limited access to resources, and unemployment have kept poverty levels high. The need for reconstruction significantly exceeds domestic financing. Without large-scale international assistance and institutional reforms, economic stagnation will exacerbate social tensions and displacement.
The social fabric has shattered: millions of internally displaced persons and refugees, marginalised youth, and low levels of trust between communities perpetuate cycles of instability. Ethno-religious enclaves remain flashpoints of conflict with the Islamist core.
Syrian foreign policy has been defined by attempts at international integration, but the balance remains complex. Israel maintains pressure on the south, the United States on the east, Turkey on the north, and Arab countries are expanding their economic and diplomatic contacts. President al-Shara’s visits to the United States, Russia, and Arab countries have demonstrated a desire to lift the country out of isolation, but simultaneously highlight the limitations of Damascus’s independent manoeuvring.
Syria’s medium-term prospects are determined by three key conditions. First, the creation of legitimate and effective institutions capable of uniting regional communities, ensuring security, and managing resources. Second, economic stabilisation through the restoration of infrastructure, stimulating domestic production, and job creation. Third, a strategic foreign policy that enables integration into international economic and political processes, reducing dependence on individual external actors.
If these conditions are not met, the country will find itself in long-term post-conflict stagnation, where the degradation of institutions, the economy, and the social fabric will create the risk of renewed violence. The successful fulfilment of these conditions could transform Syria into a resilient regional centre in slow, but steady recovery.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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