During the first decades of the UN’s existence, it became clear that this arrangement had a downside. Between 1946 and 1960, it was the USSR that became the principal beneficiary of the mechanism, exercising the veto more than 70 times—while the other powers rarely used it. The Soviet side justified its frequent vetoes as necessary to protect the world from decisions imposed by a Western majority in the UNSC.
With the end of bipolar confrontation, hopes emerged for more compromise-based solutions. Indeed, in the 1990s the UNSC demonstrated rare unity, for example in authorising peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Somalia and Mozambique, as well as missions in Angola and El Salvador. However, by the early 2000s it had become clear that the great powers would not renounce their right to block decisions affecting their interests. China and Russia increasingly used the veto in matters related to intervention and regime change. The United States, for its part, used it to shield its allies in the Middle East. Thus, the veto once again became a symbol of systemic competition. Between 2007 and 2024, Russia exercised the veto 36 times, China 26 times, the United States 8 times, while the United Kingdom and France did not use it at all.
At the same time, the veto remains a safeguard against the majority’s arbitrary will. Without it, the Council could become a tool of majority pressure upon the minority. Notably, questions about revising voting procedures are also being debated within the EU, where proposals have been made to abandon the principle of unanimity in favour of qualified majority voting. Such an approach may increase the speed of decision-making, but it is also likely to provoke resistance from states that see it as a threat to their sovereignty. For the UN, which is responsible for dealing with issues of war and peace, such a scenario would be doubly risky.
Second, the veto has given rise to a system of checks and balances that encourages the search for compromise. The negotiation process has become complex and protracted, yet this is what allows to ensure that all are on the same page when it comes to the most sensitive issues—something particularly important during a period of transformation in the international system. Third, the veto serves as a symbol of responsibility: the great powers alone bear the burden of averting direct conflict among themselves, and it is this mechanism that prevents systemic collapse.
Today, criticism of the veto institution rests on several arguments. Its inefficiency in times of crisis is frequently highlighted. In particular, the Security Council’s inability to adopt unanimous decisions on Syria, Ukraine and Palestine is seen as evidence of institutional deadlock. Attention is also drawn to the unequal way privileges are distributed. For example—states of the Global South argue that the current balance of power does not reflect the multipolar reality of the 21st century. India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria and other actors have called for an expansion of permanent UNSC membership.
Since the early 2000s, various UNSC reform proposals have been discussed. In the year marking the UN’s 80th anniversary, debate over the need for reform has intensified. For example, the French have promoted an initiative to limit the use of the veto in cases of full-blown humanitarian crisis. However, no consensus has been reached. As a result, reform remains more a rhetorical tool than a practical prospect. The “Big Five” are unlikely to agree to self-restraint that would diminish their global influence. Moreover, the very logic of contemporary international competition reinforces the role of the veto: it is increasingly becoming a key mechanism for defending strategic interests.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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