The “bright prospects” Kim Jong-un spoke of at the opening of the congress now appear to be a concrete plan for integrating North Korea into a new multipolar reality, where “self-reliance” is complemented by reliance on the support of its Eurasian partners, writes Georgy Toloraya.
The Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), which concluded in late February 2026, marked a bifurcation point in the transformation of North Korean statehood. Pyongyang, having learned its recent geopolitical lessons, has abandoned the pursuit of normalisation with the West and embraced the ideology of a sovereign nuclear power, whose future is inextricably linked to the formation of a multipolar world in close alliance with Russia. The military and foreign policy doctrine approved by the congress, the rejection of the concept of reunification with the South, the “20×10” economic project, and the generational change of leadership are elements of Kim Jong-un’s unified strategy, raising the question of the formation of a new ideology of Kim Jong-unism.
Congress of Victors and New Tasks
On February 19-25, 2026, the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held in Pyongyang – an event that came at the end of a difficult period. Five years ago, when the previous, Eighth Congress was held, conditions were “so severe that it was literally difficult to preserve oneself” due to “the increasingly barbaric blockade and sanctions imposed by hostile forces, the successive natural disasters, and the global health crisis” (pandemic).
The current congress celebrated the triumph of Kim Jong-un’s “steel fighting spirit” and “tested leadership”, declaring that “never before has there been such a summing up of the work of the reporting period with countless, precious victories that will go down in the country’s history as we are doing now.” The main leitmotif was the “comprehensive development of socialism” based on self-reliance, but within a fundamentally different geopolitical context—in the context of a deep strategic alliance with Moscow and Beijing, a choice of sides in the geopolitical struggle for a new world order, and a doctrinal rejection of interaction with South Korea. In a context where the global security architecture and the very practice of international relations are crumbling, and Northeast Asia is turning into a zone of direct confrontation between blocs, Pyongyang’s decisions extend far beyond its domestic agenda. Symbolically, the congress, by proclaiming an irreconcilable and independent concept of nuclear sovereignty in opposition to the Western “centre of the world”—unlike Iran’s conciliatory position, which led it to catastrophe—was a signal to the world on the eve of US aggression in the Middle East.
Ideological shift toward “Kimjongunism” and the new national idea of the “Joseon nation”
In his speeches at the congress, Kim Jong-un, while appealing to Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, employed concepts and notions that can be qualified as the formulation of a new ideology. This is not simply the development of Juche ideas, but an ideology of the “conventionalisation” of the DPRK as a powerful, independent entity that no longer needs either dialogue with the West or interaction with the South. The central element of this ideology (complementing the previous ones—Juche and Songun—of the leader’s grandfather and father) is “Worshiping the people as heaven.” Kim Jong-un has updated this slogan, giving it practical meaning—creating the image of a leader who prioritises the practical interests of the population, personally inspecting housing and factory construction in the provinces, and demanding that party members “serve the people.”
A key ideological element was the break with the illusion of unification with the South. South Korea’s status as the “No. 1 enemy state” was cemented. This means that the DPRK is not a temporary project to prepare for the takeover of South Korea, but an established “nation-state,” whose national idea is the well-being and development of the North Korean nation. The congress stated: “The conditions for ties with the ROK have been completely eliminated, and we will under no circumstances restore the erroneous past.” The Korean Peninsula is moving from the phase of “unfinished civil war” to a phase of interstate containment. Symbolically, figures who personified the previous policy of dialogue have been excluded from the party leadership. The South Korean media has expressed deep concern, seeing this as the preparation of an ideological basis for the possible use of nuclear weapons, since the conflict with the South is now qualified not as a civil war, but as an interstate clash. We are inclined to see “pragmatic realism” in this.
International Context: The DPRK’s Place in the “Global Majority”
As expected, the congress emphasised the “permanent, irreversible consolidation of the Republic’s nuclear-armed status”. The DPRK is no longer willing to give up its nuclear status. This is a reality that the international community will have to reckon with when building a new security architecture.
In Eurasia, the DPRK stands as a forward bulwark against the “trilateral alliance” of the United States, Japan, and South Korea and can no longer be classified as an “isolated pariah”. Speeches at the congress clearly envisioned the country as part of the emerging Eurasian pole, which resonates with the concept of a global majority and polycentricity. Speaking about “building a just, multipolar world”, Kim stated bluntly: “Our country stands at the centre of that world.” This introduces an element of long-term predictability: the regime is not seeking integration into the Western system, and is building a parallel reality. Rapprochement with Russia, enshrined in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, plays a key role.
Contrary to Western predictions, the congress did not directly mention the alliance with Russia, which has already become a permanent element of North Korea’s global positioning, requiring no further mention. Instead, it spoke of “the steady development of traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with neighbouring countries at a higher level,” emphasising North Korea’s status as an independent power pole, without turning it into a “junior partner” in the eyes of its own population, and also preventing Beijing’s jealousy. A parade of participants in the Kursk Region battles carrying Russian flags became a symbol of the alliance. Kim did not forget the United States either, noting that “Western forces led by the United States are the main culprit for the current international situation moving in a more chaotic direction”… rightly recalling that this “is not new for us, but only a continuation and extension of hooligan and hegemonic behaviour”. Nevertheless, a dialogue on equal terms with the United States is not excluded for the DPRK: if “the United States respects the current status of our state, enshrined in the DPRK Constitution, and abandons its hostile policy against the DPRK, then we will have no reason not to get closer to the United States.” At the same time, recent stories show that for the United States, diplomatic dialogue is only a cover for preparing for a military solution, and the DPRK has been considered one of several potential targets for decades. Kim is unlikely to forget this, even if we discount the North Koreans’ habitual hyper-suspiciousness.
Nuclear deterrence as a constant and the status of a global military-technical player
The adopted new five-year arms development programme marks the DPRK’s transition to creating a high-tech, world-class army. It is planned to “increase the level of combat readiness of the nuclear combat armed forces… and the use of the ‘nuclear trigger’ – a unified nuclear crisis response system…” (this may require nuclear tests). Pyongyang intends to simultaneously develop conventional weapons: “intercontinental land- and submarine-based ballistic missile systems, the power of which is further enhanced by the integration of accumulated technologies, various unmanned strike systems incorporating AI-focused technology, highly powerful electronic warfare systems capable of paralysing enemy command centres, and more advanced reconnaissance satellites.” The 2026-2030 plan aims to achieve “absolute military-technical superiority”. “Prospective plans for the creation of new secret strategic weapons” capable of not only deterring but also dominating the technological race have been approved. This statement was supported by an unprecedented military parade, which showcased prototypes indicating a profound qualitative transformation of the North Korean military machine.
The 9th Congress approved a plan to build a series of nuclear submarines (possibly equipped with long-range Pukguksong missiles capable of striking targets in the United States from the deep waters of the Sea of Japan). The use of artificial intelligence technologies and combined guidance systems for rocket artillery was announced. New multiple launch rocket systems and operational-tactical missiles are viewed as a unified tool for the “instant suppression” of enemy forces in the event of a threat. One of the most significant points of the new programme is the development of space warfare capabilities. Particular attention was drawn to a new topic: “special weapons for striking an enemy satellite in the event of war”. Attention is being paid to modern electronic warfare systems capable of blinding US and South Korean reconnaissance assets. The modernisation of unmanned strike systems, approved by the congress, is directly based on the experience of using drones in the conflict in Russia in 2024-2025. For Russia, strengthening North Korea’s defence potential is advantageous: it creates a powerful counterweight to the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and ensures stability on the eastern flank of Eurasia.
The congress confirmed that Pyongyang has chosen the path of “armed peace”, where sovereignty is secured not by treaties, but by the possession of high-tech and ruthless instruments of retaliation. In the next five years, the world will see a North Korean army that will cease to be a “Soviet museum” and become one of the most innovative combat organisms on the planet, creating a “protected rear” for Russia in the Far East.
Economic Strategy: The “20×10” Project
North Korea’s economic policy could undergo a significant transformation, moving from a “survival” mode to a strategy of “offensive modernisation” and regional development. Increased investment in automation, the digitalisation of production, and the introduction of modern management systems is expected. Kim Jong-un demands that the economy should be based on calculations and technology, not just “revolutionary enthusiasm”. Judging by the personnel rotations, special attention will be paid to the chemical industry, shipbuilding, and energy—sectors capable of ensuring real GDP growth and export potential while circumventing sanctions. Increased attention to the fisheries and food industries (despite criticism of the personnel at the congress) demonstrates the authorities’ intention to quickly saturate the domestic market with essential goods. Kim Jong-un wants to demonstrate that nuclear power status translates into a “well-fed life”.
The economic agenda focuses on the ambitious “20×10” provincial development project (the construction of modern industrial plants in 20 counties annually over the next 10 years). In his speech, Kim Jong-un emphasised that the gap between the capital and the periphery is a threat to the country’s unity. The attempt to create a self-sufficient domestic market, however, is impossible without external supplies of equipment and technology. This presents a “window of opportunity” for Russian companies. The new heads of the shipbuilding and chemical ministries appointed at the congress may be seen as more flexible partners, focused on integration with Russian production chains. Perhaps we will see a shift in the DPRK’s administrative apparatus toward a deep, almost seamless integration with the Russian industrial complex.
Personnel Revolution: Responsibility and Technocracy
One of the most discussed topics in the Western and South Korean media has been the unprecedented personnel shakeup. Despite the overall optimistic tone, Kim Jong-un harshly criticised party cadres for a “chronic lack of responsibility”, “defeatism”, “formalism”, and “immature leadership abilities”. He called for “the elimination of schematicism, conservatism, and empiricism, and the continuous creation of new innovation”. Much was made of the “need for scientific justification” of policy. The absolute supremacy of the Workers’ Party over all state and military institutions was enshrined. The WPK is not simply an ideological body, but the highest administrative centre. Economic failures are now being interpreted as violations of party discipline, not as simply management errors.
An unusually large number of officials have left the Central Committee—14 ministerial-level figures, including Deputy Prime Ministers Chung Myong-soo and Kim Myung-hoon. The rotation also includes the heads of departments overseeing the coal industry, shipbuilding, fisheries, and the chemical industry. The departure of former “second in command” Choe Ryong-hae symbolises the replacement of veterans with younger personnel personally loyal to Kim, who have no ties to past eras and are prepared to radically implement his will. The congress documents emphasise the requirement of “absolute obedience” to the Central Committee. A culture of direct accountability is being introduced. The failures of the previous five-year plan (2021–2025) are no longer blamed on “external sanctions” but are instead interpreted as the result of “bureaucratic inertia”. Pyongyang is placing its bets on a new generation of technocrats capable of working in an environment of digitalisation and new foreign policy priorities. The “diplomatic negotiators” whose goal was to bargain with the West have retired, and are being replaced by “executive strategists” whose goal is deep integration into the Eurasian space. Within the WPK leadership, the positions of those oriented toward a military and economic alliance with Moscow and Beijing are strengthening—this is being supported by the elevated status of Foreign Minister Choe Son-hee and Defence Minister No Kwang-chol. From the perspective of the South Korean media, this appears to be a search for “scapegoats” and for systemic failures, but it can also be interpreted as North Korea’s request for new forms of technological and logistical partnerships that go beyond simple trade with allies. However, speculative predictions by South Koreans about the formalisation of Kim Jong-un’s daughter’s position as successor did not materialise, although the leader’s sister was promoted to head of a department in the Central Committee.
For Russia, the results of the congress confirm the presence of a reliable, predictable, and highly organised ally on the eastern flank of Eurasia.
The “bright prospects” Kim Jong-un spoke of at the opening of the congress now appear to be a concrete plan for integrating North Korea into a new multipolar reality, where “self-reliance” is complemented by reliance on the support of its Eurasian partners.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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