The Israeli justifications for the timing of the operation against Iran have ranged from the growing nuclear threat to the weakening of the Islamic Republic’s governing system by preceding protests. However, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government—balancing on the brink of early elections—had at least one domestic political factor that pushed it towards escalation at the end of February this year. The politics of adopting a new budget were among the considerations behind Israel’s decision to initiate a new round of hostilities against Iran, writes Elizaveta Yakimova, research fellow at the Department of Israel and Jewish Communities, IOS RAS.
On the eve of the deadline for adopting the 2026 budget, the Knesset ultimately approved the relevant bill in its final readings. The country’s Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, compared this development to the process of adopting the main financial document in 1999, which, according to him, also coincided with an escalation of regional conflict and preparations for parliamentary elections. These analogies, however, are far from comprehensive, and certainly not unique. Yet they go a long way towards explaining why the budget helped the Israeli Prime Minister not only to stabilise the government temporarily, but also to make another attempt at resolving the so-called Iranian problem by force.
Perhaps the most striking similarity is that now, just like 27 years ago, it was Benjamin Netanyahu who actively lobbied for the advancement of the budget. In doing so, the politician—who has surpassed the legendary first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, in cumulative time spent in office—was making every effort to consolidate his position. At the same time, there is a notable inaccuracy in the Finance Minister’s statement. The essence of it is that the so-called exemplary result of February 1999 was achieved not under conditions of open confrontation, but rather in the context of a stalled, yet still ongoing, peace process. At that stage, the Israel Defense Forces were engaged in a low-intensity conflict in southern Lebanon, which cannot be compared to the scale of Israel’s military campaign in February–March 2026. The key event of that period is considered to be the crisis surrounding the Wye River Memorandum, signed in October 1998. The ratification of this document was accompanied by a split in Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition, which led to the calling of early Knesset elections.
Thus, 1999—chosen by Bezalel Smotrich as a role model—upon closer examination appears as a cautionary tale of what not to do for the Likud bloc and its closest allies. In this context, the shift to a forceful scenario vis-à-vis Iran created conditions to avoid repeating that undesirable outcome. Moreover, in this case, it may have been an attempt to neutralise negative effects on two fronts at once—namely, to divert attention from the Palestinian–Israeli peace process, which had once again stalled, and to avoid an early vote.
Another parallel seems to be the simultaneous deepening of contradictions with the ultra-Orthodox parties, which occurred both in the context of the adoption of the 2026 budget and 27 years earlier. These political forces, although positioned as the “natural allies” of the Likud bloc, have consistently built this alliance on numerous concessions to ultra-Orthodox parties in exchange for support for the coalition. In 1999, tensions were provoked by the traditional demand for additional funding for the ultra-Orthodox education system and social welfare. At the end of 2025, the essence of the disagreement proved more complex, as the Shas party and United Torah Judaism conditioned their support for the main financial document on a decision in their favour regarding the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews into the Israel Defense Forces.
This latter issue became markedly more acute during the “War of Revival” of 2023–2025, due to sharp public dissatisfaction among the majority of citizens over the existence of a special category of the population that effectively remained outside conscription, and thus steered clear of losses on the front lines. Under the influence of public sentiment, the opposition threatened to block the government’s attempts to extend deferments from military service for the ultra-Orthodox camp. Only the start of hostilities against Iran provided a formal pretext for freezing the debate around the legislative initiative. Among the justifications for this step, Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet cited the need to consolidate the coalition to pass the budget, which in turn was required for waging the war.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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