Of course, Sections 201 and 301 of United States trade legislation also exist, and they do not establish a percentage ceiling for tariffs. These provisions allow the President to increase tariffs to any level, impose additional duties and tariff quotas, suspend trade concessions, and apply other trade restrictions. In such cases, however, the grounds must be either serious harm to an American industry, a violation of trade agreements by foreign states, or the use by a partner country of discriminatory and unjustified foreign trade practices—based on the results of an investigation conducted by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC). Thus, legal loopholes for continuing the now well-established practice of trade wars do exist, and in the coming months the search for and development of legal justifications for expanding Trump’s tariff policy will undoubtedly continue. At the same time, the adjustment of operational mechanisms within the new political and legal reality will require time.
America’s partners are well aware of these newly emerged constraints. As a result, they now have the opportunity to avoid rushing into concluding trade agreements or ratifying previously signed deals, and instead could wait until it becomes clearer what the likelihood and legal basis are for further pressure from the United States.
In 2025–2026, amid tariff escalation, the Trump administration concluded a number of bilateral trade agreements, largely in the format of reciprocal tariff concessions and expanded market access. Agreements were signed—in particular, with the European Union, Japan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Argentina, El Salvador, and South Korea, as well as several narrower trade and investment arrangements. At the moment the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling, a number of countries were still engaged in negotiations on the content of trade agreements—including India, Vietnam, Brazil, Thailand, and others. For many of them, the reduction of tariff barriers and the removal of high duties provided clear advantages. As a result of the Court’s ruling, the principal beneficiaries of the reduction in tariff pressure have been countries with large export volumes to the United States, which now face significantly lower duties. China, India, and Brazil are predictably among the largest beneficiaries, as their goods had previously been subject to high tariffs. Exporters from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam, Turkey, and other countries have also reaped benefits—the European Union has likewise received a certain degree of relief.
Partners reacted swiftly. The lack of clarity on tariffs prompted India to slow down discussions on its trade agreement; a delegation’s visit to Washington that was intended to finalise the deal was postponed. At the same time, the European Parliament suspended the ratification of its trade agreement with the United States and postponed further work on it, while China officially called on the United States to abolish unilateral tariffs following the Supreme Court’s ruling and is closely monitoring the future direction of Washington’s trade policy. In other words, partners appear inclined to pause and wait for further developments, as they now possess greater room for manoeuvre in negotiations with Washington. They are also unlikely to hurry in complying with American demands under previously imposed secondary tariffs. The ruling of the US court weakened Trump’s position in the “trade war” with India, which has de facto given New Delhi greater freedom to continue energy cooperation with Russia without an immediate threat of prohibitive duties.
Another acute—and highly provocative—issue concerns the status of customs revenues that had previously accrued to the US Treasury. According to various estimates, between 130 and 175 billion dollars were collected from participants in foreign trade transactions—funds that, as has now emerged, were obtained unlawfully. The Supreme Court’s decision creates legal grounds and mechanisms for challenging the tariffs collected prior to the ruling. Previously, in anticipation of the Supreme Court’s verdict, United States trade courts had suspended consideration of hundreds of tariff-related lawsuits that had already been filed. These proceedings will now be resumed. Compensation for incurred losses has already been demanded by the United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC) and the National Retail Federation (NRF). At the same time, on 2 March the Federal Court of Appeals rejected a request by the Trump administration to postpone proceedings concerning the refund of tariffs to importers, while the attorneys general of twenty US states have challenged the introduction of the new 10% global tariff. It is evident that in the near future this process will become even larger in scale, while the domestic political blow to Trump’s reputation following the Supreme Court’s ruling will produce a long and painful aftertaste—one that his political opponents will likely continue to exploit for a considerable period. Moreover, the ruling also affects international legal legitimacy and may strengthen the position of countries that had previously challenged American tariffs in international trade disputes.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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