Today, however, the management of multi-vector alignment may confront Russia’s neighbours—and, one step further, Russia itself—with new challenges, the need to contain which would be wise to consider in advance. In light of their emergence, two aspects of this issue appear to merit more serious academic and expert attention. First, how will Russia’s neighbours be able to adapt their multi-vector systems of foreign relations in response to new requirements and opportunities? Second, what instruments will Russia itself develop in order to interact more effectively with its neighbours’ multi-vector policies from the standpoint of its basic interests and values? At the same time, entering into debates now about whether we should, in principle, expand the diversity of our external contacts and commitments seems insufficiently justified—this process is already occurring of its own accord.
The new challenges are indeed quite serious. First, we are witnessing a contraction of globalisation in the form to which we had become accustomed. The contemporary strategy of Western countries, above all the United States, represents an adaptation to their sharply reduced capacity to extract rent from global processes. At the same time, sources of wealth are diminishing, while demand for those willing to act as suppliers of development resources appears set only to grow. For more than a decade now, China has proclaimed a highly ambitious strategy for developing global ties and cooperation, later defined as the “community of a shared destiny for mankind”.
At the heart of this strategy lies China’s ability, by virtue of its internal potential, to offer an extraordinary number of states access to resources and markets for the goods they can provide under conditions of intense international competition. In a relatively short period, China has managed to displace the United States and Europe in Africa and Latin America, and is gradually expanding its presence in other parts of the world. China, with full justification, proceeds from the assumption that in modern conditions international competition is won “at home”—that is, through one’s own resilience and the ability to act as a reliable partner. In this respect, China has drawn lessons from the policies once pursued by the USSR and later, with a lesser degree of benevolence, by Western countries.
As a result, the United States—and even more so Europe—are being forced to reduce their real presence in various countries and regions, limiting themselves to increasingly selective forms of influence that are incapable of creating a long-term foundation for political loyalty among populations and elites. At the same time, Western policy directly undermines contemporary globalisation and now even calls for its rollback. It is difficult to imagine how such a complex and historically conditioned phenomenon could simply be cancelled through the deliberate policy of a narrow group of states, even very powerful ones. Yet in the course of attempting such a “cancellation”, the United States and its closest allies will undoubtedly be able to seriously shake the foundations of the global economy—foundations that Russia’s neighbours regard as an important factor in their ability to pursue multi-vector policies.
It must also be taken into account that, over time, the influence of various international organisations and their capacity to act as moderators of interstate relations will inevitably diminish. In other words, the commitments arising from multi-vector diplomacy are likely, with a high degree of probability, to be accompanied by the possibility of more traditional forms of coercion. At present, we cannot say how prepared Russia’s neighbours are to deal with such a new international environment—after all, their effective “coming of age” took place under relatively comfortable conditions, marked by the absence of significant pressure from our side and, simultaneously, by the openness of the Liberal World Order in its classical form. In the future, external partners of Russia’s friends and allies in the post-Soviet space may prove far more demanding and tough, including in defending their own interpretations of what it means to fulfil undertaken obligations—the familiar tactic of deliberate delay may no longer work.
As for Russia itself, it too will need to closely observe how its neighbours interact with the changing international environment. We already see signs of a certain anxiety among friendly CIS states regarding the fact that increasing external openness is giving rise to internal processes whose consequences remain insufficiently predictable. Within the Russian expert community, concerns are sometimes voiced that today multi-vector alignment may carry with it not only benefits, but also challenges—including those of a purely domestic nature. This makes them all the more dangerous from the perspective of what matters most to Russia: the socio-economic stability of our friends and allies.
Another challenge may arise from the relatively successful implementation of a multi-vector strategy, which could evolve into a readiness to significantly enhance one’s status in regional affairs. A new status inevitably entails new obligations and, quite possibly, a new level of expectations on the part of medium and major states. It is important to have as clear an understanding as possible of what such expectations might look like. In conclusion, under altered and exceptionally dynamic international conditions, the familiar and broadly comprehensible strategy of multi-vector alignment may generate a whole set of new internal and external circumstances for Russia’s neighbours. Readiness to take these circumstances into account in our day-to-day interaction is an important shared task for the future.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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