The situation surrounding Iran inspires little optimism. Instead, it fosters a kind of fatalism among all parties—a mind-set that risks defining the geopolitical climate for years to come, writes Ivan Timofeev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
The massive Israeli and US airstrikes on Iran hardly came as a complete surprise. For several months, the US-Israeli strike force had been concentrating in the Persian Gulf. Tense negotiations between Iran and the United States had stalled and were unlikely to yield progress.
The deaths of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, members of his family, and a number of senior military and political figures have sent shockwaves through the region. In response, Iran has launched retaliatory missile strikes against Israel and US infrastructure in the area. The military operation has already disrupted maritime oil shipments in the Persian Gulf and caused significant damage to the financial and transport infrastructure of economic hubs in the UAE and Qatar. Despite this, Iran stands a reasonable chance of withstanding the assault, as a full-scale ground invasion appears unlikely. However, the strikes will further erode the country’s industrial base, deepen its economic crisis, and increase the impoverishment of its population. Should Iran manage to endure this round of aggression, it is unlikely to be the last—unless the cost of the current invasion proves prohibitive for all parties involved. The situation offers several important lessons for Russia.
Lesson 1: Sanctions are followed by the use of military force
The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. While Iran has withstood this economic pressure, the damage has been significant. It grew further as Washington succeeded in expanding the coalition of sanctioning countries, internationalising restrictions through the UN Security Council, and persuading third countries to halt purchases of Iranian oil. Throughout this period, the US and its allies consistently paired sanctions with military force—evident in operations in 1980, 1987, and 2025, as well as special operations targeting nuclear engineers and intelligence officers, cyberattacks, and military threats. This pattern has been applied elsewhere: Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Venezuela.
For now, direct military force against Russia remains unlikely, largely due to fears of nuclear escalation. Nevertheless, force is being applied indirectly through large-scale aid to Ukraine, including regular Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory. Despite the recent defeat of Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, further military strikes are possible. Ongoing military modernisation among European NATO members increases the likelihood of confrontation along NATO-Russia contact zones—particularly in the Baltic region. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons could be undermined if the West convinces itself that Russia would not risk using them for fear of a nuclear response. In this context, military crises between Russia and the West are a real possibility.
Lesson 2: Western pressure will be long-term
For years, a strategy of gradual attrition has been employed against Iran. While economic pressure through sanctions once dominated, recent months have seen a shift toward military attrition through repeated strikes. These do not involve large-scale ground operations or occupation; instead, they rely on missile and bomb attacks that steadily degrade the target’s military-industrial capacity. With each new round of escalation, Iran’s ability to resist weakens further. For now, Tehran retains the capacity to launch painful retaliatory strikes, but each subsequent round risks diminishing that capability.
Russia must therefore prepare for the long-term application of sanctions—measured not in years, but in decades. Occasional easing of certain restrictions is unlikely to lead to their full removal, especially in sensitive areas such as dual-use export controls. A similar logic applies to the military dimension. Any lull in hostilities in Ukraine or elsewhere will likely be followed by a new military crisis.
Lesson 3: Concessions do not work
Throughout its confrontation with the United States, Iran has made concessions on several occasions. The most prominent example is the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231. In exchange for sanctions relief, Iran accepted significant limitations on its nuclear programme. Yet just three years later, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the deal and imposed new demands. The concessions bought only a brief respite and ultimately failed to alleviate long-term US pressure.
In the current context of negotiations over Ukraine, Russia has shown notable firmness. This may draw criticism from those seeking peace at any cost, particularly as the conflict continues to claim lives and resources. However, given that compromise often invites demands for further concessions, such stubbornness is understandable—especially when trust between Russia, the United States, and Ukraine is virtually non-existent. The Iranian experience only reinforces this caution.
Lesson 4: Leaders in the crosshairs
The attack on Iran underscores a troubling trend: legitimate leaders and senior officials are becoming priority targets. The earlier kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signalled this shift. Assassinations of leaders have occurred in wartime before—one need only recall the Soviet storming of Amin’s palace in 1979 or the killings of Libyan and Iraqi leaders during US-led interventions. However, such deaths were often incidental. In Iran, we witness the deliberate targeting of the Supreme Leader, his family, and numerous officials.
Russia is acutely aware of the threat to its President and high-ranking officials. Assassination attempts and acts of sabotage have already been carried out on Russian territory. The Iranian example confirms that protecting national leadership is no longer solely a task for intelligence services, but one that involves the armed forces as well. Gaps in counterintelligence, personal security, air defence, and broader military preparedness can leave leaders dangerously exposed.
Lesson 5: Internal unrest invites external intervention
Shortly before the airstrikes, Iran experienced mass protests driven by internal contradictions and economic hardship. Clashes between demonstrators and security forces resulted in numerous deaths. These protests were exploited by Iran’s adversaries and likely interpreted as a sign of political fragility—an invitation to strike while the system appeared vulnerable. As seen in Libya and elsewhere, external intervention can precipitate the collapse of weakened political structures.
The collapse of the USSR demonstrates that internal economic decay and societal divisions can lead to disaster even without external intervention. Effective governance, timely reform, and trust between state and society are essential to maintaining stability. Cracks within society or the elite are tantamount to an invitation for increased external pressure.
Lesson 6: “Black knights” are important—but not enough
Despite comprehensive sanctions, Iran succeeded in maintaining trade relations with several countries—referred to in sanctions literature as “black knights.” In the 1980s and 1990s, Iranian oil was sold at discounted prices to buyers in Western and Southern Europe, Turkey, Syria, Japan, India, and China. The US invested enormous diplomatic capital to reduce these flows, yet never fully succeeded. Iran lost revenue but preserved a degree of foreign trade. However, this network offered no protection against military strikes. “Black knights” can mitigate economic pressure, but they do not prevent military intervention.
Russia has similarly reoriented its trade under sanctions, with exports to China, India, and other friendly nations growing rapidly. Yet mutual military-political obligations remain absent. Russia will likely have to confront adversaries alone, with the recent exception of North Korean involvement in countering Ukrainian operations in the Kursk region. Moreover, Russia bears sole responsibility for the security of its CSTO allies—a burden that only grows heavier.
Lesson 7: The demand for a balance of power
Unlike many previous targets of US military action, Iran is far from defenceless. In 2025, Tehran responded with domestically produced missiles and drones, and it is doing so again today. While it is too early to assess their precision and effectiveness, the US and Israel appear to view the damage from Iranian retaliation as acceptable—so far. Yet Iran has also taken steps previously considered extreme, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz to navigation. The US Navy may eventually restore safe passage, but doing so will require time and resources, and success is not guaranteed—especially if Iran remains resilient.
Russia possesses far greater capabilities to counter potential strikes on its territory. Nuclear deterrence aside, Moscow has the means to inflict significant damage across multiple domains and directions. Still, the mere existence of such capabilities does not guarantee that an adversary will not deem the cost of retaliation acceptable. As history has shown, sensitivity to damage can shift under sustained political pressure. The situation surrounding Iran inspires little optimism. Instead, it fosters a kind of fatalism among all parties—a mind-set that risks defining the geopolitical climate for years to come.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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