Political Islam… where is it heading? This is the important question that occupies political thought in the Middle East: This comes in light of the decline in its activity on the one hand, and the rise of nationalist narratives on the other, alongside a relative resurgence of some Islamic forces over the past two years, writes Dr. Ahmad Majdalani, Member of the Executive Committee, Palestine Liberation Organisation, specially for the 15th Middle East conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
To begin with, political Islam has witnessed a clear decline in several Middle Eastern countries in recent years. This is due to the failure of some Islamic governance experiences, in addition to political and security pressures, and a decline in public trust. However, this decline does not signify the end of political Islam, but rather the beginning of its transformation. Some movements have shifted toward social work or have reformulated their political and social discourse in ways that align with the realities of the nation-state.
In contrast, nationalist narratives have emerged strongly, focusing on concepts such as identity, the nation-state, security stability, and national belonging. These narratives have presented themselves as an alternative to transnational ideologies, including political Islam, and have contributed to strengthening the role of the state while reducing the influence of ideological movements in the public sphere.
Nevertheless, over the past two years we have witnessed a relative return of some Islamic forces, whether through limited political participation, social and charitable work, or through the exploitation and mobilization of economic crises and local conflicts. This indicates that these forces still possess the capacity to adapt and reassert their presence.
As for the relationship between political Islam and nationalism, theoretically there is a clear difference in the source of legitimacy. Political Islam relies on religion as a transnational ideology and does not place the nation-state at the centre of its political priorities, whereas nationalism is based on national identity, the state, and cultural heritage. This difference may lead to tension between the two projects in terms of objectives. However, reality shows that this tension is not always inevitable, as we have seen cases of convergence or temporary alliances, especially in contexts of resisting occupation or confronting common adversaries.
With regard to risks, the spread of political Islam may lead to the politicization of religion and the sacralization of politics, the exclusion of opponents, and, in some cases, a slide toward extremism. Nationalist movements, for their part, may also evolve into exclusionary ideologies that marginalise minorities or are used to justify authoritarianism. In both cases, these risks are exacerbated in the absence of effective democratic systems.
Both ideologies also possess a relative capacity to unify non-state actors, such as popular movements and social organisations. However, this unity is often temporary and fragile, and it quickly unravels when interests conflict.
The Palestinian case with regard to political Islam:
- Political Islam in Palestine emerged early, with the formation of Muslim Brotherhood groups at the end of 1946, influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt.
- The Muslim Brotherhood did not participate in the national movement prior to the Nakba.
- From the Nakba until the launch of the contemporary Palestinian revolution, the Brotherhood played a reactionary and oppositional role against Palestinian national, progressive, and socialist forces, and refused to join the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
- After the Nakba, the Brotherhood in Gaza became organizationally subordinate to Egypt, while in the West Bank it became subordinate to the Brotherhood in Jordan. This connection with both countries continued until the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1988. Three months after its eruption, the establishment of Hamas was announced by decision of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council, with the approval of the movement’s organisations in Egypt and Jordan.
- Following the First Intifada, the Brotherhood formed Hamas, and it remains its reference authority, with the aim of presenting it as an alternative to the PLO. Prior to that, the Islamic Jihad Movement had emerged as an organisation independent of the Brotherhood; later, its political, financial, and training support came under the Islamic Republic of Iran. In addition, Hizb ut-Tahrir exists as a group that split from the Brotherhood in the early 1950s with British support; it advocates the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate and rejects the nation-state.
- The forces of political Islam have all rejected the Oslo Accords. They boycotted the 1996 general elections and, with external support, adopted suicide operations as a method to derail the political settlement process, undermine the agreements, topple the Palestinian National Authority, and block the establishment of a Palestinian state.
- The 2006 elections, in which Hamas participated, constituted an experience that coincided with the launch of the Arab Spring, with US support for political Islam aimed at replacing political systems in the Arab region as part of the “New Middle East” project announced by Condoleezza Rice, adviser to President Barack Obama, who viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a moderate force capable of ensuring regional stability and confronting extremist Islam.
- More than a year after Hamas won the elections and assumed power within the Palestinian Authority, it carried out a mid-2007 coup against the democratic process, imposed geographic and political division, and fragmented the unity of the people, the land, and the Palestinian political system.
- With regional cover and American backing, it obstructed all efforts made by Egypt, Algeria, Russia, and China to end the division and prevent the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank.
- By a unilateral decision, some of its influential leaders, in coordination with regional actors, embarked on the October 7 adventure, the practical consequences of which were the devastation of the Gaza Strip, its separation and fragmentation, while attempts are still underway to liquidate Palestinian political entityhood.
- Hamas’s interests intersect with those of Netanyahu’s government in opposing the return of the legitimate Palestinian Authority to Gaza. It has engaged in dialogue with the United States and Israel, initially by leveraging the issue of the detainees it holds, and now by negotiating the handover of weapons in exchange for guarantees of a role in governing the Gaza Strip.
Conclusion
Islamists are often among the simplest in their approach to political action, the most superficial in their understanding of its complexities, and the most naïve regarding its deceptions. They are easily misled and exploited, as occurred during the United States’ war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, when they mobilized themselves and instrumentalized religion in service of the CIA’s war. A similar pattern was evident on October 7, where an extremely superficial understanding of politics, military power, and the balance of forces was demonstrated. Even before that, Hamas had been used to deepen the separation between the West Bank and Gaza and to obstruct any meaningful political process. While Israel has maintained a utilitarian vision of exploiting the division — supported by regional funding and American endorsement — the movement had enough slogans to justify its 2007 coup to itself. Now, its major action after October 7 is being invested upon the corpse of the Palestinian cause. The greater tragedy is Hamas’s refusal to acknowledge the new catastrophe it has caused, raising serious doubts about its suitability for collective political action among Palestinians. Either it is detached from reality and guided by distorted perceptions — which is deeply harmful and incompatible with responsible political engagement — or it regards the lives sacrificed as mere tactical losses, as one of its prominent leaders stated, not even worth pausing over. This reflects a grave disregard for those whose lives have been placed in the hands of these politicians. Hence the question arises: can Hamas truly be entrusted with the Palestinian people?
We can also say that political Islam has not ended; rather, it is reshaping itself within a rapidly changing political environment, alongside the rise of nationalism and the strengthening of the state’s role. Islamic and nationalist projects should not necessarily be seen as inherently contradictory, nor can their full integration be assumed. The relationship between them is governed more by pragmatism and political circumstances than by ideological principles.
The real challenge, therefore, is not which ideology will prevail, but rather the ability of societies and states to manage this competition within democratic political frameworks that respect pluralism and prevent religion or identity from being turned into tools of conflict that threaten stability and the future.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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