Outcomes of the 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi: The African Dimension

New Delhi Summit demonstrated that expansion has not deprived BRICS of its ability to find common ground, and that African interests are increasingly becoming part of the group’s collective agenda.

The heightened representation of Africa within BRICS sends a powerful signal: African states are eager to help shape a new, non-Western-centric global architecture and are ready to advance their own development agendas.

The New Delhi summit was attended by the leaders of Ethiopia, Egypt, and South Africa—the three African BRICS members—while Uganda and Nigeria, which have partner-country status, were represented by their vice-presidents.

The Bandung Spirit and Global South Solidarity

The alignment of African states’ ideas and approaches with the broader agenda of the Global South was articulated in Paragraph 16 of the New Delhi Declaration—a point of great symbolic significance—where all BRICS participants invoked the legacy of Bandung:

“We recall the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia that proclaimed general principles, including equality, independence, non-intervention, and mutual benefit. We stress that the Bandung Spirit serves as a reference in the pursuit of a fairer, more inclusive, and representative multilateral system.” This reminder is, undoubtedly, no coincidence. As rightly noted in a Valdai Club report, the 1955 Bandung Conference brought together a highly diverse group of nations—all undergoing decolonisation and grappling with the arduous process of national consolidation—that nonetheless managed to present a united front on the international stage. That history of uniting culturally diverse participants amidst the global instability of the Cold War is playing out again today in a new dimension. For instance, in the New Delhi Declaration, the Global South unanimously condemned unilateral sanctions and the policies of manipulation and pressure pursued by the United States. The formulation of common positions on contentious issues demonstrates that the potential for solidarity within the expanded BRICS remains intact.

The New Delhi Declaration called for “maximum restraint” in the Middle East and West Asia, reaffirmed the Palestinians’ right to statehood, and expressed concern regarding the situation in Sudan and Lebanon’s sovereignty. US policies of pressure and sanctions were also identified as contentious issues. The declaration explicitly condemns a “unilateral mindset”—specifically sanctions and blockades that deprive people of food, electricity, and medicine, citing the blockade of Cuba as a prime example. Notably, South African Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola views this stance as a direct embodiment of the Bandung Spirit—resolving international disputes through “dialogue rather than war”—a principle also enshrined in the 1955 Freedom Charter, a document adopted the same year as the Bandung Conference.

The key question for representatives of the African continent is the extent to which this grouping can incorporate African values and practical development objectives into an increasingly complex agenda. In this context, the stance and assessments of South Africa—acting as the BRICS’ African anchor—are telling. Immediately following the summit, the country’s Foreign Minister, Ronald Lamola, issued a statement
evaluating the summit’s outcomes. Coming after the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in May—where disagreements regarding Iran and the Middle East had prevented the adoption of a joint statement. The fact that all eleven members endorsed the 140-point New Delhi Declaration was particularly significant. Lamola interpreted this as proof of the bloc’s enduring capacity for concerted action—effectively a rebuttal to the primary external criticism levelled against the expanded BRICS.

Substantively, the minister highlighted three key areas demonstrating the success of Global South solidarity with BRICS. The first is the reform of global governance institutions. A prominent African demand remains the reform of the UN Security Council in line with the Ezulwini Consensus, which calls for granting Africa two permanent seats—with the same powers held by current permanent members, including veto rights—and five non-permanent seats. The New Delhi Declaration reaffirmed support for Security Council reform and explicitly acknowledged the “legitimate aspirations of African countries” enshrined in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration.

However, the African dimension of global governance reform goes beyond this. The document advocates for greater representation of developing nations in international financial institutions, a redistribution of quotas and voting power within the IMF and the World Bank, and reform of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Regarding the latter, the general stance was translated into concrete action: BRICS explicitly supported Ethiopia’s accession to the WTO.

A second key aspect is the ability of the participants to find common ground on the most sensitive international conflicts. As Lamola noted, the summit did not shy away from issues that had hindered consensus-building during the preparatory phase. Despite differing national positions—as previously mentioned—the declaration enshrined a collective call for “restraint” in the Middle East and West Asia and for respect for sovereignty and international law; it also codified agreed-upon stances regarding the Palestinian issue, Sudan, Lebanon, and unilateral sanctions.

A third aspect involves translating the group’s expansion—through the addition of new member states and partners—into tangible economic results. This issue is particularly relevant given the persistent trade asymmetry within BRICS: while intra-BRICS trade has grown more than tenfold over two decades—reaching
a merchandise export volume of $1.17 trillion—the structure of trade remains skewed in favour of the bloc’s largest economies. Against this backdrop, the New Delhi Declaration places special emphasis on expanding settlements in national currencies and on the role of the New Development Bank—one of the most advanced institutional mechanisms within BRICS.

Particular attention was also paid to the issue of critical minerals. In New Delhi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa once again called for investments to be directed not only toward the extraction of critical minerals but also toward their beneficiation and processing, the manufacturing of batteries and electric vehicles, infrastructure development, and the building of domestic industrial capabilities. The New Delhi Declaration enshrined the principle that the development of these resources should foster value addition, a fairer distribution of benefits, and economic diversification for resource-rich nations. As Lamola noted, “the path to a ‘green’ future will be paved with minerals from African soil; however, this future ‘must not replicate past models of plunder and raw material exports’.” All BRICS leaders supported the right of resource-endowed countries to have the policy space to create value-added products and to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources.

Despite their relatively recent accession to BRICS, Egypt and Ethiopia have already actively engaged in the group’s key areas of work and are promoting their own initiatives, primarily focused on development goals. For Ethiopia, the vulnerability of agriculture to droughts and other natural disasters is a particularly pressing issue. Addis Ababa proposed integrating new members into the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation and expanding data sharing and specialist training—specifically for monitoring agricultural land, natural resources, and emergency situations.

Egypt has emphasised industrial cooperation, technology transfer, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, Cairo highlighted
the issue of returning illicitly trafficked cultural property—a matter of particular importance to it—by proposing that BRICS strengthen mechanisms for repatriating such items to their countries of origin.

Despite differing national priorities, the African participants share a common rationale: the desire to leverage BRICS opportunities to address their own development goals and strengthen Africa’s economic sovereignty. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed articulated
this logic particularly clearly at the summit: the capital, technology, and markets of BRICS nations should be aligned with Africa’s resource potential in a way that ensures the majority of value-added production takes place on the continent itself. The Ethiopian prime minister linked this objective primarily to critical minerals, renewable energy, and industrial development. Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi shifted the focus toward the practical application of this same goal—emphasising concrete projects and programmes, investment attraction, productivity gains, and the narrowing of technological gaps.

The African partners of BRICS did not remain on the side-lines, although no specific initiatives were proposed—a fact attributable more to their hybrid status than to a lack of potential. In his speech, Nigerian Vice President Kashim Shettima promoted his country as a primary gateway to the African market via the African Continental Free Trade Area, emphasising investment, infrastructure, industry, energy, and digital technologies, as well as the need to develop local supply chains and raw material processing. Ugandan Vice President Jessica Alupo delivered
a message from President Yoweri Museveni, the central theme of which was a call to leverage BRICS not only to strengthen multipolarity but also to boost the prosperity of Global South nations. It was also emphasised that the legacy of colonialism directly impacts the economic situation on the African continent.

From Proposals to Decisions

Significantly, some of the African proposals were indeed reflected in the New Delhi Declaration. For Ethiopia, the space sector proved to be the most prominent area: the new declaration notes the drafting of amendments that will allow the space agencies of new members to join the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation. Egypt’s priorities are enshrined in the final document across several areas—ranging from the repatriation of illicitly removed cultural artefacts to technology transfer, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the advancement of developing nations into higher tiers of global value chains.

Furthermore, the declaration incorporated an initiative of particular importance to South Africa: a proposal, put forward jointly with Brazil, to establish an International Panel on Inequality. In 2024, during its G20 presidency, Brazil brought the issue of the international taxation of the ultra-wealthy to the forefront; at its initiative, discussions were held regarding a global minimum standard under which billionaires would pay at least 2% of their net worth annually.

In 2025, South Africa took up this agenda during its own G20 presidency. Under Pretoria’s leadership, a group of independent experts prepared the first special report on global inequality; a key recommendation of the report was the establishment of a permanent international mechanism to systematically assess the scale and causes of global inequality, its consequences, and the effectiveness of various measures to reduce it.

Alongside the specific interests of individual African participants, the New Delhi Declaration also addresses broader pan-African priorities. A distinct “African dimension” emerges within the document—ranging from calls for global governance reform and a decolonisation agenda to support for pan-African candidacies and the continent’s role in international institutions. For instance, Paragraph 11 welcomes UN General Assembly Resolution 80/250, which classifies the trans-Atlantic slave trade of Africans and colonial slavery as grave crimes against humanity, and calls for the full implementation of Resolution 79/115 on the eradication of colonialism in all its forms.

The Declaration acknowledges the central role of the African Union (AU) in conflict prevention and resolution on the continent and supports Ethiopia as the sole AU candidate for additional seats on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), as well as its bid to host COP32. Paragraph 113 notes the 2026 UN Water Conference, co-chaired by Senegal and the UAE, thereby acknowledging Africa’s international role in this sphere. Consequently, pan-African demands—ranging from global governance reform and overcoming the colonial legacy to expanding the continent’s representation in international institutions—gain additional support through this grouping.

At the same time, it should be noted that not all proposals put forward by African participants made it into the final document. Excluded were Ethiopia’s projects for a BRICS tourism fair and a BRICS tourism competence centre, Egypt’s initiative
to establish a grain and logistics hub in East Port Said, and the proposal
to create a dedicated BRICS Artificial Intelligence Network. However, this does not alter the overall outcome of the Indian presidency: a number of national initiatives successfully advanced from sectoral meetings to a document agreed upon by the eleven BRICS member states.

New Delhi Summit demonstrated that expansion has not deprived BRICS of its ability to find common ground, and that African interests are increasingly becoming part of the group’s collective agenda. However, the durability of this consensus should not be overstated. It is most robust where members can agree on shared principles—such as the need for global governance reform, a stronger voice for developing nations, or the creation of greater value-added in the economies of commodity producers. The true test will be the ability to maintain this unity when shared principles must translate into concrete commitments that touch upon divergent national interests.