The distribution of grounds for the issuance of residence permits shows that Russian migrants fit within the broader EU migration framework. The principal motives for obtaining a residence permit are employment (approximately 34 per cent of cases), family reunification (around 26.4 per cent), education (roughly 14.3 per cent), and other grounds, including humanitarian statuses (about 25.6 per cent). This indicates a high level of professional mobility among Russian migrants.
The growth in residence permits signals a profound transformation of Russian migration—from temporary movements towards a sustained reorientation to long-term residence in EU Member States. This renders the Russian migration wave one of the key factors shaping Europe’s demographic and social dynamics after 2022.
This character of Russian migration fundamentally distinguishes it from traditional flows originating in regions affected by humanitarian crises. The issue concerns not low-skilled labour, but mobile specialists capable of rapid integration into host economies. For the EU, this represents partial compensation for demographic ageing and labour shortages, particularly in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states.
However, despite evident economic and demographic benefits, migration from Russia is viewed by the European Union primarily through a security lens. This dimension has become dominant since 2022, as strategic confrontation between Russia and the EU has extended beyond diplomatic and military logic into spheres of civilian mobility, information flows, and cross-border connections. European security services identify several risks: the potential infiltration of personnel affiliated with Russian state structures, possible activity of “pro-Russian” networks, the use of diasporas for political influence, and cybersecurity threats. These risks explain the tightening of visa policy, the requirement for multi-layered vetting of applicants, and closer coordination among EU Member States.
At the same time, a strategic paradox characterises migration: notwithstanding perceived risks, it delivers advantages to the EU that would be undesirable for Russia in the long term. Thus, managed Russian migration becomes a subtle instrument of political balancing, strengthening the EU in strategic competition with Russia.
Notably, Russian migration remains a comparatively low-conflict issue within much of the EU. Unlike flows from Africa or the Middle East, it does not generate large-scale public anxieties, is seldom actively instrumentalised by far-right parties, and rarely becomes a source of social tension. Russian migrants generally exert limited pressure on social infrastructure, and their profile is perceived as less politically sensitive.
However, this assessment applies primarily to Western and Northern Europe. The eastern flank—namely the Baltic states, Poland, and Bulgaria—demonstrates a different perception. Here, historical, cultural, and political factors render Russian migration a sensitive issue closely linked to national security considerations.
Bulgaria provides a particularly illustrative case. As one of the EU’s external borders, a state in a strategically vulnerable position, and a country with a complex history of relations with Russia, it perceives migration processes not through the logic of economics or demographics, but through the prism of security.
First, Bulgaria forms part of the EU and NATO’s eastern “security belt”. This implies that the entire system of mobility control in the region must operate as a unified filter preventing transit risks, including potential hybrid threats. Bulgaria integrates visa policy towards Russian citizens into a broader strategy of deterrence and border reinforcement, a tendency especially visible following the reform of the Schengen area.
Secondly, at the level of domestic politics, Sofia now devotes increased attention to Russian presence in the country. Bulgaria is undergoing profound political transformations, and debates concerning Russia, the EU, NATO, and security play a central role. In this context, migration becomes a symbol of political identity: a firm line towards Russian citizens is interpreted as confirmation of loyalty to the Euro-Atlantic line.
Thirdly, Bulgaria is part of a region where Russian cultural influence has historically been significant and where public opinion is often polarised. This creates a specific context in which migration from Russia is not merely a matter of administrative regulation and security, but also a catalyst for the characteristic intra-political divide seen in many former socialist states—whether to align with or oppose Russia.
Thus, the EU’s eastern flank both reinforces and complicates the European migration architecture. Here, migration from Russia is perceived not as a demographic opportunity, but as an element of strategic competition, a potential instrument of interference, and a factor capable of altering the balance of power.
Measures adopted by the European Union to restrict the visa regime for Russian citizens after 2022 led to a sharp reduction in the number of visas issued and produced a fundamental change in the structure of travel from Russia to the EU. The suspension of the Visa Facilitation Agreement in 2022 resulted in the application of the general rules of the Visa Code, entailing higher fees, more extensive documentation requirements, longer processing times, and increased scrutiny of each applicant.
The most significant structural change, introduced at the end of 2025, was the effective prohibition on issuing multiple-entry visas to Russian citizens. In practice, this means that Russian nationals must now generally apply for a new visa for each separate trip to the EU. The stated objective is to ensure “frequent and thorough screening of applicants” in order to reduce potential security risks associated with the “weaponisation of migration” and hybrid threats. This considerably complicates travel for businesspersons, frequent tourists, and individuals with family ties.
It should also be noted that EU policy is not fully uniform. Countries traditionally attractive to Russian tourism within the Schengen area, even after the events of 2022, have been guided by their own needs and interests in deciding whether to issue visas to Russian citizens. Italy, France, and Spain remain the principal issuers of multiple-entry visas, whereas the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Finland apply significantly stricter measures, including near-complete restrictions on entry. This asymmetry creates differing “access points” to the Schengen zone.
The visa restrictions introduced by the European Union in respect of Russian citizens—including the suspension of the Visa Facilitation Agreement in 2022 and the tightening of rules on multiple-entry visas from 2025—have prompted serious debate regarding their compatibility with both the Schengen Visa Code and broader democratic principles, particularly in relation to non-discrimination and individual assessment.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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