Hungary’s Foreign Policy Is Adapting to the European Mainstream

Hungary’s foreign policy has changed dramatically. The sovereigntist approach has been replaced by federalist thinking, under the cover of which Budapest is fully merging with the European mainstream, which in a global sense is being marginalised and is becoming increasingly dangerously aggressive. In this way, the Hungarian government is narrowing its own foreign-policy room for manoeuvre, which is currently most visibly reflected in the development of Hungarian-Russian relations, writes Gábor Stier.

The new Hungarian government is making an impressive break with the policies of its predecessors in all areas. The six months that have passed since the convincing victory of the Tisza party have been devoted to nothing other than the destruction of the political system built by Viktor Orbán, as well as the humiliation and annihilation of the conservative forces that have entered the opposition; in short, the cancellation of the past. Foreign policy is no exception.

Péter Magyar paid little attention to foreign policy during the election campaign and did not change this upon becoming prime minister; the government is currently clearly focused on domestic policy. The foreign minister also rarely appears in public. If she does appear, it is only to nod in response to the prime minister’s statements. Anita Orbán’s interviews are formulaic, and the only thing we can learn about the direction of foreign policy, besides the repetition of general phrases, is that the goal is to return Hungary to the European fold and at the same time to obtain European funds. The lack of substance is not compensated for by increased activity on social media either. It is not by chance that many say that the foreign minister’s task is to ensure the absence of a Hungarian foreign policy.

All of this contrasts sharply with what was observed in recent years, when Viktor Orbán focused mainly on foreign policy, especially after the migration crisis of 2015-2016. He became so fixated that he increasingly forgot about ever-more-noticeable domestic problems. However, it cannot be denied that he made Hungary—a country with a population of less than ten million people—a factor in international politics. Orbán strove for balance in the world. His principle was that the country should maintain an equal distance from the main poles of power. He always found common ground with strong leaders and at the same time effectively stood up to the European Union, which, against the backdrop of growing economic problems, was causing increasing irritation among Hungarian society.

With this, Péter Magyar is now breaking, having promised a change in Hungary’s foreign policy during his election campaign. In his view, Budapest had distanced itself too much from Brussels, so upon coming to power he immediately began revising the foreign policy associated with Viktor Orbán. He subordinated everything to the settlement of relations with the EU leadership and the obtaining of European support, which had been frozen for years. One could say that the foreign policy of the new Hungarian government is written in Brussels. One of the most important foreign-policy goals of the Tisza government is to return Hungary to the mainstream of the European Union and NATO. As Foreign Minister Anita Orbán put it, they are restoring Hungary’s authority in the Western alliances. As a result of such a comprehensive reorientation, Budapest is, in essence, handing over its relations with the world’s centres of power to EU institutions and entrusting the European Union with the shaping of these relations. Brussels, meanwhile, is in more or less conflictual relations with Washington, even more so with Beijing, and most of all with Moscow.

Not to mention that today, nothing justifies tying Hungary to a single, increasingly weakening economic centre of power.

This federalist approach to foreign policy proceeds from the premise that Hungary is a small player in its alliance systems, that is, in the European Union and NATO. However, by accepting this, it can obtain advantages in both organisations, like a good pupil. But this has a high price. This Western orientation, which is clearly more pronounced than before, narrows the country’s foreign policy space. The Euro-Atlantic orientation is difficult to reconcile with the preservation of economic ties with China and seriously limits Hungary’s possibilities in relation to Russia and, in a broader sense, the East. Meanwhile, the decline in the international weight of the European Union and its increased aggressiveness against the backdrop of intensifying global confrontations could directly lead to Hungary being drawn into conflicts that contradict its interests. This is a huge change compared with the sovereigntist, at the same time open and active foreign policy of recent years. Thus, Budapest is returning to the mentality of “Let us dare to be small!”

Since coming to power, the Hungarian government has focused exclusively on Brussels and has not entered into open confrontation on any issue. The exception has been the transformation of relations with Ukraine and Russia. Although Budapest has not become a full-fledged ally of Kiev, it has given the green light to the start of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU in exchange for a promise to settle the rights of the Transcarpathian minority. At the same time, Budapest still deviates somewhat from the main European line on Ukraine, since these issues also have domestic political consequences and affect the government’s popularity.

The situation is different in relation to Russia. Brussels is much stricter in this area, and, moreover, Péter Magyar has yet to prove that it is he who is breaking with Viktor Orbán’s policy. In addition, he has to show toughness towards Moscow in order to preserve at least a minimal space for manoeuvre on the aforementioned issue, which is also important from the point of view of domestic policy. Hungarian foreign policy is trying to drag things out and speaks of preserving pragmatic relations. But Brussels and the internal Atlanticist circles are ever more insistently demanding strategic clarity from the government in its policy towards Russia.

The government’s clear statements that it will review the question of expanding the Paks nuclear power plant project, the growing anti-Russian sentiment in society and the launch of an investigation into the alleged ties of former Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó with Russia have not boded well for bilateral relations. Therefore, it should not have come as a surprise that in the foreign policy recommendations prepared for the Hungarian delegation to the UN, it was emphasised that Russia’s behaviour poses a threat to Hungary, Europe and the world order, and also seriously endangers the Hungarian minority living in Transcarpathia. This was followed by a post by the foreign minister on X, in which she condemned the increase in the number and intensity of Russian “hybrid actions” in Europe in connection with the drone incident in Leipzig and stated that Hungary expresses full solidarity with Germany. After that, there was only one step left: the expulsion of 10 Russian diplomats, whereby Budapest finally demonstrated its integration into European society. This also means that the future of Hungarian-Russian relations clearly depends on the development of relations between Europe and Russia—and that probably means that nothing good awaits them.