Donald Trump’s moves on the international stage are increasingly defined by a reckless, snowballing habit of asserting American power by means of unrestrained military force—with Iran being the current target. Oleg Barabanov, Valdai Club Programme Director, ponders the nature of the strategic calculations behind Trump’s assault on Iran, describing the president’s approach as “I want it, therefore I can do it”.
The actions of US President Donald Trump have shown that the approach of the “global hegemon” has now come to rely exclusively on force. Moreover, the desire to use force is restrained by neither legal nor moral norms. Even possible self-imposed limits associated with the calculable uncertainty of the consequences of one’s own actions no longer function. A similar approach can, if one wishes, also be observed in a number of other cases. As a result, the principle of “I want to, therefore I do” is increasingly becoming one of the defining principles of modern world politics. It is a simple and unsophisticated principle, and one cannot even say that it is new. This was the case before, and indeed, throughout history, it has perhaps always been so.
In the past, however, this principle generally still included another element: “I can”—“I want to, I can, and I do”. Now, that element of “I can” is often dropped from the formula altogether and no longer taken into account. Firstly, because calculating one’s actions under conditions of conflict-related uncertainty is difficult and does not necessarily lead to the results originally intended. Secondly, because the force of desire—the element of “I want”—becomes psychologically dominant and all-consuming for the decision-maker. The psychological profile of Trump himself may well fit this pattern. As a result, an equals sign is immediately placed between the elements of “I want” and “I can” in such decision-making processes. Here, “I want” a priori implies “I can”. Or rather: “I will probably manage somehow, and then things will somehow sort themselves out.” All of this resembles, to some extent, the well-known general psychological principle of “keep your eyes on the goal, believe in yourself, and ignore the obstacles”. Here, however, this general motivational mindset is elevated to the basis of foreign policy and military decision-making.
At times, it must be admitted, such an approach works. One example is Trump’s operation in Venezuela. But there are also occasions when it does not work—surprising though that may seem. This applies to the current conflict in Iran, as well as in a number of other instances. It sometimes happens that everything that was planned in advance and in great detail cannot, in practice, be implemented in the course of military-political struggle. And this is precisely what, once again, happened to Trump in Iran. Naturally, in public he said that everything was proceeding according to plan, and he will say so even more insistently if efforts to settle this conflict ultimately lead to a more or less stable ceasefire. But that does not change the essence of the matter.
Iran’s resistance to Trump could probably have been predicted. In Iran’s case, moreover, we are speaking not metaphorically, but quite specifically, of collective political will. Since the death first of Ali Khamenei and then that of Ali Larijani, and, if rumours are to be believed, the severe injury or even coma of Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran has been left without a single supreme leader. Iran’s collective political will managed not to succumb to Trump’s “Venezuelan temptation”, in which it is enough to remove but one person and everyone else proceeds to rapidly adjust to new conditions. I have already written that it is difficult to blame the Venezuelan leaders for this, given the obvious inequality of forces and the simple human instinct for self-preservation, which at a critical moment suppresses, in very many people, the desire to continue fighting for their ideals. Moreover, they did not yet have before them the example of Iranian resistance. The external imbalance of power between the US and Iran, although not as overwhelming as that between the US and Venezuela, also appeared entirely obvious. Yet Iran’s collective political will chose to resist.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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