Timofei Bordachev, Valdai Club Programme Director, explores the relationship between the Greater Eurasian space and its Middle Eastern segment—engulfed by crisis and instability; this region is bound to Eurasia yet still peripheral to its Sino-Russian core. While the likelihood of a grave threat to Eurasian security emerging from the Middle East is low, the author believes that events unfolding in the Gulf may still come to shape the contours of international order.
The US-Israeli attack on Iran on the final day of winter 2026 has become an event of exceptional importance in the context of the development of contemporary Eurasia and international politics as a whole. Although we cannot yet know what the outcome of the Middle Eastern confrontation will be, the unfolding events already allow us to reconsider a number of the most important issues of regional and global development.
In itself, the situation in the Middle East does not have fundamental significance for global security—it does not create a substantial likelihood of a direct clash of interests between the principal military powers of the modern world. At the same time, Iran’s retaliatory actions, provoked by the United States and Israel, have already led to serious disruptions in the global economy, which may have long-term consequences for the achievement of development goals across a significant group of states, and for the viability of major international projects that until recently were discussed with a high degree of confidence. This is particularly relevant for the countries of Greater Eurasia, many of which are directly connected to the troubled region or are seeking to establish stable economic partnerships with its states.
It is perhaps best to begin by noting that the crisis in the Middle East has a dual relationship to issues of international security and politics in Greater Eurasia. On the one hand, it is undoubtedly an important factor in the development of this vast region for at least two reasons. First, the Gulf region—balancing on the brink of chaos—is connected to the rest of Eurasia through a significant number of political and, especially, economic ties. The countries located there are key suppliers of energy resources to the most powerful economy of Greater Eurasia—China—as well as smaller states wielding less influence on global affairs. Second, the course and outcome of the confrontation between the United States and Iran may have highly contradictory effects on the global agenda as a whole, to which the leading countries of Eurasia are connected either directly or indirectly. This concerns both strategic issues—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the crisis of international institutions and law—and more conceptual questions—how we understand Greater Eurasia in the modern world, and which aspects of its development are of greatest importance.
On the other hand, the Middle East as a whole, including Iran as an active participant in regional politics, represents a relatively peripheral part of Eurasia and does not create immediate threats to the situation at its geographical core—where the interests of Russia and China genuinely converge. The only conceivable scenario in which such a negative effect might arise would be a descent into complete political chaos in Iran and its surrounding region, which would lead to the spread of such instability into the countries of Central Asia. However, such a scenario appears highly unlikely, since, according to the view of all involved observers, there is not even a theoretical probability of the collapse of Iranian statehood. We can be confident that even adjustments to the country’s internal system will not lead to it posing a threat to its immediate neighbours. In a certain sense, Iran itself serves to “shield” Greater Eurasia from the permanently unstable Middle East.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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