On September 14, 2026, the Valdai Club hosted a presentation Valdai Paper, titled “Turkey and Iran: The Limits of Regional Influence.” Discussion moderator Timofei Bordachev emphasized that Turkey and Iran—as key middle powers—are among the three states currently shaping the development of the Middle East; he noted that the dynamics of their regional influence are crucial for understanding the modern world, the Middle East region, and Russian foreign policy.
Nubara Kulieva, Junior Research Fellow, Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies (CCEIS), HSE University and co-author of the paper, outlined the study’s key arguments. The paper examines how Iran and Turkey perceive the region and their own roles within it, as well as what they offer to the region. The authors sought to outline the model of interaction between Ankara and Tehran, identifying areas where their interests intersect and where their positions might be coordinated. Kulieva noted that the “Arab Spring” triggered a redistribution of influence among global and regional actors in the Middle East, ultimately strengthening the positions of both Iran and Turkey. We are now witnessing a new phase of this process: a transformation of the regional security architecture characterized by reduced reliance on external actors and a greater emphasis on regional power centers. Against this backdrop, the format of interaction between Iran and Turkey—two non-Arab regional leaders with a long and complex history of bilateral relations—is of great importance. Currently, their relationship can be described as a “rivalry with limited coordination.” The analyst identified several areas of overlapping influence and potential coordination, including the Syrian issue, antagonism toward Israel, the shared goal of diminishing the US role in the region, and the Kurdish question.
Taha Özhan, Research Director at the Ankara Institute (Turkey), outlined the history of Turkish-Iranian relations in the 20th and 21st centuries. He believes that for a long time, the two countries largely followed parallel paths and that—however surprising it may sound—their relationship has historically been one of the most stable in the region, despite their rivalry and competition. While that stability has diminished, it remains overall intact. The war has created opportunities for new geopolitical processes across the region, though it remains unclear whether regional players are able to capitalize on them. They should strive to reduce rivalry and build a more sustainable regional architecture. For Turkey and Iran, this is directly linked to their engagement with the Gulf states. Ankara is currently attempting to normalize relations with these nations—a process initiated by the Mecca Agreement. It would also make sense for Iran to alter its approach to these countries by shifting toward more pragmatic interaction and partially moving away from a military-centric logic regarding the Strait of Hormuz. In turn, the Gulf states also need to adopt a more rational attitude toward Iran and stop demonizing Tehran, Özhan argued.
Alexander Maryasov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Thailand and Permanent Representative to ESCAP (2010–2014), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Iran (2001–2005), characterized Turkish-Iranian relations as a form of managed, non-confrontational rivalry. He emphasized that both countries have significantly ramped up their activities in recent years, though this has largely been a forced response to the rapid regional developments, driven in part by Israel’s actions. The situation changed drastically after February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched a full-scale war against Iran. Faced with the sharp weakening of the “Axis of Resistance,” Iran was compelled to alter its tactics and launch immediate, direct strikes against US and Israeli military bases and other facilities—including those in Persian Gulf states—while also blocking the Strait of Hormuz. This caught the US completely off guard; having failed to achieve any of its objectives and encountering fierce resistance from Iran, the US is now seeking a way out of the impasse. Consequently, Iran’s geopolitical role has grown, giving it significant influence over both global political processes and oil and gas prices. Against this backdrop, according to Maryasov, the future relations between Turkey and Iran will hinge on the outcome of the US military venture.
“It is incorrect to say that we are witnessing the weakening of one major power center—Iran—and the strengthening of another—Turkey. Rather, we are observing a profound restructuring of the regional balance,” said Pavel Shlykov,
Head of the Oriental Studies Programme, Institute for International Studies,
MGIMO University, Associate Professor, Department of Middle Eastern Studies,
Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University. Multipolarity—or
polycentricity—has been a defining characteristic of the Middle East’s
development for decades. For a long time, the regional configuration was marked
by relative stability; even in the absence of true stability, there was a
certain degree of predictability and a clear planning horizon. Now, however, a
new, more fragmented order is taking shape. The issue is not specifically about
which country is currently gaining strength, but rather about the ability of
these nations to exist amidst mounting instability. Iran, Shlykov believes, has
partly lost the capacity to define the contours of the regional order, yet it
demonstrates a remarkable ability to block other players’ attempts to shape and
impose a new regional order. Turkey, for its part, appears at first glance to
be well-positioned to project influence, though its capabilities are largely
contingent on specific circumstances and the prevailing political climate.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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