The Baltic states suffered more economically from the Ukrainian conflict than other EU countries, facing recession and soaring inflation. Finally, it is in these countries that the sense of a “Russian threat” is most acute, actively fuelled both internally and externally by other EU and NATO members. The idea that “if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will move further west” finds fertile ground here.
Notably, the more ethnically homogeneous Lithuania shows the highest level of support for Ukraine—not only in the region but across all countries covered by the study. In Estonia and Latvia, the share of those who supported neither side was 36–37%. One can assume that this figure includes the overwhelming majority of local Russians (about a quarter of the total population of these countries). Low support for Russia may reflect both the reluctance of the Russian population to publicly express support for fear of persecution and an emerging interethnic consensus—which might be partly fuelled by the discussion in the Russian media about “serious consequences” in response to the alleged use of Baltic airspace for strikes on north-western Russia and other incidents.
Another country with extremely high support for Ukraine (on par with Latvia and Estonia) is Azerbaijan. There, invectives against Russia have become a common feature of official rhetoric, including at the highest level. This situation reflects the country’s increased confidence in the international arena following the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh—the primacy of territorial integrity lies at the core of Azerbaijan’s position on the Ukrainian conflict. Still, support for Russia stands at 20%, much higher than in the Baltic states. Meanwhile, neighbouring Georgia presents a stark contrast: 26% support Ukraine, 6% support Russia, and the largest group of respondents express no support for either side.
This pattern is quite widespread: in 12 of the 25 countries surveyed, the share of “activists”—those who approve of either the Russian or Ukrainian leadership—does not exceed half of respondents. For example, in Poland, where public sentiment resembles that in the Baltic states, Ukraine has a significant support base (46%), but 50% disapprove of both sides. Fatigue with the Ukrainian issue is taking its toll, but Poland also has a strong negative rating for the Ukrainian leadership, whose demarches against Warsaw provoke harsh reactions from politicians and the media. Even greater irritation with Ukraine’s leadership exists in Hungary, where Russia was supported by 29% and Ukraine by 20% of respondents. Given Péter Magyar’s initial statements on the Ukrainian issue after winning the parliamentary elections—an emphasis on the rights of ethnic Hungarians, an intention to continue buying Russian oil, and a refusal to support Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU— neither a shift in Budapest–Kiev relations nor a rise in support for Ukraine’s leadership in Hungary should be expected. However, it is likely that, along with the weakening of Viktor Orbán, who embodied warm relations with Moscow, support for Russia will decline.
It is noteworthy that support for Russia exceeds support for Ukraine in four NATO countries (North Macedonia and Bulgaria, in addition to Montenegro and Hungary), while in Greece, approval ratings for the two countries are equal. This in itself is a worrying sign for the Western bloc: four years after the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, sentiment in individual member states is far from the expected unanimity. Such a situation indicates a growing gap between the Atlanticist leadership of these countries and a significant portion of their populations—a gap that will inevitably affect domestic political balances.
In summary, we note once again that the survey results primarily speak to perceptions of Russia across a significant part of Eurasia, as any positive rating for Kiev is effectively a negative rating for Moscow. This perception is not uniform, as it is shaped by a set of factors specific to each country. High approval ratings abroad are a valuable foreign policy asset, but should not be an end in themselves. Moreover, as the contrasting examples of Central Asia and the Balkans demonstrate, such ratings arise not from the projection of soft power, but through effective economic integration in one case and a strong historical memory in the other. Meanwhile, the example of Azerbaijan and some other countries suggests that a high negative rating is not necessarily an obstacle to pragmatic interstate cooperation. At the same time, datasets like these allow us to identify the limits of a country’s capabilities in certain foreign policy areas—perhaps their main value.
The author thanks Aleksandar Mitić, Kubatbek Rakhimov, and Gábor Stier for their assistance in the work on this article.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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