Russia—US—China: The Sides of the Triangle in an Age of Conflict

The strategic triangle is a staple framework for describing the nature of the contemporary great power system, which is defined by relations between Moscow, Washington, and Beijing. Today’s political developments are once more restoring the great-power triangle to central stage, writes Oleg Barabanov, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.

One of the key elements in the functioning of the system of international relations is the relationship between the system’s great powers. These relations largely determine the overall dynamics of world politics and the vectors of its development. The great powers have their own understanding of their place and role in the world, and often have their own topics for dialogue, distinct from their communications with other states. Other countries may or may not like this (more often than not, naturally, they do not), but such is the reality of the contemporary world. The term “middle powers,” introduced into scholarly and political usage several decades ago, was intended—without offending anyone—precisely to underscore this objective difference.

It is largely this specific feature of relations between the great powers that explains the rather palpable shift in US policy towards Russia carried out by US President Donald Trump in the first year of his second term in office. This new Trump course provoked outright bewilderment and protests across the Western world, with frequent claims that Trump was undermining Western unity. In our view, however, Trump fully understood that a great power has its own priorities and its own concerns, which by their very nature differ from the interests of middle powers—even from the approaches of the United States’ traditional allies, both in Europe and in other regions of the world.

One such difference is the indisputable fact that, should the current conflict escalate and eventually spill over into a major war in Europe, it is the United States, as a great power, that would have to bear the principal share of Western responsibility for these processes. This is precisely what accounts for Trump’s now-famous remark, made during that well-known scene in the Oval Office of the White House, that Ukrainian President Zelensky was playing with the Third World War—for which it would be the United States, not Ukraine, that would have to answer.

In the history of international relations, as indeed today, relations between the great powers have often been characterised in terms of a triangle, whose sides are the United States, Russia and China. Henry Kissinger himself once made use of this scheme in his practical policy-making. His strategy of bringing the United States and China closer together was based precisely on this idea of the triangle. It is therefore no coincidence that the subsequent rapprochement between Russia and China has sometimes been called “Kissinger’s nightmare.”

Let us therefore consider what influence the current political situation may have on relations between the sides of this triangle of great powers.

At present, a fierce political struggle is under way in the United States ahead of the Congressional elections scheduled for early November 2026. According to a number of polls, the Republican Party (Trump’s party) stands a fair chance of losing the elections to the House of Representatives, while the balance of forces in the Senate remains unclear. The situation, however, could well change.

The renewed military action in Iran will remain Trump’s principal foreign-policy concern for the time being. Declaring victory ahead of the elections matters a great deal to him, even though the conflict in Iran has already settled into a routine phase, and its impact on American society is now nowhere near as acute as it was in the spring.

Given the situation in Iran, and given also that Trump has so far failed to achieve success in settling the conflict in Ukraine, his direct attention to Russia and Ukraine is quite likely to wane.

At the same time, amid the electoral contest, in order to demonstrate that he is putting pressure on both sides of the conflict and not only on Ukraine, Trump introduced new sanctions against Russia, affecting among other things the shipping of Russian oil. 

Given that Trump may perceive strikes on Russian oil refineries deep within the country and the petrol shortages in Russia as Ukrainian successes, and may also regard them as marking a kind of turning point in the conflict, pressure specifically on Russia may well strike him as timely.

Should Trump’s party lose the elections, this course is highly likely to be continued regardless. All of this makes the intensification of sanctions pressure on Russia—including on its energy sector—one of the key issues in Trump’s policy over the coming months.

That said, given the “predictable unpredictability” of Trump’s character, one cannot rule out the possibility that a defeat in the Congressional elections could, paradoxically, leave him freer to act. He would, quite simply, have nothing left to lose but his place in history. Trump might therefore move even further than at present towards governing by executive order, paying no heed to a hostile Congress.

The agreements reached with Trump offer an opportunity for China to build a constructive economic relationship with the United States. Chinese media and experts write almost openly that China has already become a global leader and world centre—and that not a single issue on the international agenda can be resolved without China. As the Chinese Communist Party’s congress next year draws closer, this tendency to emphasise China’s leadership will only intensify.

The current impasse in Trump’s attempts to settle the conflict is making increasingly apparent a trend towards more active Chinese involvement in the negotiating process over Ukraine. In recent months, Chinese diplomacy has stepped up its contacts in Europe on this issue. The image of peacemaker will matter a great deal to Xi Jinping in the domestic political context ahead of the party congress. If Xi were to achieve peace in Ukraine—something Trump failed to achieve—this would be an ideal pre-congress scenario for him.

It may therefore be assumed, with a certain degree of probability, that in the coming months China will attempt to exert non-public influence on Russia with a view to ending the conflict.

Moreover, the normalisation of relations with the United States (or the “temptation of normalisation,” one might say), together with the ability, as it is perceived in China, to influence Russia, is already having an effect on Russian-Chinese relations in the energy sector. This is evident both in China’s inflexibility on pricing for the new “Power of Siberia 2” project and in its reserved stance on petrol supplies. It is therefore possible to expect an intensification of non-public Chinese firmness in its dialogue with Russia across the whole range of energy-sector relations. The reluctance of major Chinese companies to fall under US secondary sanctions will also continue to grow.

Naturally, China will not turn into an adversary of Russia, but one can attempt to forecast a possible intensification of non-public pressure and firmness, both on economic and, to some extent, on political matters, over the coming year.

As a result, a situation may emerge within the virtual triangle of great powers in which both the United States and China—each for its own reasons, which by no means coincide with one another—emphasise their desire for peace in the current conflict. This could well affect their respective approaches to Russia. We should not forget, however, that both countries (again for entirely different reasons) may to some extent also be regarded as indirect beneficiaries of the current conflict (both economically and, to a certain degree, in terms of global political standing). They may therefore each have their own reasons for wishing the conflict to continue—without major escalation, which is important. Time will tell how far all this proves true. But the significance of the great-power “triangle” is now once again coming to the fore.