Even if the Republic of Serbia is unlikely to be admitted to the European Union soon, as an island surrounded by the European Union and NATO, it must stick to the European path in order to avoid the interruption of Western investments and the introduction of a visa regime. That would cause additional revolt and would serve as an essential internal trump card for the further destabilisation of the government and a deeper crisis in the country, writes Aleksandar Raković.
The President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, has called for parliamentary elections on October 25, 2026 and will lead the Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia electoral list. The ruling Serbian Progressive Party has nominated Vučić as its candidate for Prime Minister, and he intends to resign from the presidency. He has announced that he will resign on September 27th, upon returning from the United Nations General Assembly session in New York.
This resignation will bring an end to Vučić’s presidency, which has spanned two terms since May 31, 2017. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, a person may be elected president only twice.
Yet Vučić’s resignation does not mean he will no longer lead Serbia. Even during his tenure as prime minister (April 28, 2014—May 31, 2017), Vučić was the undisputed state leader. The same is expected to happen again: if his United Serbia wins the parliamentary elections, he will become Prime Minister of Serbia once more—an outcome widely regarded as certain.
The results of Vučić’s foreign and domestic policy from 2017 to the present reveal significant achievements and reinforce his position as the absolute favourite.
Throughout his presidential term, Vučić pursued a multi-vector foreign policy grounded in four pillars—cooperation with Moscow, Beijing, Washington, and Brussels.
Bilateral relations with the Russian Federation have continued to improve. In 2019, President Vladimir Putin awarded Vučić the Order of Alexander Nevsky. Moreover, energy and economic cooperation have underscored a reliable partnership between Serbia and Russia, even amid the difficult circumstances brought about by the Special Military Operation. Russian gas remains vitally important for Serbia and for Serbian-Russian relations. Despite demands from the political West, the Republic of Serbia has not succumbed to pressure and has refrained from introducing sanctions against the Russian Federation or visas for its citizens. Air Serbia continues to operate flights from Belgrade to Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kazan, and Sochi, with plans to add additional Russian destinations. Serbian athletes compete alongside Russian athletes in friendly matches. Cooperation between Serbia and Russia in the fields of popular culture, high culture, and science continues smoothly.
Relations between the Republic of Serbia and the People’s Republic of China have been growing rapidly year after year. Fruitful ties are manifested through economic cooperation: Chinese investments in factories and production processes, construction of road and railway infrastructure, takeover of key industrial giants for mining and the processing of ores and metals, and so on. Another great success in Serbia’s cooperation with China is military-technical cooperation, through which the most modern Chinese-produced military systems arrive in Serbia. President Vučić has created a strong friendship with President Xi Jinping, who awarded Vučić the Order of Friendship, the highest Chinese decoration that a foreign citizen can receive.
Donald Trump’s first presidential term brought a refreshing relief for Serbia. Trump stood publicly against the authorities in Montenegro, who were pursuing anti-Serbian policies, while some Western countries simultaneously accused those same authorities of mafia ties. Vučić seized on this to present, at international forums, the precarious position of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. This diplomatic engagement and support from Serbia helped Serbs in Montenegro secure victory in the parliamentary elections of August 30, 2020 and take power. Building on this understanding of the Serbian issue, Vučić signed the Washington Agreement on the economic normalisation of relations between Serbia and the so-called Republic of Kosovo on September 4, 2020 in Trump’s office. During Trump’s second term, on July 17, 2026, a strategic dialogue between Belgrade and Washington was launched. These good relations have led OFAC to repeatedly extend the operating license of the Serbian Oil Industry (NIS)—still majority-owned by Russia’s Gazprom—despite US sanctions on Gazprom. Nevertheless, the full history of Vučić’s relationship with Trump and his administration has yet to be written.
The Republic of Serbia remains on the path of European integration, which is also a foreign policy priority for Belgrade. Serbia’s largest trading partners are EU member states. However, because of Serbia’s relations with Russia, the European Union has refused to open a new cluster in Serbia’s membership negotiations since 2021. The West exploits this situation, tied to the Ukraine conflict, to undermine Serbian interests in Kosovo and Metohija, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Despite this, President Vučić has managed—through a series of arrangements with the Republic of France and excellent personal relations with President Emmanuel Macron—to secure France’s support in international institutions. This includes France’s opposition to the so-called Republic of Kosovo being admitted to certain important European institutions, including the Council of Europe.
A very important foreign policy success for Vučić is the country’s extraordinary economic and political cooperation with Israel. During the ongoing military conflicts in the Middle East, Israeli sports clubs were permitted to host European competitions in Serbia. At the same time, Serbia has maintained a neutral position toward the war in the Middle East between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other. Likewise, Serbia has taken a neutral position toward the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
An important point in the foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia is the deepening of cooperation with the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. Most of its members have not recognised the independence of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, including its most populous countries, India and Indonesia. During Vučić’s presidential rule, as many as 28 countries withdrew their recognition of Kosovo’s self-declared independence. In addition, Egypt has frozen its recognition of Kosovo—a recognition granted by the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia) during its brief rule after the colour revolution there.
When it comes to regional policy, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska have taken the position that the Serbian people are one and indivisible, regardless of imposed borders. In this regard, on June 8, 2024, an All-Serbian Assembly was held in Belgrade, attended by representatives of the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Srpska, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Serbs from Montenegro, North Macedonia, and the surrounding areas. The Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People.
Serbia has achieved significant domestic successes under Vučić. From May 2012 to May 2026, salaries in Serbia increased almost threefold, and pensions nearly 2.5 times. Serbia has been networked with highways and expressways, and the modern road network is expanding toward the Republic of Srpska and Montenegro. Belgrade and Budapest are expected to be connected by a high-speed railway by the end of 2026, after which construction would continue from Belgrade toward southern Serbia. The capacity of Belgrade Airport has been expanded. Serbia will host Expo 2027.
Despite these achievements, Serbia has been shaken since November 2024 by attempts at a colour revolution, the script of which was connected to Western elements. The trigger for organised discontent was the collapse of a canopy at the Novi Sad railway station on November 1, 2024, when sixteen people died. For more than a year, parts of the middle class participated in blockades and riots, but the working class did not join in. The blockades of Serbian institutions were supported by media networks from Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as by some anti-Serbian media from Montenegro and the so-called Republic of Kosovo. The regional octopus of bots operating against Serbia has reached gigantic proportions.
Although the situation in Serbia is now calmer, the blockades of Serbian institutions are expected to restart after the opposition’s defeat in the parliamentary elections. When discontent is again inspired from outside, few of the protesters will have in mind the realistically better standard of living in the country and Vučić’s successful four-pillar foreign policy. Serbia has largely escaped the international strait unscathed in the latest geopolitical clash of great powers, but the security of its citizens has been undermined domestically.
Even if the Republic of Serbia is unlikely to be admitted to the European Union soon, as an island surrounded by the European Union and NATO, it must stick to the European path in order to avoid the interruption of Western investments and the introduction of a visa regime. That would cause additional revolt and would serve as an essential internal trump card for further destabilisation of the government and a deeper crisis in the country. Vučić knows this, and it will not be easy for him to win—or at least draw—in the new chess game that will be set after the parliamentary elections. So far, however, he has succeeded.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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