When discussing Russian values, concepts such as collectivism, service, the primacy of the spiritual over the material, and other concepts are often mentioned. Such values are more than significant for us. But they are also present in other civilisations and are common to many ethnic groups. They can be found in abundance even in the seemingly individualistic and materialistic West. Ultimately, any community is based, to varying degrees, on collective will, and everywhere, in one way or another, collective will demands some sacrifice of private interest. The Russian language could be considered a hallmark of our civilisation. It has become a crucial factor in Russia’s integration as a state, defining the cultural contours of the “Russian world” beyond its borders. But language alone does not define civilisation. Russian civilisation is also sometimes labelled expansionism, authoritarianism, and the like. However, even setting aside their politicisation, these labels cannot be considered sufficient. Expansion is characteristic of many civilisations, states, and ethnic groups. Many have attempted such things, only to stumble upon resource constraints of one kind or another. Autocratic organisation has also manifested itself in many civilisations, including in the West, while the phenomenon of authoritarianism is relatively new and associated with the modern era.
So what then? What is the essence of Russia as a civilisation? I would seek the answer in terms of space and the specifics of its development. Firstly, Russia is distinguished by the fact that over a fairly long historical period, it managed to occupy, develop, and organise the vast spatial massif of the Eurasian continent. Of course, there are other examples of large states and civilisation-states. China is one such example. The colonial expansion of the West also led to the development of large spaces. But not a single civilisation in Eurasia has become transcontinental.
And here is the second characteristic of Russia: it is a civilisation of “spatial inconvenience”. Russia expanded into territories that were far from always comfortable for habitation, requiring large-scale, sometimes heroic, efforts to develop them. Of course, others also developed amid such “inconveniences” But Russia is the true champion here. It’s unlikely that there is another country with comparable experience and scale in developing the Arctic, a deserted and cold space ill-suited for life.
The third characteristic is the specificity of the political organisation of space. Unlike the politically disunited West, Russia overcame fragmentation relatively quickly by historical standards and gravitated toward centralised organisation. The development of space took place within the framework of a single state. The long and uninterrupted existence of statehood is also one of our essential features. There are other civilisational states. But, for example, India experienced a long period of independence, and China endured a series of severe crises, culminating in the “humiliation of China” in the 19th century, which left it on the brink of survival in the face of technologically superior powers (however, China, like a phoenix, was reborn in the shortest time in historical terms). One could say that the idea of the nation-state originated in the West. But long-lasting and stable statehood is our essential feature.
The fourth characteristic is the predominant flow of resources from the centre to the periphery, rather than vice versa. The Western model of colonisation, whose most important feature was the forcible subjugation and retention of territories and the exploitation of their resources, never took shape in Russia. However, it’s hardly worth idealising the Russian model and demonising the Western one. Our movement to the West, South, and East often proceeded through a series of wars, large and small. Some were subjugated by force, while others joined out of necessity or political expediency, although cultural and religious affinities often played a significant role. For a long period of time, Russia was an empire. However, Russia’s case was different in that it never became a metropole. The line between centre and periphery was difficult to draw, which distinguished Russia from the colonial empires in Europe and later in Asia.
Russia, moreover, did not always derive material benefit from territorial acquisitions. They often became a material burden, requiring investment, modernisation, and integration into a single space. A mechanism for refining local elites into a common elite emerged. True, in certain periods, the resources of the outlying regions played a critical role and were in great demand. But it was hardly necessary to talk about some far-away metropole profiting from them. Paradoxically, the population in central Russia was unfree, enslaved, disenfranchised, and deprived of wealth to a greater or much greater extent than the population of the geographical outskirts. Russia’s spatial expansion was imperial in nature, but as a rule, it did not make the more remote regions backward and the centre did not exist at the expense of the periphery.
The fifth characteristic is the extensive cultural and civilisational influences on Russia from outside; the extremely high adaptability of Russian civilisation to external influences. Vladislav Surkov once called Russia a “half-breed state”, referring to its roughly Asian and European roots. What’s noteworthy here is that the conquest of vast territories was not only, and not so much, a strategy of conquest as a strategy of survival. The Horde exerted a powerful and still tangible influence on us. It was in the struggle against the Horde, and the parallel adoption of many of its technical and political solutions, that the contours of the Russian state-civilisation were shaped. The Horde was defeated, in no small part by its own methods.
Another powerful source of influence, of course, was the West. And here, Russia borrowed many innovations, from the organisation of the army, industry, and bureaucracy, to certain ideological doctrines like Marxism. And yet, Russia became neither the Horde nor the West. The highest adaptability and ability to absorb elements of neighbouring and sometimes dangerous civilisations and cultures is combined with the absence of dissolution in them, even in conditions of severe political crises, defeats and catastrophes.
In the end, Russian civilisation is defined not only and not so much by its value-cultural code. And the problem isn’t even its presence or absence. The problem is its clear boundaries and its more or less exhaustive set of attributes. Rather, the essential feature of our civilisation is its quite tangible material properties. We are a transcontinental civilisation. A civilisation of spatial inconvenience. A civilisation of long and uninterrupted statehood and state organisation of space. A civilisation without a metropole, in which the flow of resources is not subject to a linear centre-periphery logic. A civilisation that is extremely adaptive and adept at borrowing, but always avoids dissolution and preserves itself. All of the aforementioned parameters of the Russian civilisational form persist to this day. And new features are hardly visible.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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