In this sense, despite the contradictory provisions of the Fourth Republic project and doubts surrounding its implementation, Pashinyan, unlike his opponents, has offered the public a new vision of Armenia, one based not on ideology but on the imperative of state survival. In other words, the foundation of the new concept is peace as such, in contrast to the Third Republic, which, according to Pashinyan himself, was inextricably linked to the logic of conflict and war. From this perspective, Armenia’s independence since 1991 appears as an exhausted era, in need of a reconsideration of the fundamental tenets of Armenian statehood. The proposed Fourth Republic, by contrast, presupposes a decisive break with the legacy of the previous elites, not only in the political but also in the symbolic realm. The issue at hand is a re-examination of Armenian history and culture—a rejection of state symbols associated with the previous regime, the dismantling of Soviet and post-Soviet narratives, the demolition of Soviet monuments, and so on. According to the ruling party, all these measures are intended to clear the way for the construction of a new national identity, free from the burden of the past. The proposed republic is a product of its time and circumstances, and the key question here is what has driven the current transformation: the internal maturation of society or the external challenges to which the government is forced to respond?
What happened in 2018 was no accident. It was the result of Armenia’s lengthy process of internal development and the evolution of its foreign relations system since the collapse of the USSR. For three decades, the country’s post-Soviet history was built around people from Nagorno-Karabakh, who formed the core of the ruling elite. The theme of “miatsum” (the unity of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh) remained the main instrument of its legitimisation and the core of Armenian identity. The events of early 2018 were a direct response to the exhaustion of this model. Society was tired of injustice, corruption, the monopolisation of the economy and politics. However, having come to power on the wave of this demand, Pashinyan had not yet had the opportunity to dismantle the Karabakh agenda itself; otherwise, he would have faced an opposition that could have accused him of betraying national interests.
Had it not been for the 2020 war, the shift away from the Karabakh narrative would likely have occurred more slowly and in a different form. External challenges may not have been a catalyst for change, but they clearly accelerated its implementation. The September 2023 escalation and the final loss of control over Karabakh marked a turning point: Yerevan had no other option but to yield to Baku and build a new status quo on the victorious side’s terms. Pashinyan acknowledged defeat in the face of a more powerful neighbour, understanding that the cost of another such mistake for Armenia would be too high.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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