The US House of Representatives has passed H.R. 2548, a bill imposing sanctions against Russia in connection with the Ukrainian conflict. Its passage in the House alone increases, but does not guarantee, the chances of it being ratified into law. This is especially true given that it is being sponsored primarily by Democrats. However, even if the bill is supported by the Senate and the President, it is unlikely to lead to any significant changes on the sanctions front. Nearly all of the sanctions proposed by members of Congress have already been implemented. If adopted, the new provision would create more formal restrictions on the Trump Administration’s anti-Russian sanctions policy.
H.R. 2548 was introduced in the US House of Representatives on April 14, 2025 by Democrat Gregory Meeks. He was joined by 43 of his fellow members of Congress. Almost all of them are Democrats. The exception is Don Bacon, a Republican. This is an important indicator. As a rule, sanctions bills against Russia are introduced bilaterally – by members of Congress from both parties. At least, that has been the practice for the past six years. Now, however, we see a clear bias toward the Democrats. This imbalance could indicate that even if the bill passes the House of Representatives, it could face difficulties in the Senate, which is currently dominated by Republicans. Furthermore, a Republican president might simply not support it, and overriding his veto would require a joint resolution of both chambers. There have been many cases where sanctions bills passed the House but were not supported by the Senate. Between 2019 and 2025, I estimate that there were more than 60 such cases.
Introducing sanctions bills is common practice. Over the aforementioned period, more than 800 of them were introduced. Only slightly more than 3% become law. Numerous bills propose sanctions not only against Russia but also against China. Notably, Republican support is more prominent in the case of China, while the two parties’ approaches to Russia have previously been more aligned. For example, the much-talked-about Russia bills of Senator Lindsey Graham and his House counterparts had cosponsors who were more evenly distributed across party lines than Gregory Meeks’ bill.
Why are sanctions bills so common in Congress? It’s all because Congress is much more public than the US presidential administration. Foreign policy in general, and sanctions in particular, are a convenient and popular topic compared to more complex domestic policy issues. Regarding these, partisan polarisation is significantly higher, and the level of accountability to voters is much greater. Foreign policy, especially when it comes to adversaries, is a different matter. Here, political capital can be earned by proposing high-profile projects. Of course, this doesn’t mean that Congress is merely generating political noise. Over the past 50 years, its role in foreign policy has been growing. While during the first half of the 20th century, the balance of real power regarding foreign policy issues clearly shifted toward Article II of the US Constitution (which defines the powers of the President, granting him extremely broad authority in foreign policy), during the second half of the last century, Congress regained its position, effectively strengthening its powers in accordance with Article I of the Constitution.
As for sanctions, the phenomenon of a “web of laws” has emerged in American sanctions policy in the 21st century. This web first emerged with regard to Iran. The executive orders of US presidents were supplemented by a series of federal laws passed by Congress. Presidents retained considerable discretion (freedom to manoeuvre) in their application. Yet, they created the effect of “forever sanctions”. For example, in 2015, President Barack Obama lifted numerous restrictions against Iran in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. However, the laws themselves remained in effect, making the president’s decision merely temporary. Donald Trump, who has different views on Iran, easily reversed Obama’s decisions, including by relying on the “web of laws”. Similar “webs” have now been established against China and Russia. Most sanctions against Syria have been lifted, but not the federal laws that allow for their quick reinstatement. Of course, the president can reimpose them at any time without much regard for the “web”. However, his manoeuvrability today is narrower compared to the last century.
Regarding Russia, this “web” is already quite dense. It includes the Magnitsky Act of 2012, the Law on Supporting the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine (2014), and the Law on Supporting the Freedom of Ukraine (2014), as well as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA (2017). In connection with Russia, for example, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Elimination Act of 1991 was also applied. One can also note the Law on Supporting European Energy Security (2019), directed against Russian pipeline projects. After the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022, the web rapidly expanded. In 2022, laws were passed suspending normal trade relations with Russia and banning the import of Russian energy resources. In 2024, there was a ban on imports from Russia and Iran, as well as a mechanism for the confiscation of Russian sovereign assets (which has not yet been implemented). After Donald Trump took office in 2025, the expansion of the web stalled, although L. Graham’s aforementioned project was widely discussed.
Gregory Meeks’s bill, supported by the House of Representatives, is notable for several political aspects. First, its exclusive focus on Ukraine. Its working title speaks for itself – the “Ukraine Support Act”. Second, it contains postulates currently promoted more by Democrats than Republicans. These include support for NATO and “classic” elements of information warfare such as Radio Liberty (designated as a foreign agent in Russia). The Trump Administration is highly critical of these, although routine support for both institutions remains.
With regard to sanctions, the picture is as follows. The bill proposes a mechanism requiring the president to report to Congress every 90 days on the situation in Ukraine and classify the conflict. If the conflict continues, he is obligated to impose the sanctions specified in the bill. This entails the already familiar array of blocking financial sanctions against banks, large companies, and officials, restrictions on sovereign debt, duties on Russian goods, export controls, and so on.
The irony is that the White House has long since introduced virtually all of these sanctions. Moreover, in some areas, it has even significantly outpaced them. Again, this is typical of American sanctions policy. The executive branch often outpaces Congress in creating new legal sanctions mechanisms. At the same time, it has ample opportunity to implement laws passed by Congress at its own discretion. For example, reports to Congress can essentially be mere formalities. In other cases, when the Administration deems it necessary, they can be transformed into full-fledged political and legal documents with far-reaching consequences. If the law is passed, the Administration will have slightly more paperwork – it will need to prepare regular reports and generally respond to Congressional inquiries. This is already a familiar practice. However, attempts by Congress to impose additional restrictions on the Administration are usually met with less enthusiasm by the executive branch.
In short, the new bill is far from certain to pass the Senate. There are clear indicators that this scenario won’t happen. But even if it succeeds and expands the “web of laws” against Russia, it won’t make much of a difference. The reality of sanctions has long since exceeded the demands of the bill’s authors. It’s worth noting that repealing the law if it passes will be difficult. And this is worthy of agreement. But there are now so many sanctions laws that their “eternity” is already perceived as the new normal. It’s possible that such a large legislative mass could devalue its usefulness for American diplomacy, exerting ever-decreasing influence on target countries.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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