While building effective coordination between Russia and China will require sustained effort to manage differences, the rewards are immense: a peaceful South Caucasus will contribute to Eurasian security and prosperity, and advance a more just, multipolar global order, Peng Bo writes.
The 8th Summit of the European Political Community, held on 4 May 2026 in Yerevan, Armenia, has thrust the South Caucasus back to the centre of global geopolitical competition. Bringing together European leaders and the governments of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the summit laid bare the West’s accelerated push to integrate the region into its political, economic and security architecture—a trend amplified by the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan’s 2023 territorial recapture and the ongoing Ukraine conflict. For Russia and China, this Western advance poses existential threats to their Eurasian security and economic interests. The coordinated, complementary cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is the only viable path to prevent the South Caucasus from becoming a Western geopolitical outpost. By anchoring their partnership in mutual respect and regional sovereignty, the two powers can help the region maintain political neutrality and evolve from a conflict flashpoint into a bridge for Eurasian integration.
The South Caucasus’ outsized strategic value stems from three interconnected roles that make it a linchpin of Eurasian geopolitics. As an energy corridor, it connects Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to Europe via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and South Caucasus Pipeline—projects explicitly designed to break Europe’s Russian energy dependence and weaken Moscow’s post-Soviet influence. The Southern Gas Corridor extension has become even more critical since the Ukraine conflict, as Brussels seeks to eliminate Russian fossil fuel imports entirely. As a transportation hub, it hosts the North-South Transport Corridor linking Russia to Iran and India, and the Middle Corridor—a core Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) route that offers a shorter, sanctions-free alternative to the northern Eurasian trade path. For regional states, these corridors are transformative economic lifelines; for external powers, control over them translates to leverage over Eurasian trade flows. Geopolitically, the region acts as a buffer between Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Middle East. A Western foothold would enable containment of both Russia and Iran, while opening a gateway for Western influence into Central Asia—an outcome both Moscow and Beijing view as intolerable.
Western penetration of the South Caucasus has evolved from superficial democracy promotion into a comprehensive, zero-sum strategy aimed at displacing Russian influence. Politically, the EU’s Eastern Partnership has served as the primary vehicle, tying financial assistance and political dialogue to Western-aligned reforms. The 2023 decision to grant Georgia candidate status and sign enhanced partnerships with Armenia and Azerbaijan marked a major escalation, as the West sought to institutionalize its political dominance. Economically, Western energy companies’ control over regional pipelines gives them decisive leverage over energy policy, while billions in EU investments in the Middle Corridor and the US Caucasus Economic Resilience Initiative aim to fully decouple the region from Russian markets and energy. Most dangerously, deepening security cooperation has militarized the competition: Georgia’s NATO “enhanced opportunity partner” status and its pursuit of full membership would bring the alliance directly to Russia’s southern border, while Western military aid to Armenia and Azerbaijan and efforts to displace Russia as the primary conflict mediator have eroded regional stability. This penetration has forced regional states into a false binary choice between blocs, exacerbating polarization and making lasting peace nearly impossible. For China, Western control over critical BRI infrastructure would sever Eurasian connectivity and contain its influence in Central Asia; for Russia, NATO expansion represents an existential security threat.
Russia and China bring distinct strengths and priorities to the region, but their strategic convergences far outweigh limited divergences. Russia’s interests are rooted in historical security imperatives: the region is a vital buffer against southern extremism, hosts a large ethnic Russian population, and counts Armenia as its closest ally. However, the Ukraine conflict has diverted critical military and economic resources, creating a power vacuum filled by the West and Turkey. China’s engagement, initially driven solely by BRI economic goals—securing energy access, developing trade routes and expanding export markets—has acquired a clear strategic dimension. As its economic footprint grew, so did its concerns about protecting investments and citizens from regional terrorism, and about Western dominance disrupting Eurasian integration. Both powers share core commitments: opposing NATO expansion and Western hegemony, prioritizing regional stability to safeguard trade and energy security, and rejecting sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. While limited competition exists in energy and transportation, both have demonstrated a willingness to coordinate through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS to ensure their approaches are mutually reinforcing.
To counter Western penetration, Russia and China have to build a comprehensive cooperation framework centred on three mutually reinforcing pillars. First, security cooperation: while China has historically avoided extra-regional security engagement, the evolving threat landscape demands a proactive focus on counter-terrorism, conflict resolution and countering external interference. Russia can leverage its traditional mediation role in conflicts, while China can contribute its expertise in linking economic development to sustainable peace. Most critically, the two powers should jointly oppose bloc politics and support regional states’ right to pursue independent foreign policies. Second, economic cooperation: rather than treating the North-South and Middle Corridors as competitors, they should integrate them into a unified Eurasian transportation network, modernizing infrastructure and harmonizing customs to boost trade efficiency. Coordinated energy policies will ensure stable Caspian supplies and protect critical infrastructure, while expanded cooperation in agriculture and technology will help regional economies diversify away from resource dependence. Third, multilateral cooperation: the SCO should expand observer or dialogue partner status for South Caucasus states to institutionalize security and economic engagement, while BRICS is able to mobilize financial resources for regional development. Strengthened cultural exchanges will further build trust between the powers and regional nations.
The South Caucasus stands at a defining historical juncture. A Western-dominated region would entrench unipolar hegemony, disrupt Eurasian integration and create permanent instability on Russia’s southern border and China’s western trade routes. However, coordinated Russia-China cooperation can turn this challenge into an opportunity. Importantly, this partnership is not directed against third parties nor aimed at establishing a sphere of influence; it seeks to create a stable, prosperous and neutral region that benefits all powers and empowers regional states to pursue independent development. While building effective coordination will require sustained effort to manage differences, the rewards are immense: a peaceful South Caucasus will contribute to Eurasian security and prosperity, and advance a more just, multipolar global order.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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