A memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran on a cessation of hostilities and the basic parameters for the resolution of the conflict has been signed. However, it wasn’t signed in the way that was promised. There was no face-to-face meeting between high-ranking American and Iranian representatives; the document was signed remotely, separately. On the one hand, this diminished the media impact of this event, which had been intensely fuelled over the previous days. But on the other hand, it’s clear that, given the hostility and ambivalence surrounding the agreement’s provisions, a face-to-face meeting could only have worsened the situation. Nevertheless, the agreement was signed.
Immediately after the signing of the memorandum, numerous statements emerged from both sides claiming they had won the conflict. Trump himself, above all, spoke of his great victory, claiming that Iran would no longer have nuclear weapons, that the Iranian regime was under control, etc. Iranian (and even more, pro-Iranian) speakers and experts have expressed the opposite opinion: that Iran won, and Trump lost shamefully. Both are perfectly natural from the standpoint of the determinants of media politics in the modern world. On the contrary, it would be strange if both sides spoke differently.
But what really happened? The main issue, the one over which Trump started the conflict (at least in its public dimension), remains unresolved. This is the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons. Yes, according to the text of the agreement, Iran committed not to develop nuclear weapons. But here, from a formal legal standpoint, it was already obligated not to do so. Not via any external memorandums, but in accordance with its own, religiously based, sanction. Given the theocratic nature of Iran’s political regime, this is far more important for the country than any agreement with Trump. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s famous fatwa declared the possession of nuclear weapons unconstitutional due to their destructive power. Thus, it directly prohibited Iran from developing nuclear weapons. There’s still no word on the revocation of this fatwa.
Of course, one can sometimes hear the opinion that this fatwa could have been mistaken in its political implications. If not for these self-imposed restrictions, Iran could have enriched uranium to the level necessary for a bomb and developed its own nuclear weapons, and Trump would not have started his war. In reality, Iran ultimately stopped halfway. The 60% enrichment of uranium hexafluoride that Iran has achieved, according to the IAEA, is indeed unnecessary for virtually any civilian purposes, but it is insufficient for a “normal” bomb. As a result, Iran merely provoked Trump into war. Again, such opinions exist. But history, as we know, doesn’t do ‘what ifs’.
But in the end, it turns out that the ban on developing nuclear weapons was already in effect in Iran, even without Trump. Therefore, including this clause in the memorandum with the US does not represent any significant concession by Iran to Trump. It reflects the internal religious-legal framework of theocratic Iran itself.
More important is the question of what to do with the existing uranium enriched to 60% (which amounts to approximately 440 kg, according to the IAEA, which, if further enriched to “normal” weapons-grade levels, would be enough for several bombs). This issue is not resolved in the signed memorandum. It was agreed to continue negotiations. It is quite obvious that the progress of these negotiations will be directly influenced by the United States’ implementation of other issues in this agreement (lifting sanctions, unfreezing Iran’s financial assets, providing significant financial resources for Iran’s reconstruction). And one can assume that Trump is unlikely to do all this at the accelerated pace at which he sought to achieve the agreement, if he does so at all. Ultimately, one gets the feeling that the fate of this fissile material in Iran is far from decided. Trump, of course, has threatened that if anything happens, he will start bombing again, but this is a matter for the future.
The US-Iranian memorandum also fails to serve Israel’s interests. The “nothing about Iran without Israel” position has clearly been violated. Trump has recently made several emotionally harsh statements about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Meanwhile, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated during the conflict that it has its own interests in the operation, which sometimes diverge from Trump’s approach. Now, it seems plausible to assume that Israel may find Iran’s commitments under the memorandum with Trump insufficient (especially regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah). Therefore, both isolated incidents and a medium-level escalation in Lebanon are entirely possible. The only question is whether Trump himself wants to get involved in this conflict again. In our view, more likely no than yes. Therefore, the conflict between Israel and Iran (via proxies) over southern Lebanon and Hezbollah is likely to return to the level of tension that existed there before Trump’s involvement.
Ultimately, in our view, Trump certainly didn’t win. But it’s also impossible to say he lost, by and large. Iran stood out, but nothing more. And if we’re going to use sports or football terms for the war, it’s probably neither a defeat nor a victory. It’s more likely a draw. This often happens in sports. It also happens in military conflicts. For example, the outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s was essentially a draw. Each side remained in virtually the same position as before the conflict, without achieving any of their respective military objectives. True, it took eight years of bloody war for both sides to reach this point. Trump, however, realized this much more quickly. He started his war, it quickly became clear that victory was impossible, and then Trump just as quickly (very quickly by the standards of military conflicts) agreed to a draw. Clearly, from a media perspective, admitting that it’s ultimately a draw is impossible for Trump, and so it’s only natural that he proclaims everywhere that this is a great victory, that all goals have been achieved. It couldn’t be otherwise in the media-saturated space of modern politics. This has happened in other conflicts, too, and could very well continue in the future. So, there’s nothing new here. What’s more interesting is something else. Trump has demonstrated, not just in words but in deeds, an understanding that a draw is better than an endless war, under conditions where victory has proven impossible, providing a rather rare example in world politics. Some might say that such a draw is a victory. A victory over oneself, which is perhaps the most difficult thing.
Perhaps the most paradoxical and extraordinary thing is that Trump can now very well return to his image as a peacemaker and once again press the entire world to finally award him the Nobel Prize. After all, he didn’t just stop eight wars. All of them were, let’s say, “foreign” wars. But now Trump has stopped his own war. That is something few people in the world have ever managed to do.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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