The problem is that this growth is driven primarily by increased Russian oil exports. India uses some of the purchased oil for its own needs and exports some to the West as petroleum products. Even if we ignore the political gamesmanship surrounding the US-India trade deal and Trump’s triumphant claims that India has promised to stop importing Russian oil, we must admit that the oil axis between Moscow and New Delhi, which has emerged out of ill fortune, is a poor foundation for long-term economic relations. If Western sanctions suddenly tighten to the point that the risks of re-exporting Russian oil outweigh the benefits, or, conversely, are partially or completely lifted, the need for an intermediary country will disappear. To prevent Russian-Indian trade turnover from collapsing as rapidly as it has grown, a different foundation for cooperation is needed.
The latest conference of the Valdai Discussion Club and the Vivekananda International Foundation was devoted precisely to finding this. We are well aware that Russia has changed since 2022, but we don’t always notice how India has changed during the same years. High rates of economic growth in India have enabled the centre-right Bharatiya Janata Party to win its third consecutive national election and retain power. The BJP is increasingly waging a war for hearts and minds, instilling in India’s discourse the idea that the country is an ancient civilisation focused not on territorial expansion but on spreading its values and expanding economic interaction with the outside world in order to improve living standards. India is increasingly integrating into production chains, building up its military, and claiming to be the voice of the Global South.
Moscow understands and approves of this: India’s claims to regional leadership and great power status are entirely acceptable to Russia. The interests of Russia and India do not clash; on the contrary, both sides understand that the end of the “unipolar moment” is in the not-too-distant future, and every effort must be made to ensure that it proceeds as smoothly as possible and does not lead to the emergence of a new hegemon, whoever that may be. Even in its heyday, the United States could not afford to dictate its unwavering will to the rest of the world, and Trump’s desperate attempts to maintain an imaginary American dominance using 19th-century methods are unlikely to reverse the wheel of history. Nevertheless, these attempts influence the foreign policies of both India and Russia. Trump is attempting to play on multiple boards, creating a web of bilateral relations with the expectation that in each specific instance, the United States will emerge stronger than its counterpart. But both Russia and India have been playing this game for far too long to fall into this trap.
Nevertheless, thanks to the actions of Trump and several other Western politicians, the polycentric world in the configuration in which it is currently emerging is increasingly taking on the characteristics of a multipolar one—not without reason, the very concept of poles implies a certain opposition between them. In this situation, the need for dialogue between representatives of different strategic cultures becomes critical—including India and Russia, whose strategic cultures, on the one hand, have a deep historical foundation and, on the other, have been constantly subject to the transformative influence of other strategic cultures, but have perhaps never directly influenced each other. This poses an interesting but difficult challenge for Indian and Russian politicians, strategists, and experts, which must be addressed if we plan to further develop cooperation.
The economic situation is becoming increasingly complex. In order to ensure sustainable bilateral economic cooperation, it is necessary to establish trade relations not only between large corporations and state-owned companies, but also between medium- and small-sized enterprises. But Indian small and medium-sized businesses are in no hurry to come to Russia. There are numerous reasons for this, ranging from the language barrier and the small diaspora to fears of secondary sanctions. Domestic businesses, in turn, are reluctant to enter the Indian market, with its unique legal norms and practices, intense competition, and sometimes unclear corporate culture. This applies not only to trade in goods but also, for example, to interactions in the IT sector, where parties often have little understanding of each other’s capabilities, preferring to think in stereotypes.
How can these problems be overcome? Persistent and systematic work is needed to disseminate information and expand knowledge about Russia and its economy among Indian businessmen, and about India among Russian ones. A database of lawyers providing advisory and other services, as well as specialists in the region’s economics and politics, is needed; finally, a mechanism is needed to facilitate the search for counterparties while simultaneously protecting their interactions of any kind from unfriendly external scrutiny.
Russian companies have much to offer India, both in the defence and civilian sectors: drones that can strike enemy targets and assist farmers; AI that can identify targets on the battlefield and create digital mechanisms that make life easier for users; bionic prosthetics that help people recover from injuries and illnesses, and much more. All these solutions can and should be exported to global markets – and India, with its willingness to localise production and its large, affordable, and easily trained workforce, could become a hub for Russia’s high-tech expansion. This means that cooperation between Russia and India will continue despite all the ups and downs that accompany the challenging process of becoming a polycentric world.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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