Where is the Middle East in this transformation?
As a region which often serves as a litmus test for global change, the Middle East entered an active phase of transformation roughly 15 years ago—earlier than many other regions. Long exposed to conflict and crisis, regional states are acutely aware of the costs of instability and increasingly rely on diplomacy, mediation, and pragmatic adaptation to mitigate risks.
Looking into the region several key characteristics of a newly formed regional system are already visible. Essentially, Middle Eastern political-security landscape is being reconfigured. Power is becoming more diffused, roles are getting more fluid, and threats are more multidimensional. So, the overarching trend can be described as a rise of regional autonomy/agency guided by increasing uncertainty and a multipolar logic.
Key features of the transforming Middle East include:
1. Genuine pragmatism
Regional states increasingly prioritize national interests while maintaining flexibility in partnerships. Traditional ties with the US and Europe remain important, but they no longer preclude building new ones, engaging with Russia, India, China, Iran, and Southeast Asia.
This approach reflects a desire to avoid overreliance on any single external actor. By expanding partnership networks, regional states seek to hedge risks and increase room for manoeuvre. Growing regional engagement—including normalization processes and renewed diplomatic channels—has contributed to a stronger regional voice that is increasingly difficult to disregard externally.
2. Transactionalism
Partnerships are becoming more issue-based and transactional. They have already become less predictable and with prioritization of short-term bilateral gains/cooperation which depends on pragmatic needs rather than ideology, alliances or long-term strategy. A good example here is GCC states pragmatism when they deal with Israel despite domestic public opinion, when they develop ties with Iran and Russia despite US and EU pressure not to do that, or when they selectively comply with certain Russia sanctions, while using ways to bypass them. This transactionalism is rooted in this very transformation period which is characterized by increased uncertainty. Such approach increases flexibility while also contributes to unpredictability.
3. Diversification
Risk-hedging through diversified partnerships has become a priority. Growing scepticism toward the Western “double standard” and inconsistent policies on issues of refugees, arms transfers, security guarantees, Israel-Palestine, etc., convinced regional countries to be more cautious. Now regional states increasingly avoid putting all their eggs in one basket and try to maintain balances for greater autonomy. It doesn’t imply radical change in relations with traditional partners, but signals that countries want to have a bigger room for autonomous actions, that do not necessarily undermine their old partnerships.
4. Careful neutrality and strategic hedging
Rather than formal neutrality, most Middle Eastern states are practicing strategic hedging within a fragmented international environment. This approach does not imply equidistance from all major powers, nor does it suggest the absence of external dependencies. Instead, it reflects an effort to preserve maximum flexibility under conditions of increased uncertainty.
The regional states have generally avoided explicit alignment choices, at least openly. Russia-West confrontation is a vivid example. While maintaining security cooperation with the US and Europe, they have not joined anti-Russian sanctions and have continued political and economic engagement with Russia and China. The majority of Arab rulers remain silent over recent US seizure of Maduro. This is not to say that regional states have become immune to any US pressure, but to underline that they chose not to take sides on global issues and to avoid being put in confronting camps under increased uncertainty.
It seems such behaviour is rooted in both ideological shift (multipolar logic) and in a calculated response to the shrinking predictability in great-power relations.
Countries of the region try to keep balances and to invest in multi-vector policy emphasizing their choice towards strategic autonomy trajectory and flexible partnerships. Undoubtedly, military-technical dependence on Western partners, exposure to regional escalation, and domestic political pressures impose clear limits on strategic autonomy and neutrality. However, such behaviour has already produced the cumulative effect—the emergence of informal norms favouring dialogue, diversification, mediation, and de-escalation. Therefore, today it may represent an early-stage trajectory toward greater collective agency, which later can transform in institutional neutrality.
5. Fragility
Despite adaptation, the region remains highly fragile and vulnerable to conflicts. Security challenges are no longer purely military; they have become multi-dimensional and include cybersecurity, food and water security, climate risks, domestic legitimacy, governance issues, economic resilience. In general, today’s risks come increasingly from internal weaknesses and governance failures, rather than exclusively from external threats.
Emerging opportunities
Under current conditions, the Middle East, particularly Gulf States, has a unique opportunity to position itself as a platform for genuine dialogue and mediation. They could also launch various expert-level initiatives involving scholars from opposing sides, potentially with support of the US, Russia and China in order to set the ground for uninterrupted dialog.
As previously neutral European states—such as Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland—ceased to be such, demand for alternative formats capable of accommodating conflict-specific sensitivities is likely to grow.
Ultimately, this may evolve into a renewed form of Non-Alignment Movement uniting neutral states around shared interests and strengthening regional cohesion.
Limitations
At the same time, the West should not be expected to abandon its attempts to put pressure on its Middle Eastern partners whether it is about Israel and Gaza or Iran and Russia. While many regional states have so far resisted this pressure, it still imposes real constraints.
Overreliance on the US and EU remains particularly strong in military-technical sphere. According to SIPRI’s 2024 annual report, five MENA countries—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait and the UAE—are among the top 11 global arms importers, accounting for 22.4% of global imports. Over 70% of their arms purchases come from the US and EU. And that is in addition to hosting US
and European
military bases. Basically, bigger part of the region outsources its security. It is quite clear that complete detachment from traditional Western partners is unrealistic.
At the same time, neither the US, nor the EU
are the region’s primary trade partners. Such imbalance is quite telling as it underscores MENA’s diversified external strategy.
That said, if Middle Eastern countries succeed in preserving their pragmatic approach, and in continuing their multi-vector policies, they will have more chances for gradual development and a smoother transition to a new architecture of international relations and security.
Fostering relations with everyone makes it possible to maintain a balance net and to rein in excesses. Therefore, multi-vector policy appears to be one of the major features of the emerging system.
In conclusion
As the world undergoes a prolonged and uncertain transformation, clarity about the final destination remains elusive. Middle Eastern states have entered this phase earlier than many others and have been adapting through constructive pragmatism, transactionalism, diversification and strategic hedging. These approaches reflect an understanding that future stability requires flexible, multi-vector diplomacy rather than rigid alignment, which they quite successfully utilize.
Even if this transition proves long-lasting, MENA countries have already begun to adjust, internalize lessons, and reduce risks. Other regions may want to look at the Middle East more closely as it offers valuable insights into policy behaviour and adaptive strategies that are likely to become increasingly relevant in coming years.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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