Iran’s Civilisational Memory
However convincing the structural interpretation of the crisis may appear, it is impossible to avoid reference to Iran’s cultural code—a factor consistently underestimated by Western analysts. Washington’s strategists sought to force Tehran into a public “capitulation” akin to the “Road to Canossa” (January 1077)—that is, submission and humiliation—in exchange for a possible reduction in military pressure. Such an outcome is unacceptable within Iranian political culture.
The narrative of resistance is rooted in the Shiite understanding of mazlumiyyat—the theological perception of the righteousness of the oppressed, and the archetype of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom at Karbala (680). Through this prism, military strikes, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation are perceived not as weakness, but as a legitimate basis for resistance.
This is precisely why, in 2013 and 2015, Iran agreed to temporary restrictions on its nuclear programme, but only with the explicit reservation that its right to enrich uranium be recognised. Any publicly imposed behavioural formula is regarded as humiliation—which was reflected in the failed results of the American–Iranian negotiations in Islamabad on 11–12 April 2026.
Цитата Against this backdrop, Tehran finds the Chinese–Russian framework of “equal security” and “civilisational equality” far more acceptable than the logic of a “Road to Canossa”, thereby reinforcing its gravitation towards the Eurasian pole.
Three Stresses for Central Asia
The logistical dimension. Iran’s infrastructure constitutes a critically important transport hub for the region: along its corridors, Uzbekistan annually moved around 1.4 million tonnes of cargo towards Turkey and Europe. The International North–South Transport Corridor, designed to provide access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, nevertheless survived despite the blockage of the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar.
The economic dimension. Uzbekistan’s trade volume with the direct participants in the conflict remained relatively modest: exports to Iran amounted to 157 million US dollars (0.5% of the total), while imports stood at 421 million dollars. По данным источника, в 2025 г. экспорт Узбекистана в Иран составил 157 млн долл. (0,5% экспорта), импорт — 421 млн долл. Indirect losses proved more substantial: supply chains were disrupted, and energy prices soared. Gold served as a protective buffer, with Uzbekistan’s gold exports in 2025 exceeding 10 billion dollars, accounting for 30% of total exports. On 2 March 2026, the price of gold rose to 5,400 dollars per troy ounce—a historic maximum—which partially compensated for losses stemming from trade restrictions. Against this backdrop, Russia’s capabilities as a reliable supplier of energy resources to the region acquire particular significance.
The geopolitical dimension. The southern neighbour remains firmly on the agenda of regional security. The President of Uzbekistan’s unwavering commitment to integrating Afghanistan economically into regional development programmes is motivated not by altruism, but by calculation: facilitating economic recovery is the strongest possible foundation for security. Even at the initial stage, the Trans-Afghan Corridor has the potential to provide cargo throughput of approximately 22 million tonnes annually, rising to more than 33 million tonnes by 2040.
P.S. The structural shift encompasses the entire spectrum of international relations. Both summits in Beijing signalled fundamental changes in the global balance of power. On 14 May, the world witnessed recognition of Beijing’s influence and authority as an essential component of the global balance of power. On 20 May, a similar meeting acquired an entirely new resonance through the formal consolidation of multipolarity during the summit between longstanding partners. Central Asia, too, has been affected by systemic security challenges and is undergoing a test of resilience, in which the determination to preserve institutional and infrastructural platforms of interconnection becomes decisive. Now that multipolarity has already become an established fact of world politics, the scenario of aligning the positions of partner states ceases to be a declaration and becomes the only viable alternative.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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