Security issues in Europe are undergoing both real-world and conceptual changes. On a real-world level, the region is in the midst of a severe political crisis. Its epicentre is the Ukraine conflict, and its core lies in the contradictions between Russia and NATO countries on a wide range of issues. These real-world factors, in turn, have led to a conceptual crisis of the idea of European security as it had evolved over several decades. At its core was the premise that security dilemmas in Europe could be resolved through a system of fundamental principles, international treaties, and institutions that would preclude the possibility of military conflict.
Today, the European security architecture lies in ruins. In Russia, the focus has shifted from a European to a Eurasian perspective, which in itself has represented a major shift in the country’s foreign policy thinking. The country’s foreign policy identity is shifting away from a focus on Europe and, more broadly, the West. Hopes for building a sustainable security architecture are now pinned on Eurasia. However, the crisis of the concept of European security and its architectural projects is unlikely to mean the end of the problem of security in Europe as such. By promoting the idea of a security architecture in Eurasia, Russia will face the problem of security in Europe. In the near future, the way to manage risks to European security will be a balance of power, both on the part of the collective West and on the part of Russia.
In its current form, the problem of European security is defined by the risk of direct or indirect conflict between Russia and the Western states united by the North Atlantic Alliance. In this form, the immediate roots of the problem lie in the Yalta-Potsdam system, which emerged as a result of World War II. Its components were (a) the resolution of the German question through the partitioning of Germany; (b) the de facto division of Europe into two ideological camps – a socialist bloc led by the USSR and a so-called “liberal democratic” bloc led by the United States; (c) the military-political formation of the two camps in the form of military-political alliances – the Warsaw Pact and NATO.
In terms of problems, one could speak of a security dilemma between the two blocs: their relations were characterised by antagonism and mutual fear of military aggression, as well as reliance on military deterrence as a means of resolving the problem. Deterrence was based on the balance of power, characterised by a constant nuclear and conventional arms race. The ability of both sides to maintain a balance of power became an important factor in preventing a new war in Europe. Although the rivalry between the USSR and the US was global and extended far beyond the geographical borders of Europe, it was there that the largest military contingents were concentrated, and it was there that the largest battles, including those involving nuclear weapons, would have taken place in the event of war.
It is natural that it was in the European context that the concept of a European security architecture emerged—that is, a system of ethical, political, and legal norms and institutions that resolve, or at least mitigate, the security dilemma. The very idea of resolving the security dilemma through the creation of such an architecture has a lengthy intellectual tradition. The European region had been torn apart by wars for centuries, yet by the 17th century it had already transformed into a space of advanced military technology and the economic systems that underpinned it. The beginnings of the concept of security architecture in its relatively modern (modernist) form can be found in the works of 18th and 19th century French and German philosophers. Even then, it was clear that the balance of power was temporary and would not solve the problem of war in the long term. However, despite the abundance of ideas, building a security system in Europe never came to fruition. The 20th century became the apotheosis of military crises. At the peak of the Cold War, it became increasingly clear that another war would leave Europe as smoking embers.
Interestingly, during the Cold War, European security began to be determined for the first time by non-European actors. Strictly speaking, the key rivals were two powers that geographically did not fit entirely into Europe and for whom Europeanness did not exhaustively define their identity. The United States was located on another continent. Its political identity was built on a rejection of “despotic” Europe, although its political, philosophical, and cultural ties to Europe were strong. The very idea of American democracy was based on the concepts of the French Enlightenment, and its culture was shaped by European ethnicities in all their diversity. Culturally, the United States remained rooted in Europe, although it had politically emerged as a powerful player beyond its borders. Russia (and later the USSR) entered the European subcontinent from the East. But as it expanded, Russia gradually advanced deeper into Eurasia in the North, East, and South. Geographically, Russia expanded beyond Europe, and the specifics of its expansion were clearly different from the colonial expansion of the European empires. More importantly, long before its rapid advance across Eurasia, Russia clearly stood outside Europe as a Christian community. Its Christian identity differed from the Catholic and then Protestant code. It was influenced by intensive interaction with Eastern cultures. In Europe itself, despite its political disunity, Muscovite Rus’, and later Russia, were perceived as the “significant other”. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Russia began to intensively borrow Europe’s technology, military organisation and industrial methods. The combination of such borrowings with its own algorithms of political development saved Russia from the fate of China during the Opium Wars. Russia was a powerful military player, actively participating in European politics. But it never became truly European. The Europeanisation of the elite during the imperial period, and then modernisation in the 20th century through socialism—the European political doctrine—did not help. The country remained politically distinct, despite periodic attempts to establish itself within Europe.
Thus, during the Cold War in the second half of the 20th century, the European region found itself caught between two external players, around whom a pool of European allies had formed. In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe marked a major step toward the formation of a European security architecture. Its key characteristic was the recognition of the borders that emerged after the end of World War II. However, the end of the Cold War was determined not so much by the movement toward a new European security architecture as by the growing backwardness and crisis in the USSR and the Soviet bloc as a whole. An exit from the Cold War through mutual agreements with the enemy and the formation of a security architecture in Europe seemed like a reasonable option for a “soft landing” for the USSR. This could have allowed it to take a break and concentrate its resources on domestic development. However, this “soft landing” turned into “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” The USSR and the socialist bloc simply ceased to exist.
For several years after the collapse of the USSR, it seemed that the security dilemma in Europe had been resolved. Russia remained a major nuclear power, but was in a profound crisis. Moreover, it aspired to become part of the Western community. However, the new system soon began to falter. The key problem was its inability to be fully inclusive of Russia. NATO remained as a military alliance. Moreover, former Soviet allies, and then its former republics, began to integrate into the Alliance. The European Union increasingly became NATO’s junior partner. Simultaneously, the key normative and institutional foundations of the European security architecture, established at the end of the Cold War, began to erode: the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and began developing missile defence infrastructure in Europe, NATO countries failed to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty, and the work of the OSCE became increasingly politicised, particularly with regard to the third basket—democracy and human rights. Despite the physical reduction of military contingents in Europe, the number of interventions by NATO or its members in conflicts both within Europe and beyond is growing. Russia’s initiative to conclude a European Security Treaty is not receiving widespread support in the West. The politicisation of electoral processes in post-Soviet countries, linked to the movement of individual countries toward Euro-Atlantic integration, is becoming an irritant. Ukraine is becoming a focal point of tensions. The events of 2014 indicate a severe crisis in the European security architecture as it existed at the end of the Cold War. The launch of the Special Military Operation in 2022 signals its final collapse.
The crisis of the European security architecture was one of the reasons for Russia’s shift from Europe to Eurasia. However, this was hardly the only reason. Long before Moscow’s initiative for a Eurasian security system emerged, Russian diplomacy was vigorously expanding its efforts to the east and south. Russia managed to resolve its security dilemma with China by including the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation in 2001. Russia became a key member of the SCO and BRICS. It retained its key role in security issues in Central Asia. At the same time, international relations themselves were characterised by the rise of new centres of power such as India and China. Global politics has become increasingly less Western-oriented, although Western countries, particularly the United States, retain significant military, industrial, and technological potential, and Western investment played a crucial role in the modernisation of these new centres of power. A critical mass of players has emerged in Eurasia, ready to discuss algorithms for equal and indivisible security, subject to mutual respect for national sovereignty and the diversity of domestic systems. Moreover, initiatives have begun to emerge among them that are close in spirit to the Russian idea of Eurasian security, and therefore have the potential for synergy. This includes, for example, the Chinese global security project. The Russian initiative is only taking its first steps. Work lies ahead to calibrate the normative and, perhaps, institutional foundations of the new architecture. But it already demonstrates a significant shift in foreign policy orientations.
Can a Eurasian architecture solve Europe’s problems? The Russian idea encompasses the entire geographical continent of Eurasia, including its westernmost part. But in practice, in the foreseeable future, it will be more relevant to other parts of the continent. Western institutions are unlikely to agree to support the Russian initiative, betting on exhausting and strategically defeating Russia.
Does this mean that the term “European security” should be forgotten and erased from the lexicon? No. If only because, having failed as an architectural idea, European security remains a practical problem for Russia. The failure of the idea of a European security architecture has led to the formation of an asymmetric bipolarity in the region, once again defined by the rivalry between Russia and the West. The security dilemma in Europe remains unresolved, and the balance of power and deterrence are once again becoming key factors in preventing a major war. The concept of European security has once again returned to the status of a problem without an architecture for its solution. The success of the Eurasian security architecture initiative will largely determine whether it is possible to tame the anarchic nature of international relations and, at least temporarily, transcend Hobbesian fear and the “war of all against all”.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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