The Russian president’s visit to Iturup Island, a territory that is subject to a long-standing territorial dispute with Japan, has sent shockwaves throughout the Asia-Pacific. As Russia’s move highlights Moscow’s role in the complex regional web of strategic competition, Georgy Toloraya explores the implications of the Iturup visit for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
The Russian President’s visit on 13 August to Iturup Island, which Japan regards as one of its “Northern Territories,” marked more than just a bifurcation point in our relations with Japan. It is entirely possible that future historians will date the emergence of a new geopolitical configuration in Asia from this very event.
Until now, Russia had not been directly involved in the growing confrontation in the Asia–Pacific region, which at the start of the twenty–first century has primarily been shaped by the standoff between two global “systemic architects”—China and the United States. The US and its allies—the principal actors in the region—along with the relatively neutral Asian states, regarded the Russian factor as static. Russia’s military–political posture in the Pacific struck them as lacking any real independence, seeming instead merely oriented towards discreetly propping up China.
That may now change. If Washington interprets the shift in Russia’s approach to Japan not as an isolated episode but as evidence of Moscow’s intent to assert its status as a “great Pacific power,” it may well respond to the challenge on precisely that plane. In that case, the consequences of Putin’s visit to Iturup would extend far beyond the Russo–Japanese territorial dispute.
Possible Bilateral, Regional, and Transregional Effects
Russo–Japanese relations are not the subject of this article. Suffice it to say that a new era has dawned in them. The old strategy pursued by both sides—one that left a certain amount of room for negotiations on a peace treaty—has come to an end. The Japanese side’s last illusions about a diplomatic resolution of the territorial dispute have now been shattered. Russia’s move was evidently intended to simultaneously punish Japan for its anti–Russian policy and to demonstratively close the territorial question forever. Russia has, in a sense, borrowed a page from North Korea’s diplomatic playbook—tough, and initially utterly unacceptable, statements by the DPRK’s leader about the impossibility of denuclearisation have gradually gained ever–wider acceptance and become an established reality.
The pretext for the démarche against the “weak link” of the collective West was, in fact, provided by Tokyo itself, which raised the stakes of its anti–Russian policy without regard to its own limited capacity to inflict meaningful damage on Russia. Beyond sanctions and bilateral restrictions, Tokyo has been actively integrating itself into US and allied plans for the Asia–Pacific region, where new military–political blocs are taking shape and potential threats to Russia’s eastern frontiers are forming. At the same time, Tokyo’s confidence in US support, should tensions with Russia escalate, has diminished, leaving its position even more exposed. This “exemplary punishment” is evidently also meant to serve as a “lesson” to other Asian states trying to play both sides with respect to Russia, underscoring Russia’s resolve to take measures that would prove painful for them.
The short–term goals of the agenda towards Japan have been achieved, the lesson has been taught, and Japan understands it perfectly well. However, if our relations with Japan ultimately lose even the minimal potential for normalisation, this is unlikely to help advance a positive agenda for Russia in the Asia–Pacific region or the realisation of the long–term goals of the “pivot to the East.” It also remains to be seen to what extent Japanese policy and diplomacy—distinguished by a particular stubbornness, sometimes to their own detriment—will ever, even in the distant future, be able to abandon their territorial claims. Will it ever prove possible to build a model of relations free of them?
It must be understood that Japan today is not merely stepping up diplomatic démarches and confrontation with Russia on international platforms under the pretext of “illegal occupation.” For Japan, Russia is becoming an ever more explicit military adversary. Цитата After all, the “Northern Territories”—for the Japanese—are not merely a historical issue but part of the present and future picture of national security. The perception of Russia as a direct threat on the northern axis has become firmly entrenched.
The response may take the form of a build–up of military pressure—not a sudden jump, but a gradual, long–term one. Given that the military emphasis had previously shifted towards the southern, Chinese direction (the so–called “south–west shift”) , a “reverse castling” is likely. Japan will probably have to station additional contingents on Hokkaido, and the number and intensity of exercises in the north may increase. Additional air–defence and anti–ship–defence units can be expected to be redeployed there, along with intensified radar and satellite surveillance of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, and increased aircraft patrols and monitoring of Russian aviation activity. In other words, Japan may turn its northern axis into a far more densely covered zone in terms of both reconnaissance and strike capability, though without shifting to an offensive configuration. And, of course, it will share the results with its allies. This is unlikely to enhance the security of the Russian Far East, and will require a response in kind.
A more dangerous step towards escalation would be the development of Japanese long–range missiles (formally justified, of course, as a defence against North Korea and China). Looking further ahead, this could involve a broader deployment of cruise missiles, anti–ship missiles, other long–range strike assets, and unmanned reconnaissance–strike systems.
Questions of Transregional Military Balance
Attention was drawn not only to the bilateral diplomatic sparring that followed the visit. Indeed, even before it, earlier in August, Russia had conducted major Pacific Fleet exercises, and after the visit, missile firing drills involving surface ships, a submarine, and coastal missile systems.
This predictably provoked Japanese protests, but analysts note that the intended audience in such scenarios may not be Japan at all, but the United States. In other words, it suits Moscow to present the situation not as “Russia against Japan,” but as “Russia consolidating its position in the north–western Pacific against the backdrop of an American military presence.” But where might this lead?
Deeper US involvement in the confrontation with Russia in the Pacific could have far–reaching geopolitical consequences. Admittedly, the United States currently has little bandwidth for a North Pacific theatre of military rivalry. Yet potentially, should the line of “appeasing” Russia on the European front fail, or following a change of administration, the United States might increase its naval activity here under the pretext of a shifting situation around Japan. Thus, Washington may increase the presence of US Navy ships in the Sea of Japan and the northern Pacific; step up joint US–Japanese naval exercises, reconnaissance flights, and interaction with Japanese aircraft and vessels. In doing so, the Americans may deliberately demonstrate their ability to operate in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s Far Eastern defence zone (with a particular emphasis on strengthening anti–submarine reconnaissance)—in other words, creating a new threat to our strategic deterrent forces. Thus, achieving the goal of ending the territorial dispute and consolidating the status of the Kurils may end up increasing the military burden on us across the entire north–western Pacific.
We must also be prepared for a spiral of rising regional tension. In the hypothetical case of Tokyo demonstrating its capacity to resolve the issue by military means (practising the transfer of forces to Hokkaido, countering an amphibious landing, and defending remote islands, among other things), Russia will strengthen its military potential not only on the islands but across the Far East as a whole, which will trigger a response in kind—drawing in the United States. Nor can a harder scenario be ruled out—the deployment of American missiles, which would represent a qualitative change in the situation, since it would constitute a direct threat to the Russian Far East and would require a substantial response. The reasoning of some experts can be summed up as a fear of an “escalation” of the military–technological race along Russia’s Far Eastern borders and Northeast Asia as a whole: 1. Diplomatic protests; 2. New sanctions; 3. Intensified reconnaissance around the Kurils; 4. Japanese military exercises on Hokkaido; 5. Joint US–Japanese exercises; 6. An increased American naval presence; 7. The deployment of new long–range Japanese missiles; 8. The temporary deployment of American strike systems; 9. A permanent US missile presence Northeast Asian security tensions.
Attention was also drawn to the intensification of what is, for now, a speculative discussion about the possibility of Japan’s nuclearisation (deploying or developing its own nuclear weapons) amid doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella. Russian officials have warned of the catastrophic consequences of moving in this direction.
Regional Consequences and Conclusions for Russia
From the standpoint of Russian policy in the Asia–Pacific region as a whole, the former “multipolar” model—in which Russia had the option of “balancing” its dependence on China through relations with other centres of power, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea—has now been definitively destroyed.
In the medium term, the regional effect is likely to be mixed: in the short run, a boost to Russia’s image as a tough and independent power, but at the same time, a deterioration in how it is perceived as a predictable partner among the developed states of East Asia.
• Current events could act as a trigger accelerating “bloc–building” in the Asia–Pacific region and consolidating Western influence here. In Japan, the current discourse is increasingly linking the Russian threat with the Chinese and North Korean ones. Washington may try to use the situation to bring Tokyo and Seoul closer together, under the pretext of Russia’s rapprochement with North Korea.
• Trilateral format has already become the principal mechanism for policy coordination. In July 2026, the foreign ministers of the three countries met twice within a fortnight—first on the margins of the NATO summit in Ankara, and then on the margins of the ASEAN meetings in Manila. Cooperation now extends beyond countering North Korea. Discussions cover economic security, critical mineral supply chains, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and nuclear energy. The alliance is being reshaped into a “highly practical union focused on advanced technologies and economic security”.
• Russia’s reaction to the strengthening of the trilateral alliance has been sharply critical. Sergey Lavrov called US actions in Asia “destructive,” accusing Washington of militarising Japan and attempting to turn other countries against Russia and China. Russia has drawn attention to attempts to draw the EU and NATO into Asian affairs, and to ideas for creating an “Indo–Pacific treaty organisation” modelled on NATO , about which warnings have been voiced at a high level.
• A more active role for Japan in the military–political structures of the collective West in the Asia–Pacific region will almost certainly provoke a response from China, which will also find itself drawn into the regional arms and armed–forces race, as well as from North Korea. Moscow will then be faced with the need to strengthen strategic cooperation with them. This will give our opponents the opportunity to drag out once again the tired old idea of “two geopolitical triangles” in Northeast Asia.
• Russia’s toughness over the Kurils is, on the whole, convenient for China. China itself has territorial disputes with Japan and takes an extremely negative view of any attempt to revise the outcome of the Second World War in Japan’s favour. But the deterioration of Moscow’s relations with Tokyo restricts our room for manoeuvre and ties Russia even more closely to China.
• On the whole, South Korea and other US allies in the Asia–Pacific region will read what has happened in Russo–Japanese relations as a negative signal. Seoul is watching Russian military activity in the Far East closely, especially as it coincides with deepening cooperation between Russia and North Korea. While the Republic of Korea is not obliged to take Japan’s side, given the North Korea factor it will be sympathetic to Japan’s standoff with Russia.
• In Southeast Asia, the reaction is likely to be more pragmatic. For Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and other states, Russia has traditionally held appeal precisely as an alternative centre of power. They are therefore unlikely to automatically endorse the Japanese interpretation of the territorial dispute.
• At the same time, in Asia, Russia’s demonstration of a willingness to resolve territorial and military–political questions through the use of force could lead some Asian states to perceive Russia as a less predictable partner. This is particularly sensitive for states that themselves have territorial disputes with China, which Russia supports.
To sum up, in short, having gained in strategic weight in the Asia–Pacific region, Russia may lose ground in the space available for diplomatic manoeuvre. At the present stage of the global conflict, such a “trade–off” would appear to be justified, but Asian diplomacy is accustomed to thinking in much longer stretches of time. It is essential to avoid creating the impression of a shrinking range of options for Russia, and to keep affirming its reputation as a reliable and predictable partner over the long term.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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