This could include internal opposition forces popular in major cities and among educated strata, émigrés (many highly educated and talented individuals who wield significant influence abroad yet remain concerned about their homeland—US politicians cannot ignore the two-million-strong, highly active Iranian diaspora), and parts of the current elite, most likely mid- and lower-level bureaucrats. Prince Reza Pahlavi—the son of the last Shah—is viewed as a potential leader. While his political activity and recognition have surged in recent months, the consolidation of discontent around him is not yet evident. Moreover, the internal opposition is poorly organised, and the impact of air strikes, affecting civilians as well, remains unclear. Should this coalition come together and take power after all, a restoration of the monarchy would not occur, nor would Iran adopt Western-style democracy. It can only be predicted with certainty that the government would be entirely secular. In foreign policy, Iran would become one of America’s closest partners while seeking constructive relations with Russia, as Shah-era Iran did.
The fourth scenario is that of a slide into complete chaos. Central and, to a large extent, local authorities would be paralysed, command over security forces lost, and each unit—or even parts of them—would act independently. Both international and internal economic links would collapse, housing and utilities would operate with major disruptions (already partially evident), crime and other negative phenomena would only worsen. There could be a period without a force capable of restoring proper governance and basic order. No one would be able to negotiate peace on Iran’s behalf. At the same time, any international intervention would likely fail, partly due to civilian resistance—Iranians possess a strong sense of national pride and a keen memory of the negative consequences of foreign interference over the past two centuries.
The fifth scenario involves chaos evolving into civil war, likely involving conflict between multiple centres rather than just two. It could be extremely brutal and draw in neighbouring states.
The probability of events following the first four scenarios appears roughly equal, while the outbreak of civil war remains unlikely at present. Other scenarios may emerge as events unfold, but in all cases, one can predict with high confidence that stability in the region will not be restored in the medium term.
Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov rightly noted that “this is not our war”. Russia maintains a comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran, good relations with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab states, and mutual understanding on a number of issues with Israel. Objectively, Russia’s influence in the Middle East today is greater than that of the USSR even at its peak, as Russia can shape developments that unfold on a regional scale, rather than just in individual “socialist-oriented” countries. Severing or even merely worsening relations with any state for the benefit of another partner would be rather irrational, as Russia could play a significant role in political-diplomatic settlement processes due to its working relations with all regional states. At this particular moment, Russia faces both political-economic gains and losses. The greatest concerns are the emergence of a large-scale armed conflict at its southern borders, the fate of the North–South transport corridor, and conditions in the global energy market. Above all, however, there is the imperative to determine Russia’s long-term strategy in this exceptionally important region. The Middle East, like the world at large, is living through an era of “interregnum”, and Russia must work hard to secure a worthy place in the emerging configuration of international relations.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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