Given the persistent mutual hostility, distrust, and unwillingness to compromise on both sides, the prospects for a durable political and diplomatic settlement of the conflict between Iran and the United States remain uncertain, although temporary tactical agreements on specific issues cannot be ruled out, writes Alexander Maryasov.
Iranian–American relations deteriorated sharply following the Islamic Revolution and the hostage-taking of staff at the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. From being a reliable regional ally, Iran turned into an irreconcilable political and ideological adversary of Washington. Every US president pursued a hard-line anti-Iran policy, imposed sanctions, and threatened the use of force. However, Donald Trump went further than any of them—he withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme, and twice, together with Israel, initiated war against Iran.
Given the persistent mutual hostility, distrust, and unwillingness to compromise on both sides, the prospects for a durable political and diplomatic settlement of the conflict between Iran and the United States remain uncertain, although temporary tactical agreements on specific issues cannot be ruled out.
The Iranian Revolution and the hostage-taking of American diplomats dealt a severe blow to the pride and prestige of the United States. To this day, it has not been able to rid itself of the sense of humiliation and helplessness experienced in 1979. This continues to shape the hostile course pursued by any American administration towards Iran.
Despite the fact that anti-Americanism constitutes one of the core elements of the Islamic Republic’s political ideology, proponents of normalising relations with the United States always existed within the Iranian establishment—figures prepared to pursue compromise arrangements with Washington that would not threaten Iran’s security or infringe upon its national interests.
In 1995, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani lobbied for the conclusion of a multi-billion-dollar contract with the American oil company Conoco for the development of the major Iranian oil field Sirri. However, the administration of President Bill Clinton not only blocked the deal, but also imposed an embargo on American investment in Iran’s energy sector and banned the development of economic relations with Tehran.
In 2003, when it became known that Iran was developing a nuclear programme, President Mohammad Khatami was prepared to agree to substantial limitations on nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and the establishment of trade and economic cooperation with the United States. Washington rejected the Iranian proposals.
The most successful attempt to resolve the most acute issue in Iranian–American relations was the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear problem in 2015 under President Hassan Rouhani. The implementation of this compromise document significantly restricted Iran’s enrichment activities, blocked Tehran’s path to developing nuclear weapons, provided for the lifting of anti-Iranian sanctions, and created the conditions for developing trade and economic cooperation between Iran and the United States.
However, in 2018, the United States withdrew from the agreements reached, and Iran ceased to comply with its obligations to limit nuclear activities. Under the Biden administration, Tehran and Washington made attempts to reconfigure and revive the nuclear deal. However, Donald Trump’s return to the White House interrupted these efforts.
Trump attempted to resolve the Iranian impasse by military means. Together with Israel, the United States launched massive missile and air strikes against Iran’s military, industrial, and civilian infrastructure. The primary objective of this unprovoked aggression was regime change and the installation in Tehran of an opposition force loyal to Washington. However, Iran demonstrated resilience and a readiness to go to the end in repelling what it perceived as an existential threat to its existence as a sovereign state. It also became clear that Iran lacks a strong, well-organised opposition capable of challenging the theocratic regime.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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