At the present stage of Russian–Chinese interaction, however, a lack of coordination is evident in the spatial structuring of foreign policy and in the vision of Eurasia as a macro-region. While Russia’s foreign policy strategy distinctly foregrounds Eurasia as a space for the application of initiatives and connectivity projects, Eurasia has yet to enter the core focus of China’s foreign policy planning and practical activity. Even the announcement and implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative did not lead Beijing to revise its perception of the Eurasian space or to conceptualize a “Eurasian idea”, nor to articulate a Chinese notion of Eurasia. Moreover, the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative itself expanded beyond its original regional scope, evolving into the global Belt and Road Initiative.
By contrast, Russia’s contemporary international identity is inseparably linked to the notion of Russia as a Eurasian great power. The major international initiatives advanced by Moscow are closely tied to Eurasia and are designed with Eurasia in mind. Over the past decade and a half, Russia’s vision of the trajectory of Eurasian “integration of integrations” has evolved from the concept of a “Greater Europe”—the idea of establishing a unified economic, political, and cultural space stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok—to that of “Greater Eurasia”, and subsequently to the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The intensifying confrontation between Europe and Russia since February 2022, although it has effectively excluded the European Union from Russia’s “integration of integrations” plans, has not led Moscow to abandon its course towards developing the Greater Eurasian Partnership. In the updated version of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of 31 March 2023, Eurasia is identified as a distinct regional priority, with the stated objective of “transforming Eurasia into a unified, continent-wide space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development, and prosperity”. In February 2024, President Vladimir Putin put forward the idea of forming a “new framework of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia”.
In Chinese foreign policy planning, by contrast, there is no Eurasian vector as such, nor is there a developed conceptualisation of a Eurasian agenda. There exists a policy towards neighbouring countries—the so-called neighbourhood or peripheral diplomacy—as well as distinct approaches towards Central Asia and South-East Asia; a clearly articulated Chinese agenda is also evident for the Asia-Pacific region. However, an overarching strategy for the development of the Eurasian space is absent.
A defining feature of contemporary Chinese diplomacy is its operation on two levels—global and narrowly regional (or even country-specific)—while a macro-regional vision of Eurasia is lacking. In recent years, Beijing has attached increasing importance to issues of global governance, advancing global initiatives, working towards the provision of global public goods, and developing new initiatives, policy prescriptions for development, as well as ideas and concepts intended for the international community. This creates the impression that the global scale is coming to the fore in Beijing’s diplomatic activity.
Within China’s foreign policy toolkit, even the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has been reassessed—an organisation that would seem, by its very nature, to be regional. From a focus on ensuring practical cooperation with Central Asian countries, China’s interest in the SCO has increasingly shifted towards discussions of global governance and the promotion of Chinese global initiatives. It was at the Tianjin SCO summit that China advanced its fourth global initiative—complementing the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilisation Initiative—namely, the Global Governance Initiative.
While Russia has put forward the idea of creating a Eurasian security architecture, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative. It should be noted that these initiatives are not contradictory, and their underlying principles are very similar, yet their spatial focus differs.
Beijing has neither a Eurasian strategy nor initiatives specifically tailored to Eurasia. With regard to the Eurasian macro-space, China operates through regional and subregional vectors, among which the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East are prioritised. It is indicative that, at the recent traditional press conference held during the “Two Sessions”, Foreign Minister Wang Yi identified the construction of an Asia-Pacific community as a key objective during China’s APEC chairmanship. The Asia-Pacific vector is particularly pronounced in Chinese foreign policy. Previously, Beijing has advanced concepts such as the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, a new security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, and the joint construction of an Asia-Pacific community of shared destiny.
At the same time, the spirit of the times points towards a more targeted engagement with the Eurasian space. The intensification in recent years of great-power rivalry and of tensions between the United States and the European Union, on the one hand, and China, on the other, as well as the growing confrontation between the West and Russia, is driving profound transformations—above all across Eurasia. Moreover, in a period of global turbulence, the breakdown of the international system, the erosion of institutions and mechanisms once deemed immutable, and the reconfiguration of supply chains and transport logistics, new opportunities are emerging to structure the Eurasian space and its political and economic processes. Demand for such structuring is increasing.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
Please visit the firm link to site
