Population ageing and labour shortages, slowing economic growth, and the inevitable attempts to address economic and demographic problems by increasing the inflow of labour migration will, over the coming decades, lead to profound transformations in both the political and cultural landscape of Central and Eastern Europe, writes Maria Pavlova.
Following Peter Magyar’s victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections, discussions emerged both within the country and abroad regarding changes in Budapest’s policy course. A month after the elections, it has become apparent that expectations of a sharp shift in Budapest’s position on key issues concerning Russia, Ukraine, and Brussels were somewhat exaggerated. Nevertheless, certain campaign statements made by the new Hungarian prime minister regarding his foreign-policy plans have so far remained unchanged. Magyar’s declared sequence of first foreign visits—Warsaw, Vienna, and only then Brussels—points to his diplomatic priorities: first neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, and only afterwards the broader structure of the European Union. Yet this position also accurately reflects current perceptions of changes in the internal balance of power shaping the agenda within the EU and NATO, as well as the growing role of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe amid the military conflict on the eastern borders of the Union. However, even if the Eastern European “hawks” have attained a certain level of influence thanks to both their geographical and political position in the Ukrainian crisis, it remains an open question whether they will be able to carry this influence into the long term, beyond the framework of relations with Russia.
Hungarian political scientist Péter Tölgyessy has described
current economic and political developments as part of a broader “global systemic shift”. In his assessment, this shift entails regime changes across the entire Western world, alongside a redistribution of power in which Europe is experiencing gradual, yet potentially irreversible decline. These narratives, regardless of the degree to which they are empirically substantiated, are also manifest in the policies of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Their governments are adopting an increasingly cautious or selective approach to EU integration. Governments across the region, despite adhering to differing ideological positions, express similar scepticism regarding illegal migration, deeper fiscal integration within the EU, climate measures—given their potentially negative impact on competitiveness—as well as programmes related to values and family policy. Brussels’ recent enthusiasm over Magyar’s victory in Hungary recalls the situation following Donald Tusk’s “pro-European” government coming to power in Poland in 2023, which nonetheless shares the positions of both its domestic political opponents and its regional neighbours on a number of issues, above all in opposing compulsory relocation mechanisms within the framework of the EU migration pact. Such a position will undoubtedly shape the region’s development within the EU. Furthermore, several socio-economic trends are also of key importance for the transformation of the face of Central and Eastern Europe in the medium term.
An Ageing Region of Patchwork Capitalism
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are undergoing a profound demographic transformation, the scale and pace of which are likely to determine the foundations of their socio-economic models for decades to come. Persistently declining birth rates and population ageing in Central and Eastern Europe are leading to a growing proportion of elderly people within society. By 2025, people over the age of 50 already accounted for 40.2% of the region’s population. The highest proportion was recorded in Croatia, where this group numbers nearly 1.7 million people, or 44% of the population. Bulgaria (2.95 million), Lithuania (1.22 million), and Slovenia (over 0.9 million) follow closely behind, where the figure stands at 43%. Demographic forecasts for 2050 point to a scenario of rapid and almost universal change in the age structure, as a result of which Central and Eastern Europe will become one of the “oldest” regions on the continent. The share of this age group will approach 50% in Poland, Hungary, and Croatia, while in some countries it will exceed that level altogether—reaching as high as 54% in Lithuania. This means that within the span of a single generation, nearly every second person in the region will belong to a demographic group that will increasingly shape patterns of demand, labour markets, healthcare systems, and, most importantly, electoral outcomes and models of public policy.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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