On April 15, the Valdai Club hosted an expert discussion titled “Elections in Hungary and the Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.” Moderator Anton Bespalov noted that these elections have attracted an unusual amount of attention in Europe and around the world due to the clearly mythologised figure of Viktor Orbán, who, during his 16 years in power, has branded Hungary as a bastion of right-wing conservative values in a liberal, globalist Europe, while also making numerous enemies both domestically and internationally.
“The majority of Hungarians voted against Orban, but they don’t even understand who they voted for,” said Gábor Stier, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of the #Moszkvater portal, and columnist for the weekly Demokrata. He added that while many think they know something about Peter Magyar, there are likely many more surprises to come. Until 2024, he was relatively unknown, but he ran a very skilful campaign, and received help from Western countries. While there was undoubtedly interference in the elections from both Ukraine and the West, that’s not why Magyar and his party won. The main reason was fatigue with Orban. It’s impossible to predict the balance of power in the new government, but it will likely surprise both supporters and opponents alike, according to Stier. He sees a number of contradictions in the future prime minister’s plans. It’s impossible to simultaneously shout “Russians, go home!” and build pragmatic relations with Russia. It’s impossible to attract Fidesz supporters and please the liberals in your circle. It’s impossible to simultaneously return to the European mainstream and promote a conservative line. All of this points to the populist nature of Magyar’s promises. Nevertheless, as Stier emphasised, the most important thing is that the election results demonstrated that the Hungarian democratic system is functioning properly.
Dmitry Ofitserov-Belskiy, Head of the Baltic Region Comprehensive Studies Group, IMEMO RAS, noted that while many initially thought Peter Magyar was a liberal politician, a comparison of party platforms reveals that the Tisza party’s platform is not so different from that of Fidesz. Importantly, Magyar himself is a descendant of the Hungarian political elite and, at heart, neither a conservative nor a liberal, but a technocrat flexible enough to pursue a wide range of policies. Perhaps this is precisely what Hungarian society needs now, Ofitserov-Belskiy suggested. The analyst also emphasised that Magyar is largely defined by his entourage, which is closely tied to the West. At the same time, he is constrained by the Hungarian system of government (in particular, the role of the Constitutional Court and the president), as well as by his campaign promises, which are essentially analogous to Fidesz’s campaign promises, albeit with a strong anti-corruption component. He will likely use this restriction as leverage in his negotiations with Brussels.
Maria Pavlova, Senior Researcher at the Baltic Region Comprehensive Studies Group at the Centre for Strategic Planning Studies, IMEMO RAS, examined the change of power in Hungary in the context of Polish-Hungarian relations. She emphasised that the arrival of Donald Tusk’s pro-European government in Poland has not significantly impacted Poland’s domestic and foreign policy. Both in rhetoric and in its actions, the Tusk government is largely reminiscent of the previous Law and Justice Party government. Similarly, it is unlikely that the new Hungarian government will radically shift to a pro-European course, much less to join forces with Poland in this direction. Overall, Pavlova believes that interaction formats in Central and Eastern Europe will be determined by the problems and challenges facing the region. Primarily, this concerns the demographic issue associated with declining birth rates and increasing life expectancy. To address this, the European Commission is pushing countries in the region to increase migration flows, which in itself is significantly transforming the region.
Misa Djurkovic, Principal research fellow at the Serbian Institute of European Studies, called Orban’s departure a major victory for Brussels and NATO. According to him, the West is currently preparing for some kind of global conflict, possibly a war with Russia, but Hungary under Orban took a distinct position and criticised this course. Therefore, the EU and NATO considered Orban as a problem. The Tisza campaign promised to change policy toward Russia, and the party succeeded in promoting this anti-Russian narrative. However, the economic and anti-corruption agenda played an equally important role. Brussels pressured the Orban government with economic sanctions, but Magyar’s party argued that the main damage to the economy was not due to EU policy, but to corruption. Nevertheless, the elections were generally democratic, and Fidesz conducted itself with dignity. Orban congratulated his opponent on his victory immediately after the election. This suggests a sense of national unity will be maintained in the future, Djurkovic asserts.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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