If the bloc fails to propose an alternative security model (not necessarily a military alliance, but a diplomatic platform for conflict prevention), its less influential members and partner countries will begin seeking guarantees individually from the United States or China. BRICS would then become a declarative club, while real influence would shift to bilateral alliances—particularly if the West, driven by a survival instinct (a determination to prolong its dominance and system of exploitation), succeeds in overcoming its internal contradictions, as has happened before.
Thus, in order to remain relevant, BRICS will have to establish permanent structures for mediation, monitoring, and coordination in the field of security. This should occur alongside deeper financial and payment integration (central bank digital currencies and BRICS Pay may gain momentum precisely as a means of insulating against dollar-based sanctions). The energy dimension may also play a role: the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from OPEC could trigger a domino effect and a restructuring of the global energy market. BRICS—encompassing both energy producers and consumers—could become a new platform for coordination in this sphere. Artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, developed independently of the West, may likewise serve as instruments of consolidation.
A bureaucratic remedy
The central element that the entire structure must be anchored to is “soft institutionalisation”—not in the direction of a unified alliance, but towards a flexible, multi-level structure.
For many years, the author has consistently argued for the urgent necessity of the evolutionary institutionalisation of BRICS, beginning with a technical-bureaucratic format aimed at coordination, monitoring, and the preservation of institutional memory—it is gratifying that these ideas are now reflected in the aforementioned report.
Previously, the model of “minimalist institutionalism” provided high flexibility and lowered the barrier to entry for new members. However, a systemic problem is now evident: the rejection of bureaucracy results in a lack of continuity. Each chair country shapes the agenda according to its own priorities; previous decisions often remain unresolved, and institutional memory relies on the enthusiasm of individual states (a role currently performed de facto by Russia). With the expansion of BRICS to ten members and the creation of a “partner countries” group, the problem has become critical. New member states objectively lack familiarity with the full historical agenda, and some do not possess sufficient bureaucratic resources to manage chairmanships involving hundreds of events.
What might the modalities of “soft” institutionalisation be? The model proposed in the aforementioned report—a technical “distributed” secretariat spread across countries—appears somewhat detached from bureaucratic realities and the practical functioning of international organisations, with which the author is well acquainted. The creation of a BRICS Secretary-General, whose office member states are unlikely to endow with meaningful powers, combined with a geographically dispersed staff, risks turning the structure into little more than a façade.
There is no need to reinvent the wheel. What is required is a compact secretariat composed of one official from each member state at approximately the D-2 level (according to the United Nations classification), as well as officials at a slightly lower level (D-1 or P-5) from each partner country. A certain number of administrators (P-2 to P-4) would also be needed, with national quotas determined by a formula based on population size and GDP per capita (the same principles should underpin budget formation). Provision should also be made for a technical staff recruited without quotas (G1–G7). The head of the secretariat would be appointed for a one-year term from the chair country and would, inter alia, be responsible for liaison with the chair’s government. The budget of such an organisation, comprising approximately 50–60 staff positions, can readily be estimated.
A physical headquarters would nonetheless be most effective, preferably located in a relatively neutral setting. Potential examples include Macau or Goa, given their distance from national capitals and the “Lusophone factor”, which is important for linguistic balance. Naturally, this does not preclude the presence of secretariat representatives in national capitals, including local nationals, provided the host country is willing to finance them.
The technical secretariat would perform a limited set of functions, including:
— Monitoring the implementation of decisions, maintaining documentation, and preparing reports and recommendations for leaders and governments;
— Preparing agendas for high-level meetings and contacts in cooperation with the chair country, along with relevant briefing and analytical materials;
— Coordinating sectoral tracks, as well as ensuring their alignment and synchronisation;
— Maintaining contacts with global and regional international organisations;
— Organising training and capacity-building for partner countries and new members, as well as for states and organisations provisionally referred to as members of the “Friends of BRICS Club”.
The fulfilment of such functions falls far short of transforming BRICS into a classical international organisation with binding obligations and supranational bodies, which should alleviate concerns among states wary of external diktat akin to that of the European Union. Yet without such a mechanism, BRICS is unlikely to pass the stress test of the current crisis, develop its own governance system, establish a crisis-response mechanism, or formulate, coordinate, and implement a unified strategy—let alone aspire to the role of a global arbiter.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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