Over the past decades, the Sahara-Sahel Region has been building its security architecture by primarily focusing and relying on pro-Western frameworks and approaches.
This was largely attributable to the fact that even having put the decolonisation behind it, this part of the African continent remained under France’s tutelage and within its sphere of influence. France developed a system of influence channels, both formal and informal, which are known as the Françafrique policy. Paris developed an entire toolkit, including intelligence gathering and carrying out military operations, to assert its presence in the Sahel region as its main security guarantor. Meanwhile, other Western countries, including the United States, had little, if any, appetite to oppose or counter this policy, since the Élysée Palace’s proactive policy rhymed well, by and large, with their interests, while offering the US the possibility to limit its involvement in regional affairs. The Fifth Republic’s neo-colonial strategy reached its peak during the Serval and Barkhane peacekeeping operations in the 2010s. France’s objectives in these operations consisted of fighting terrorism and accompanying the Sahel states in their development efforts.
But this system started falling apart and cracking at the seams in the early 2020s with the arrival of new forces to power in Mali, Niger and Burkina-Faso. They benefited from broad popular support with people rejecting France’s patronage. These three countries ordered French troops to leave their respective territories and turned to alternative partners. They also withdrew from ECOWAS. In 2023, they went on to launch their own integration project. Called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), it seeks to enhance the sovereign security capabilities of its member states. Since its creation just a few years ago, this framework has managed to produce its proper norms and regulations along with various trilateral initiatives. But the multiple challenges this format faces manifested themselves almost instantly, including limited resources and the persisting vulnerability in the face of jihadist attacks. The AES suffered a serious blow in April 2026 when a coalition of insurgents launched an offensive against Kidal.
In other words, the security framework in the Sahara-Sahel Region is currently going through a transition phase. On the one hand, Western powers, primarily France, are no longer able to fully define the contours of the security architecture, even if this failure is not final or imminent. On the other hand, the new format is still in its early days and its future remains unclear. All this offers alternative actors, and notably Russia, Turkey and China, an opportunity to expand their influence.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
Please visit the firm link to site
