Finally, Ethiopia faces yet another issue: the presence on its territory—in the northern border areas of the Tigray regional state—of a 20,000-strong Eritrean military contingent, deployed there at the outset of the Tigrayan armed uprising under the aegis of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front
. Initially, this suited Addis Ababa, as it diverted significant forces of the Tigrayan rebels, but after the signing of the Pretoria and Nairobi peace agreements in November 2022, it became one of the problematic aspects of their implementation for the federal government. With the onset of a narrative-shaping campaign in preparation for the possible establishment of control over Assab, it has effectively become one of the motivating factors for a potential military operation.
The above set of issues in Ethiopia’s foreign policy agenda—as the regional centre of military and economic power—largely determines the configuration of bilateral and multilateral relations in the Horn of Africa.
In seeking access to the sea—whether through a long-term lease of a coastal strip in the Gulf of Aden via Somaliland, or through establishing control over Eritrea’s Assab in the southern Red Sea—Ethiopia relies on the support of the United Arab Emirates and Israel. For the UAE, this concerns the creation of a trade route into East and Central Africa; for Israel, it is about countering Iran and its proxies—the Houthis—in the region. The Emiratis, who have long and actively developed logistics networks in Somaliland and Puntland and were previously expelled from Assab by Eritrea, are prepared to support either of the scenarios under consideration by Ethiopia. The Israelis, however, are more likely to back the Somaliland option than the Eritrean one, owing to their particular—albeit unofficial—relations with Asmara. On the issue of Nile water usage, Ethiopia largely acts independently, cooperating with the UAE in the Sudanese dimension and relying on Israel’s tacit consent more broadly.
In its relations with Somalia, Ethiopia takes into account Egyptian, Turkish, and Eritrean support for Mogadishu, while itself benefiting from mutual understanding with Israel and the UAE regarding Somaliland, and from cooperation with Kenya in countering al-Shabaab and supporting regional elites in the south-western federal states of Somalia in their complex relations with the central government. In relations with Eritrea, Ethiopia likewise acts independently, without overt external backing—apart from possible tacit support from the UAE—while having to consider Asmara’s ability to appeal to Cairo and Riyadh in the event of escalation.
In sum, the Horn of Africa today features two military-political coalitions: on one side, the regional leader Ethiopia, supported by the UAE, Israel, and Kenya, as well as the partially recognised Somaliland; on the other, Ethiopia’s opponents—Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea—backed by Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Djibouti maintains a policy of positive neutrality in its relations with all regional and extra-regional actors. Overall, the military-political situation in the region is characterised by a fragile equilibrium on the brink of peace and war.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
Please visit the firm link to site
