Specialisation in technologies for the northern environment, the construction of an icebreaker fleet, Arctic energy, and the unique experience of economic activity under harsh climatic conditions create undeniable advantages for Russia in the face of new Arctic actors.
The Russian Arctic generates a unique effect: the region simultaneously serves as both a resource base and a transit corridor—something rarely encountered anywhere in the world, as resource-rich regions are typically located far from major transport routes. In Russia’s case, resource and logistical potential coincide within a single space. This forms a northern development line of the country—from the Kola Peninsula through Yamal and Taymyr to Chukotka and Kamchatka.
The Arctic transforms the very conceptual foundation of the Eurasian project, as it synthesises a continental logic of development—based on overland connections and the strategic autonomy of landmasses—and a maritime one—built on flexibility, speed, and the openness of trade routes. In Russia’s current national strategy, this synthesis is embodied in the multimodal Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, presented by Vladimir Putin in March 2025 at the International Arctic Forum “Arctic—Territory of Dialogue” in Murmansk.
This project would see the creation of a unified system of transport corridors linking the regions of Siberia, the Urals, and the Far East with the ports of the Northern Sea Route and extending those links further out to global trade routes. It envisages the integration of maritime and land corridors into a single system, where inland routes connect the country’s internal regions, and the northern route ensures access to global markets. The centre of gravity thus shifts towards the northern arc—from Murmansk to Vladivostok.
The Arctic is becoming the axis of Eurasian integration—not only internally, but also externally. Internally, this involves the creation of industrial and energy clusters in the Arctic, the development of the Far East as a key junction linking the Arctic with the Asia-Pacific region, and the strengthening of the military-strategic dimension of Russia’s Arctic policy, as the Arctic also constitutes the country’s northern frontier, which must be secured.
Externally, under current conditions, the “northern dimension” of Greater Eurasia is inseparable from the eastern vector. China, India, and Southeast Asian countries are interested in diversifying logistics routes and energy supplies. For Asian states, the Arctic is no longer a distant or abstract region—it is acquiring significant strategic importance. Russia, in turn, acts as the organiser of this entire northern architecture of Greater Eurasia—across both eastern and northern directions.
Risks and Limits of the “Turn to the North”
Russia’s strategic shift towards the North-East should not be perceived as an unconditional trajectory of success. For the concept of “Northern Eurasia” not to remain a purely declarative formula, it is essential to account for the potential risks associated with its development. “Northerness” may become a competitive advantage for Russia in the twenty-first century—but it may also turn into a source of excessive strain on the country’s economy and state resources.
Among these risks are demographic challenges—low population density, high migration towards central regions, and the high cost of living in the North—as well as infrastructural constraints, including ageing Soviet-era infrastructure requiring substantial investment and continuous technological renewal. There are also climatic and environmental risks: permafrost thaw, coastal erosion, and changes in hydrological regimes pose threats to infrastructure, necessitating a balance between economic activity and environmental responsibility. Finally, geopolitical competition in the Arctic raises the risk of militarisation of the region. Russia must simultaneously develop cooperative frameworks and ensure the strategic security of its Arctic zone.
Returning to the notion of “pivots” in contemporary Russian policy, it should be noted that, as a great power seeking to “preserve and strengthen its influence at the global level”,
Russia simply cannot afford to pursue any one-sided policy.
In this context, the “turn to the North” should not replace other directions of Russia’s development, but has the potential to complement them—provided it is embedded within a balanced strategy.
Russia’s “northerness” represents potential, not a passive advantage; it requires institutional maturity, a technological base, and long-term planning. If Northern Eurasia remains merely an ideological construct, it will remain political rhetoric. If, however, it is supported by a realistic assessment of risks and a systemic policy, as well as a comprehensive approach to development, then the “turn to the North” may become a sustainable structural shift rather than a temporary reaction to external circumstances.
At this stage, the principal challenge lies not in mastering ice and permafrost territories, but in institutionalising “northerness”—that is, in building a sustainable model of integrated development combining security, environmental responsibility, economic efficiency, and international cooperation. Russia is the northern core of Eurasia, and whether it succeeds in conceptualising and institutionally shaping its northern identity will determine not only its own future, but also the entire configuration of Greater Eurasia in the twenty-first century.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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