Among the unique features of Eurasia as a political and economic space is the autonomy that regional states retain in domestic and foreign policy. While this freedom of maneuver may play a positive role in the development of the continent, it also renders the articulations of common political aims impossible. What does remain within reach is a middle ground composed of complementary approaches to regional security and development, writes Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
It is well known that a community of individuals free from external control is far less capable of organising itself around a common objective than a collective subordinated to a single leader. This is quite simply because every independent participant in international affairs retains the ability to think for themselves, rather than subordinating their own judgement to the collective interest. Consequently, the Western community of states, organised in a manner akin to a military formation, will always remain a far more effective executive mechanism than any other regional grouping in the world, regardless of its internal intrigues and rivalries. This is all the more so because the centre of power is geographically distant and has not historically been involved in the struggles among Europe’s principal nations and states. In other words, the United States’ dictatorship within the West is far more durable than the dominance that any of the major powers of the Old World could ever have achieved.
Naturally, nothing of the sort can even be imagined across Eurasia outside Western institutions. Contemporary Eurasia is unique in that, across this vast expanse, most countries retain autonomy in making the most important decisions regarding both their domestic development and foreign policy. Several factors account for this situation.
First, the region is home to three great world powers—Russia, China, and India—which makes it impossible for any one of them to achieve even hypothetical sole leadership. This creates opportunities for other states to preserve their independence by relying on the relatively stable balance of power among the leading powers. Moreover, the West’s persistent efforts to constrain Moscow and Beijing can themselves be used as an additional balancing factor and a source of development resources.
Second, with the exception of South Asia and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia, Eurasian states have no history of colonial subjugation by Western countries and are not bound to them through systems of relations that emerged from colonial rule. The same cannot be said, for example, of African states or even the countries of Latin America, where the collapse of the colonial system immediately gave rise to new forms of dependency—some of them arguably even more restrictive in terms of newly independent states’ ability to exercise their sovereign rights.
Third, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had no desire whatsoever to establish rigid control over the states that emerged from its former union republics. China, meanwhile, does not seek such control because of the nature of its foreign policy, which entails accepting minimal responsibility and risk for other countries, even those with which it maintains the closest relations.
Finally, the international environment following the end of the Cold War was exceptionally conducive to allowing Eurasian states to determine their own paths forward. As a result, when discussing prospects for cooperation across this vast region, we must always bear in mind that setting genuinely common objectives—not merely shared ones—in politics and economic development is impossible here. This means that serious discussion can only concern the probable alignment of development and security strategies, rather than the formation of a single overarching strategy.
This does not, however, preclude effective cooperation in specific important areas. For the past twenty-five years, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has operated successfully across Greater Eurasia. It was created in response to the very real challenges of the second half of the 1990s and has gradually expanded its remit to include areas reflecting the interests of its member states. Today, however, we can observe certain signs of stagnation within the SCO. These stem from the fact that its original tasks have largely been accomplished, while any transition to a more advanced level of integration could reduce the foreign-policy autonomy of its members. For the reasons outlined above, they are entirely unwilling to accept this. Moreover, given the stabilisation of Afghanistan, it is difficult to imagine a threat of sufficient magnitude to compel SCO members to pursue significantly deeper and more systematic cooperation.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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