Vladimir Putin took part in the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club titled “Responsibility for the Future: Limits of the Possible, or Limitless Possibilities?”. The plenary session was held by Valdai Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov.
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Fyodor Lukyanov: Friends, ladies and gentlemen.
It is a pleasure to welcome you to the plenary session of the 23rd annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. I am pleased to invite President Vladimir Putin to join us.
Mr President, welcome. We are very pleased that, as in previous years, you have taken the time to meet with us.
Valdai meetings are always packed with events. Apparently, in keeping with the global dynamics, they are becoming increasingly packed and intense, and the mood is becoming increasingly upbeat as well, to put it mildly.
This year, if I were to list the key takeaways from the meeting, the forum that we have held over the past three days, first thing I would mention is change. Clearly, we witness changes taking place across all areas of human activity; second, responsibility, because the greater the changes, the less clarity we have about the way things will unfold in the future, and the greater the responsibility we all bear for such developments; and third, surprising as it may seem, and discussed this matter at length, is the concept of calm.
Our annual report this year is titled “Don’t Panic.” Given the difficult circumstances, we suggest avoiding the worst possible response, namely, giving in to panic.
I think that, given your position, you have a better sense of which international issues are the most important right now, so I am pleased to invite you to speak.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues.
As is customary, we have gathered at the annual forum of the Valdai International Discussion Club to discuss the most pressing global issues.
We have always sought not only to diagnose the state of the world, but also to provide an outline of the emerging world order.
I am convinced that the Club’s intellectual legacy and many years of direct and candid dialogue will certainly be called upon when all of us – East and West, North and South – will sooner or later need to come to terms on the principles for shaping a new world order that is capable of ensuring progress and development of humanity for decades to come.
Unfortunately, we must admit that we are facing different tasks today: ones that are more pressing and acute. Although the moderator spoke about the need to calm everyone, these acute problems have not disappeared.
The alarming trends we are seeing on the international stage compel us to think first and foremost not about how to organise global interaction more wisely, effectively, and equitably in the future – although all of this is, of course, vitally important – but about how to preserve global peace and security here and now, at a time when many established legal norms have been cast aside and new ones have yet to emerge.
What must be done to avert the most catastrophic scenarios? Responsibility for our shared future is far more than just an abstract slogan. It entails a set of practical measures aimed at preventing humanity from being pushed to the brink of survival and averting irreparable consequences.
The world has reached a decisive turning point in its development. This is not just because of politics; politics, as always, is a consequence of profound changes. Transformations are taking place across every sphere: from virtually all areas of technology to the social structures of our societies; from climate to medicine; from military science to bioethics; from the future of energy to demographic shifts; and from universal digitalisation and artificial intelligence to entirely new models of economic development. The list goes on. Taken together, these factors are creating the conditions for a fundamental transformation. We cannot yet fully assess or definitively interpret all the circumstances and consequences of this shift, if only because these changes are unfolding simultaneously and their impact on societies and states is contradictory. But I will return to this later.
The scale of the changes that have already taken place, and those still to come, is truly immense. We seem to grasp this – as evidenced by the many debates that are being held about the future, often tinged with anxiety over uncertainty and unpredictability – but humanity has not yet fully comprehended the true magnitude of the challenge it faces. We are entering a completely new and unprecedented reality. Threats and dangers are inextricably intertwined with opportunities and prospects; they cannot be separated from one another. Our entire way of living is changing.
To reiterate, this is not only and not so much about shifts in the balance of power among major powers or the redistribution of economic and technological influence. All of that is, of course, important and is effectively taking place. What matters most, though, is that these changes affect the biological and moral nature of human beings, go to our core, and impact our way of life and the foundations of our worldview. Technology is opening up, quite literally, fantastic prospects for extending lifespans and improving the quality of life. However, it is also taking the possibilities for the destruction of all humanity to a whole new level, be it as a result of military conflicts, rapid degradation of the environment, or loss of control over technological processes that have been set in motion.
Clearly, an atmosphere like that cannot but exacerbate anxiety among people and societies, and cause an increase in internal tensions stemming from uncertainty and a lack of understanding of what tomorrow will bring us. One consequence includes domestic political “fever” in many countries, all the more so because traditional party systems are increasingly failing to reflect rapidly changing social structures. For any state, regardless of how well it is organised or what cultural and historical traditions it relies on, internal stability – I think you will agree – is always more important than anything else. To preserve it, governments may take a wide range of actions, including actions that affect the situation beyond their borders in neighbouring countries, regions, and, indeed, the world at large. In other words, they may, unfortunately, export instability which only exacerbates and heightens tensions and – if I may put it that way – further increases the overall strain in the international environment.
Whatever scenario unfolds in the world in the years ahead, the international conflicts, unfortunately, are likely to continue. This is due in part to the fact that the profound shifts now under way, and the opportunities they create, fuel and encourage ambitions and a willingness to take risks for what may appear to be a major payoff. I wish I were wrong in this assessment, but the sustainable trends we are witnessing, unfortunately, suggest otherwise.
We remain confident, though, that, in the long term, as the world moves away from Western hegemony, the international situation will gradually improve leading to a more stable, democratic, and free multipolar international order. It is equally clear, however, that on the path towards such a world order, states, communities and every individual will face various risks. This is inevitable in times of profound change. That is why minimising risks at every level from global to personal is the key task today for policymakers, business leaders, and top figures in science and life in general. Much depends on these people. Responsibility also means helping people understand these risks and be prepared for them, so that individuals and families are not left one-on-one with problems in the area of security, changing labour market, or the digital environment, to name a few.
What has more importance these days: caution and good judgement for avoiding being swept by an avalanche of uncontrolled change, or sticking to an assertive approach for overcoming unfavourable scenarios or using the existing circumstances to serve our own needs? There is no clear-cut answer to this question since each particular case requires its own line of rational conduct.
Of course, decision-makers seek to adapt to what is going on around us. However, considering , as they call it, the polycrisis, all-encompassing and ubiquitous, these decision-makers struggle to look beyond their everyday administrative travails and deadlines and adopt a more forward-looking perspective, beyond the polycrisis. The weight of responsibility is immense, and mistakes will come at a dire cost, including for the future. Immediate goals tend to relegate strategic objectives to the background. While this is obviously understandable, it is also extremely dangerous. Responding to many of the existing challenges would be impossible without taking into account how our current actions are going to affect our future. As one well-known classic of Russian political thought said, you must be able to see the wood for the trees.
So what is the overall situation? It is obvious that the mechanisms for striking a balance between state interests and actions as they evolved over the preceding years are unable to fully and effectively fulfil their regulating function. Not because they are no good but because the conditions in which they were created in their day – these conditions have changed. Of course, the new emerging reality will help develop new instruments but this will be a lengthy process. Let us be honest – today, certain international organisations often fail to mitigate risks and sometimes even create and provoke them by serving the interests of a single country or a group of nations. However, these structures were designed to serve a different purpose.
There have been critical voices targeting also the United Nations, a fundamental structure. According to its Charter, it must operate as a central coordinating mechanism in international affairs. This criticism is not always objective, of course, but well-grounded objections do exist. To an extent, they stem from the fact that the United Nations, even if it is the most representative international organisation, falls short of the collective and democratic principles in the way it is being managed compared to its original design. A narrow grouping of Western countries wields an unproportionally large influence. It constitutes a global minority by all accounts while seeking to appropriate administrative functions. And since these countries’ are seeing their influence diminish as it is taken over by a more and more independent and confident global majority, the lack of balance within the UN system is becoming increasingly obvious. This is a system-wide issue that cannot be resolved in an instant.
Russia still continues to support the idea of fair reform of the United Nations, yet such reform is impossible without internal consensus that is difficult to achieve today. Let me reiterate that we consistently advocate a UN structure that fully reflects the diversity of the world, with countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East playing a far more significant role in the Organisation. Meanwhile, it is crucial to recognise that reforming the UN entails far more than simply expanding the Security Council or adopting other measures to achieve more balanced geographical representation in international governing bodies. It also involves redefining the Organisation’s substance, its priorities, including future ones – particularly given that global changes are creating a list of new dilemmas that simply did not exist before.
The most obvious example is artificial intelligence – something we must all learn to live and work with. How will its rapid development affect humanity’s intellectual capacity, or spiritual and cultural heritage? It is no coincidence that the concept of “mindful digitalisation” is being discussed. This means refusing to allow the uncontrolled integration of such technologies into areas that have always been vital and sensitive to human moral development. Indeed, the social and humanitarian implications of the spread of artificial intelligence are currently being examined even more closely and thoroughly than its technical or economic aspects. Experts are increasingly voicing concern that the proliferation of artificial intelligence could represent yet another attempt to reduce everyone to a common denominator, stripping away individuality – this time through algorithms configured by others. Such digital totalitarianism would be just as much of a dead end, and just as bleak and inhumane, as the totalitarian societies of the past which we are all familiar with.
There is another significant issue, one that is already relevant today and will become even more acute in the near future: how can states undergoing increasingly extensive digitalisation ensure their sovereignty in this sphere? In other words, how can they safeguard their security and distinct identity without isolating themselves from global progress or falling behind in technological development?
Another area in which science and technology are radically changing the world is the ability of humans to intrude deeply into what was previously seen as the Creator’s domain: genetic changes to the body, the shaping of personality, the programming of human behaviour and even of thought itself. It is essential to combine the efforts of countries and communities to work together on mutually acceptable solutions to these extremely delicate, defining, truly existential questions.
It would be logical to do this work within existing international frameworks. Yet, many of these organisations, as I have already noted, are under excessive influence of Western countries, which are not interested in universal progress – only in maintaining their own power. The institutions that worked well after World War II no longer reflect the reality in the second quarter of this century. Is it possible to reform them successfully so that they conform to modern realities? The question remains open.
New international communities are also emerging, generated by the current international situation. Of course, they have great prospects, whether they are regional associations or global structures such as BRICS. However, it must be admitted that all of them have a great deal of work to do to define their functionality, the optimal areas for its application, and the limits of their own capabilities. Of course, organisations that are relatively new can hardly be expected to quickly reshape the world order and build a multipolar architecture; this is a long and thorny path with many unknowns, but it will undoubtedly lead to results.
Does this mean that we are now doomed to chaos? No, it is certainly premature to make such a judgement. In general, a world regulated by clearly defined norms and the institutions that uphold them – a world that is orderly, so to speak – is a recent invention, one that emerged only in the last century. All previous centuries managed without it. As we know, the results were mixed, to put it mildly: arrogance, envy, and greed have always plagued world politics, and they still occur today.
Nevertheless, responsible powers have always competed with each other in one way or another, but they have also worked together, collaborated to build frameworks for relations among themselves and with smaller states, and in general, as a rule, still sought to maintain stability.
Amid the ongoing crisis of institutions and the erosion of international law, the major powers bear an enormous responsibility that matches their immense capabilities. Such states have the potential to take actions that can reverse global trends towards achieving greater predictability and security or, conversely, towards exacerbating all existing problems. This potential gets multiplied by the innovative technologies I have mentioned before. Clearly, the future of the world and every individual depends on how effectively risks are managed during the period of abrupt changes.
The absence of universally recognised rules and a shared understanding of the principle of equal and indivisible security – or cancelling that principle altogether – often encourages selfish behaviour. In some cases, it turns into aggressive attempts to secure unilateral advantages, aggravate the confusion and exploit it to promote one’s own interests. International politics provides examples of this almost every day. Every conceivable and inconceivable taboo is being violated. I will not go over them now. I think everyone in this room understands perfectly well what I am talking about. I am deeply convinced that something as complex as international relations nevertheless requires prudence and adherence not only to established laws but also, as lawyers say, customary law, meaning not only the letter but also the spirit of the law, as well as established and universally recognised practice.
Moral and ethical constraints and basic standards of decency still matter, because respecting them creates at least a possibility to maintain some kind of dialogue. Conversely, the systematic failure to honour commitments, deception, turning communication into a farce and any substantive discussion into a propaganda exercise, and the blatant mockery and distortion of facts for the sake of fleeting gains destroy the very foundation of international coexistence.
Such, if you will, approach to conducting international affairs is short-sighted and dangerous. A temporary gain achieved in this manner can turn into long-term setbacks, and, most importantly, make the situation worse for everyone, because the interconnectedness of the world is here and is not going away. The might makes right principle sometimes appears to guide certain international actors who are convinced of their own military-political, economic and, as they think, moral exceptionalism. We know perfectly well from history that this never ends well.
Let me digress from the main topic for a while. There are people here in this room who hold a very diverse mix of opinions regarding an extremely acute present-day conflict – the Ukraine conflict, and what caused it. I would like to say a few words on this matter. It is a fact that many hundreds or even thousands of experts, your colleagues who will study the materials from this Valdai Club meeting, they have their own opinions on this matter. I am, of course aware that some within the expert community might ask why Russia started the war while talking about peace. I have commented this many times already, but let me say this once again in front of this audience.
Where is the truth? The truth is that we did not want and were not the ones who started to fight. In fact, they started to fight against us. They should have refrained from encouraging aggressive nationalism and Russophobia in Ukraine so as to turn it into a tool for fighting Russia. NATO should not have embarked on an effort to make our historical territories part of its military space in its own interests and should not have planned setting up its bases there. Radicals in Kiev should not have been pushed to a government coup while the de facto illegal regime should not have been pumped full of all kinds of offensive weapons after that. Plans for setting up concentration camps for the people from Donbass and Crimea should not have been drafted. Unarmed people should not have been rolled over by tanks, shelled with missiles and bombed from the air and burnt alive just for being Russian, in terms of both their ethnic background and their spirit.
The list of these do-nots goes on, but let me stop at that. I am convinced that this was an intentional effort to place Russia in a situation when it was simply forced to defend itself with arms in hand to respond to this obvious act of aggression. They pushed us to this brink knowingly and intentionally. Overall, Russophobia, oppressing and killing Russian people and destroying Russia should not be turned into state ideology while striving to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. This was the way it was all articulated, right? No one forgot this. At least, we did not forget this.
If we want to live – and who does not? – as I have already said during one of my public appearances, let us live in friendship and work together for finding ways to accomplish this aim. Of course, confidence building is a painstaking and fragile process. Placing it on the right track is very hard, while it can be derailed very easily.
The interests never fully coincide even when it comes to the closest partners, let alone countries which are rivals and are locked in an all-out competition or even confrontation against one another.
Sooner or later, the international situation and the international system will settle into some form of stable equilibrium. This is undoubtedly a complex, multifaceted and multilayered process built on mutual compromises, willingness to meet each other halfway, and a level-headed assessment of the situation, including by the West. The former hegemon will unavoidably have to acknowledge the realities of a multipolar world – just look at the trends shaping the global economy – and learn to cooperate with the countries of the Global Majority on the basis of respect for their fundamental interests. Of course, this will take time. We are going to have to live in an extremely unstable and ever changing world. The path to a new system will be full of unexpected twists and turns; unfortunately, often unpleasant and even dangerous ones.
I would like to turn to the history of our country. Russia has travelled a thorny path of profound transformation, and this process is still underway. Thirty-five years ago, we experienced the collapse of the state system, which was a genuine tragedy for tens of millions of people who woke up one morning to find themselves beyond the borders of their own country and whose lives – and the lives of their children – were changed overnight. Both in Russia and in neighbouring countries this led to a fundamental transformation and international affairs get transformed as well.
I would also like to highlight a certain naivety, idealism, or perhaps even complacency on the part of those who stood at the helm of the state during the final years of the Soviet era. Blind trust in Western partners and confidence in “gentlemen’s agreements,” when they thought they could simply take someone at their word and come to terms also played a cruel joke on the Soviet Union.
In retrospect, it becomes clear just how destructive a role this played not only in the fate of the Soviet Union, but also in ensuring long-term global stability. The Soviet leaders wanted the West to like them, while Western leaders sought to reshape the world to suit their needs and to grab their share – preferably a large one – of the Soviet legacy. We can see the result now.
The Soviet Union collapsed due to a mix of internal imbalances. This is the most important dimension to it. This is the truth, and this is what happened. Specifically, internal imbalances, as well as mistakes made by successive generations of the country’s leadership. Short-sightedness, narrow and unrealistic ideological dogmas instead of pragmatism, incompetence, and the practice of sweeping obvious problems under the carpet gradually exacerbated and undermined the Soviet Union’s domestic and international standing. Ultimately, these factors led to its collapse.
What is happening in the world today, the present-day conflicts and upheavals – all this largely stems from the fact that late 20th-century politicians, both in the East and the West, were unwilling, unprepared or unable to treat the era of major shifts with the required seriousness and depth. This is not a question of shifting responsibility onto the leaders of the past; this is simply how it all happened in reality.
However, even during that period, there were people, both in the East and West, there were other kinds of politicians who developed a keen understanding of these challenges and offered what I believe to be the right ways of resolving them. Today, their assessments can be viewed as visionary.
You know that I have mentioned Egon Bahr in the past, a politician from the Federal Republic of Germany. He was a member of the Social Democratic Party’s Executive Committee.
I will share just a few thoughts with you. I was very surprised to learn about his contacts with the Soviet leadership in both Bonn and Moscow. What surprised me was the extent to which this person had mastered the subject, his intelligence and competence.
Let me share some of the things he said in June and February 1990. As we all understand, this was a time of radical shifts for Europe and the entire world.
Bahr’s main concern was the threat of a lingering confrontation in Europe after Germany’s reunification, and once, and I quote, “those circles within NATO which are not at all eager to pursue the path of pan-European cooperation and ending the confrontation” reinforced their positions and influence. This is what he said. He could already see at that time that forces of this kind existed. He was well-placed to know this, wasn’t he? During the 1990 talks, Egon Bahr said, and here is another quote: “Without a decisive step towards overcoming Europe’s disintegration into hostile blocs, events can take quite a negative turn that would doom the USSR to international isolation.” This is what he said. What did that mean? By the way, we can see that it all happened just as he had predicted and warned.
What was the offer for Eastern and Central Europe? The proposal consisted of setting up a security council that would include both the United States and the USSR and giving this structure a broad mandate. This council was designed to include almost all Eastern and Central European countries.
However, after the USSR’s dissolution, the forces which came to dominate the West, just as Egon Bahr said, had little, if any, interest in pursuing the path of pan-European cooperation. Despite the fact that new Russia spent many years – and I would like to emphasise that this was a process that lasted for many years – trying to integrate into the so-called Western civilisation, they did everything to effectively isolate the Russian Federation and break it down even further. All the shifts in Russia’s domestic politics notwithstanding, and despite all these changes, they still viewed Russia as the core element of the historical Russian Empire. To this day, they keep talking at all kinds of events and gatherings about the need to complete the effort to break up the Empire.
Taken together, all this produced a rather dangerous, to put it bluntly, situation in Europe and around the world.
I would stress, ladies and gentlemen, that it is my deep belief that Mr Bahr did not have anything other than Europe’s future on his mind at that time. He was thinking about this pan-European home. The USSR leadership also talked about it a lot at that time but, unfortunately, they failed to put words into action.
Russia probably understands better than many the difficulties of overcoming the consequences of historical collapses and cataclysms, and of finding its way forward in new and often unfavourable conditions. We often had to learn by trial and error, making quick decisions in response to emerging situations.
But we never forget that the nation needs a perspective and a clear view of the road ahead. Of course, there is no future without a past. The legacy of our forefathers, who built a great and unique country, must be preserved and strengthened. No society can exist without a historical foundation and respect for traditions. But the opposite is also true: the past becomes meaningless without a future. No matter how great the achievements of our forefathers, the nation must not become a museum of its past greatness.
The true greatness of a state is impossible without the ability to keep pace with the times and, ideally, to move ahead of them. Multiplying one’s heritage and creatively developing it amid modern conditions are the best guarantees of preventing our national tradition from becoming a vintage collectible, a trendy historical accessory, or the sole subject of our undivided attention. We must take into account the vibrant and productive environment for our future accomplishments.
As for the future, much is really shrouded in uncertainty, and there are too many incoming and rapidly changing factors. But we certainly need a roadmap for our movement into the future. What we need is not wishful thinking, an abstract and speculative construct or an unrealistic visualisation of our wishes, but a realistic assessment of risks, capabilities and essential objectives. Russia is building this path to the future for itself, and is certainly ready to do this jointly with other nations around the world.
As I said, the scale and, more importantly, the speed of changes underway in the world are unprecedented. We must realise that the point of no return can come very quickly and unexpectedly for all. It may turn out one day that the logic of escalating mutual retaliation leads to a point of fatal irreversibility.
The word “escalation” is often used now to describe and forecast various global conflicts, meaning unwillingness to use real diplomacy based on reality and respect for the interests of all sides, a desire to aggravate the situation, raise the stakes and even bluff, crossing red lines in the hope of suppressing and intimidating the opponent, and breaking their will. There is nothing new in the escalation of hostilities and sanctions; this practice has been used in many conflicts, and it is never unilateral, because one side’s provocations inevitably trigger a response from the other side. Therefore, the spiral is tightening, and the devastating consequences are growing.
Escalation is based – I am not telling you anything new – on arrogance and overconfidence. It is a path towards a precipice, especially today when the world’s leading powers have weapons in their arsenals that are capable of destroying all life or at least reducing the Earth to a catastrophic state. Can we guarantee that these weapons will never be used? We cannot, of course. We all remember the saying that if you have a rifle hanging on the wall in the first act, it will eventually be fired. We must remember this and try to prevent it.
The more uncompromising a response, and the more clearly the goal of the opponent’s “strategic defeat” is declared, the greater the chances that the battle will escalate into the most violent phase. The survival of the fittest applies not only to the natural world but also to social communities, if they are faced with the possible loss of their independence, dignity and the very right to exist.
Ladies
and gentlemen,
Let me
reiterate: the fundamental formation of a new world order is
inevitable – and one hopes it will occur within the foreseeable
future. For now, however, events are unfolding in a highly
turbulent and spontaneous manner. We are only beginning to outline,
feeling our way towards, the contours of what is to come.
This,
however, does not mean we should sit idly by and wait to see
what happens next. To reach the phase of building – which,
as I have said, will undoubtedly arrive sooner or later –
we must first weather the current period of danger and avert
the most destructive threats.
I consider
it particularly important to emphasise once again two aspects that,
in my view, should be the subject of serious discussion
by us all – at the political, technical, expert
and even philosophical levels.
First
and foremost is the issue I have already touched upon:
artificial intelligence. A global debate is currently underway
as to whether measures should be taken to deliberately slow
research and development in this field, to prevent these
technologies from spiralling out of human control. This is
a multifaceted issue requiring thorough examination. Human history
demonstrates that technological progress cannot be halted; however, we must
understand the consequences of that progress – above all when it
comes to the use of its achievements, particularly
in the military domain.
There are
already documented cases of artificial intelligence making decisions based
on its own assessment of what is expedient. This applies to both
civilian and military contexts. As artificial intelligence
technologies become more widely adopted, their role will grow,
and algorithms will assume greater responsibility. After all, humans
simply cannot compete with a machine’s ability to analyse
a situation almost instantaneously. Yet humans possess other qualities:
instinct, intuition and the ability to make decisions that may
not be immediately obvious but ultimately prove to be the only
correct ones, and even life-saving.
I would
like to recount a story from the Soviet era – from
the everyday reality of those years. It was September 1983.
Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, an officer at a missile
early-warning centre, was on duty when the system picked up
a signal. Both we and the United States had long since had such
systems in place and operational. The system detected
the launch of five American intercontinental ballistic missiles. Any
algorithm would have classified this as an unambiguous trigger
for a retaliatory strike. Yet the experienced officer questioned
the accuracy of the signal, suspecting a system
malfunction. And he turned out to be right. Had artificial
intelligence been in his place, things might have turned out very
differently. To my mind, this is a very compelling example.
The limits
on the use of AI technologies in the security sphere
are a matter of humanity’s survival. AI can increase
the effectiveness of means of warfare, which also makes
conflicts more destructive.
We need
an unbiased and professional international discussion on modern
methods of warfare to preserve humanitarian limits and mitigate
the most brutal effects of armed conflicts related
to the growth of destructive capabilities. I know that your
forum held a session that was very accurately titled The Ethics
of the New War: Humans and Inhumanity.
It is true
that the inhumanity of modern conflicts can be interpreted
in two ways. It is increasing brutality and disregard
for humanitarian norms. It is also the new forms
of confrontation, where AI and autonomous systems play a growing
role in hostilities, gradually replacing humans, including
in decision-making, which is especially significant. This is a huge and complex
topic, which requires the utmost attention. The automation
and digitalisation of war lead to the dehumanisation
of perception, turning bloodshed and the loss of human
lives into a kind of computer game, into a mechanistic routine.
To call a spade a spade, this is a path towards
the regression of humanity into savagery amid endless talk about
grandiose technological progress.
At the end
of the 19th century, more precisely in 1899, Russia proposed
holding the Hague Conference, which for the first time
formalised the rules of war, peaceful settlement of conflicts,
and the humanisation of hostilities. Of course,
the true and noble ideas laid down back then did not save humanity
from the tragedies of the 20th century. The world wars
seemingly wiped out the achievements of humanitarian law. But now
the time has come when we must again raise the issue
of the rules of armed confrontation.
We have no
illusions: wars have been a constant feature throughout human history,
they are still waged today, and armed conflicts will most likely continue
in the future. Regrettably, this is an integral part
of human existence. Military service is the profession of those
who defend the interests of their countries, but professionalism
in the military sphere includes respect for humanitarian norms.
In particular, the Russian military have always been guided
by the inviolability of these norms, and I would like
to emphasise that they were never the first to attack facilities
that are not related to the adversary’s military infrastructure.
The rise
in international tensions and overall confrontation has one more
extremely negative and long-term consequence – this is
the second fact I would like to draw your attention
to today. In this conflict situation, we are sacrificing
the solution of global problems of concern
to the whole of humanity. We addressed these problems –
climate, the environment, poverty and inequality – only
recently, but today we have forgotten all about them. They have been pushed
aside, but they are growing more acute. This has not changed. Regrettably,
there are no grounds to hope that the international community
as a single body will be able to deal with this agenda
in the near term. But if acute and pressing issues are not
settled on a global scale, we must address them
at the regional level, especially since it is closer to home
and easier for people to understand.
We are all
responsible for our planet as a whole, but we are first
and foremost responsible for our own home and its immediate surroundings.
Our home in the broader sense is Eurasia, a vast territory that
is the centre and the setting for the most important
processes unfolding in the world. A great deal
on the international stage as a whole depends on how
we develop Eurasia.
The idea
of a Greater Eurasian Partnership advanced by Russia some time
ago is acquiring special significance amid growing instability worldwide.
Military-political confrontations are undermining global connectivity
and endangering industrial, transport and logistics chains,
as well as the established trade and communication paths.
The task and responsibility of Eurasian countries is
to maximally protect our space from global risks and destructive
processes, using all available technological and other opportunities
to improve the quality of Eurasian interaction
and strengthen connectivity across this vast territory.
I would
also like to note that Eurasian cultural and civilisational
communities have, over many centuries, established mutual understanding even
in the most complicated historical eras. Eurasia can become
the prototype of international communication in conditions
of diverse cultures, approaches and interests, where differences do
not become an obstacle but an advantage for the development
of a sustainable and balanced partnership.
In this
connection, I would like to draw your attention
to the initiative we have advanced jointly with our Belarusian
friends, the drafting of a Eurasian Charter of Diversity
and Multipolarity in the 21st Century. Last week, the foreign
ministers of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and our other
partners launched practical work on this fundamental document
at their meeting held on the sidelines of the UN
General Assembly.
The primary
significance of Eurasia is that it is largely self-sufficient
and capable of dealing with any problems. The only thing this
vast community of nations needs is indivisible security, the absence
of military threats, and lasting peace.
Colleagues,
All
of us, the international community as a whole, bear overall
responsibility for the future. This is not an exaggeration
or a metaphor. As I have said, this is an absolutely
practical task that requires our immediate attention.
One would
like to believe that our descendants will read in their history books
that the second quarter of the 21st century was the turning
point when humanity, becoming aware of the scope of change
and the challenges to its existence, managed to put aside
petty squabbles, ambitions and selfishness and joined hands
to address common problems, turned the technological revolution from
a set of threats into a wide range of possibilities,
addressed the problems of social inequality and environmental
degradation in deed rather than in word, realised the futility
of military confrontation and dictate and the need
for mutually acceptable solutions to all arising questions
and problems, and started, at long last, to build
a new stable world order. I am confident that this is how it will be,
because if this does not happen, there is a risk that there will be no one
left to use these textbooks, and nobody to write these
textbooks.
Let us hope
for the best and, most importantly, do everything in our power
to make this better future happen and be with us.
I would
like to thank you for your attention and to wish you
success. I really appreciate our meetings. Thank you very much.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, thank you very much
for such a comprehensive overview of all these problems, both
specific and broader ones.
You quoted Egon Bahr. He lived a very long life
and died in 2015. In other words, he witnessed
the beginning of Europe’s slide into a real military
and political crisis. We know that he was deeply distressed
by the events unfolding in Europe during the final years
of his life. As someone who first observed and then participated
in European processes, can you perhaps identify, or pinpoint,
a moment when the ideals of which Bahr spoke
at the time became lost?
Vladimir Putin: He did not write about them.
Fyodor Lukyanov: He spoke about them.
Vladimir Putin: I want to emphasise once
again that what I have just recounted comes from the archives –
from his discussions with representatives of the Soviet leadership
in Bonn and Moscow.
Fyodor Lukyanov: When did the vision he set out
at the time, and which the Soviet leaders probably agreed
with, become impossible?
Vladimir Putin: That is precisely the point: it
was not so much that they agreed with it; they listened and listened,
and did nothing. You know, this prompted Bahr to say something that
shocked me. He said, “I never thought that at my age
I would have to put forward such a point of view
in Moscow. If the Soviet leadership does not do anything but remains
a passive bystander (this is roughly what he said), I will not come
to Moscow again; you will not see me here.”
Fyodor Lukyanov: Be that as it may, did that
moment come?
Vladimir Putin: Which moment?
Fyodor Lukyanov: The moment when all that became
impossible.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, of course. As soon
as the Soviet Union fell apart, as I mentioned
in my remarks, the aggressive NATO quarters, which Bahr
mentioned, actually took that as a cue that Russia should not be
included, as I said, into the family of civilised nations
of Europe and the world. They used that situation to spur
its disintegration. That is how it all started. It all started precisely with
this.
They said that NATO would not expand eastwards –
and immediately they broke that promise and started doing so. There
were five or six waves of expansion. And the Soviet Union,
and then Russia, kept saying: no, this should not be done; we had
an agreement, after all. They did not care; they did as they saw fit,
precisely in the direction Bahr had spoken about – towards
isolating Russia and subsequently breaking up the Russian Federation.
There was support for separatism
in the Caucasus, and, in fact, support using
the instruments of terrorism. Those who were fighting there were
terrorists. Everyone knew that they were from the Islamic State, from
ISIS. Everyone condemned what they were doing in other parts
of the world, but looked away when they did it in Russia. They
acted as if they did not know about it, which is remarkable,
and simply turned a blind eye.
In other areas as well, I vividly recall
my discussions with representatives of international financial
organisations and political circles at that time. My jaw
literally dropped every time. There was clearly a deliberate strategy
at play. That was all it took. Everything went downhill from there. This
impunity and permissiveness on the part
of the West – that is precisely where it all led.
Fyodor Lukyanov: In other words, when
in the first half of the 2000s there were very intensive
contacts with the Europeans, new ideas, the four common spaces,
and so on – it was all hopeless, wasn’t it?
Vladimir Putin: You know, the forces
in the West that sought to fight Russia to the end
gained the upper hand, that’s all. I have said this before,
and we all know – and criticise – the UN for its
ineffectiveness, for this and for that. But where did it all
begin? With NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia. Yes, there was a grave
internal conflict. But did it warrant launching a military operation
on the territory of an independent state
in the heart of Europe without the sanction
of the UN Security Council? Did it warrant bombing the capital,
Belgrade? Why? Without any decision by the Security Council, without
its sanction, a major war was unleashed. That’s how it all started.
Naturally, everyone around the world saw it. But if one country is allowed
to do it, then everyone else is allowed to do it too. That’s all
there is to it.
The system that developed after World War II was based
on the balance of power between the victorious countries.
Then the Soviet Union was brought down, and this balance collapsed.
And Western countries thought to themselves: “Why should we comply
with these rules that were signed alongside the Soviet Union, when
the Soviet Union no longer exists? We will now make the rules
for ourselves, as we see fit, in order to achieve our
interests in the international arena.” And that was that.
And so the process began, and was implemented step by step.
I also remember Boris Yeltsin trying to reach
an agreement on Yugoslavia, to resolve those problems,
and he said that yes, of course, it was necessary to take into
account the aspirations of the peoples living there – let
us do it peacefully. Excuse my bluntness, but they didn’t give
a damn. They did as they pleased, by force. And that was
that. Every step after that has been a form of pressure – military,
economic or financial. It is all talk from a position
of strength.
We had to live with that reality because, naturally,
all the disintegration processes unfolding across the former Soviet
Union had an immediate impact, in one way or another,
on the new Russia – the Russian Federation. We had
to deal with the consequences while rebuilding and strengthening
the statehood of Russia, our economy, our Armed Forces and so
on. We were not in a position to sit down with the world’s
leading powers and negotiate the rules of conduct
on the international stage. We were focused on ourselves,
on strengthening our own country. That’s all there is to it.
And that is how the situation deteriorated.
We continued down the same path, moving further
and further in that direction, until Ukraine eventually became
the focus. Yanukovych was president at the time. I am not
going to pass judgement on him now. The people of Ukraine
may well have had every reason to say that he should not be president.
Fine. But he had agreed to everything, including holding new
elections – early elections, at that. All that was needed was
to go to the polls and solve the problem. But
no – it was deemed absolutely necessary to stage a coup d’état.
When I asked some of my European colleagues,
“Why did you do it? It was obvious that Yanukovych would lose power
at the next election, let alone an early one,” they would say,
“Yes, that’s true.” “Then why did you do it?” And the answer was,
“Well, that’s just how it happened.”
“That’s just how it happened” – what kind
of explanation is that? They removed from power a person who
supported Ukraine’s accession to the European Union but opposed its
NATO membership. They ousted him, and events began to spiral:
Russophobia became rampant, hostilities broke out in southeastern Ukraine,
and we had to intervene to protect the people
of Crimea. And so it continued, step by step. Then came
the Minsk agreements, which, as it later became clear, no one had any
intention of honouring. In fact, they said so openly: they had never
intended to implement the Minsk agreements.
This went on for eight years – eight years,
do you understand? Throughout that entire period, we did not recognise
the LPR and the DPR. But eventually it became clear that
the situation could no longer continue, and we recognised them. Once
we had done so, we had the right to conclude treaties
of friendship and mutual assistance with them. Was that
a violation of international law? No, it was not. So, we concluded
those treaties.
And once those treaties were in place, did we have
the right to provide assistance and support when they asked us
to do so? Of course, we did. And that is precisely what we did.
When the UN Secretary-General visited Moscow, I set out this entire
sequence of events for him and asked, “Where exactly is
the mistake [in this reasoning]?” He looked at me, paused
for a moment and said, “Well, all right… but it was you who
attacked anyway.” And that was the end of it.
But no one wants to consider how we actually reached
this full-scale, hot phase of the conflict. Or rather, everyone
understands perfectly well how we got here; they simply do not want
to acknowledge it. That is the problem. And it all began with
what Egon Bahr was talking about. He saw where it was heading.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Following this trajectory,
as you said, we have now arrived at an interesting juncture:
NATO exercises are taking place in the Baltic Sea, accompanied
by very stern statements and threats directed at Kaliningrad.
Meanwhile, the Russian side has promised that, should the need
arise –specifically, in the event of an attempt
to blockade Kaliningrad – it would use every means at its
disposal, up to and including nuclear weapons. Is this a genuine
escalation? Are we on the brink of war, or are we simply
trying to scare one another?
Vladimir Putin: We are not trying to scare
anyone. What you have just mentioned – the Foreign Ministry’s
statement and the letters it sent to certain countries – is
not intimidation; it is a response to attempts to intimidate us.
After all, it is not use who are making these statements
about the need, possibility, or preparation for a war with
Russia in 2029 or 2030. These statements come from Western
and European politicians. We hear them constantly. Constantly.
And then there are concrete actions: one exercise after another
in the Baltic Sea, followed by attempts to detain our ships
and vessels. All of this constitutes escalation, as I said
in my remarks. All this is escalation.
Then we began hearing a statement concerning
the Kaliningrad Region. The Foreign Ministry’s statement
and the letters that were sent out were entirely justified. If it
comes to a direct attack on the Russian Federation –
in this case, Kaliningrad, although it could potentially involve other
territories as well – the question of Russia using all
the weapons at its disposal would inevitably and immediately
arise. That is inevitable.
This has nothing to do with who holds the post
of Supreme Commander-in-Chief or President of Russia.
The point is this: as I understand it, the NATO Secretary
General spoke about the 300 million people in Europe, and so on.
Yes, that is precisely why we would inevitably have to consider employing
all the forces and means at our disposal.
Why? First, we understand that we would be facing an adversary
with twice our population. It has immense economic and military potential.
Yes, we would not have a vast array of forces and means
at our disposal to counter such a threat. We would have
to rely on our competitive advantages in this struggle. And what
are they? The fact is that we possess such advantages
in the means we have to defend ourselves. Yes, of course,
France and the UK are nuclear powers. We understand that perfectly
well and are fully aware of it. But no one else possesses
the kinds of strike capabilities that Russia has today.
And these are our competitive advantages.
So, how can we counter an aggressor? We are not
threatening anyone. We are simply stating that we do not have all that many
means of defending ourselves. And, incidentally, neither that letter nor
the Foreign Ministry’s statement mentions the use of nuclear
weapons. They speak, as I have just put it, of employing all
the forces and means available to our country. As for how
that would actually happen, we will decide that ourselves.
Fyodor Lukyanov: But the NATO Secretary General
you mentioned reacted to this, I would say, quite calmly. He said
they did not consider it serious.
Vladimir Putin: Quite right. Unless, of course,
one considers their threats against us to be serious.
Fyodor Lukyanov: One more topic, then, to round
off this discussion.
A few weeks ago, the Ministry of Defence…
Vladimir Putin: By the way, Fyodor, excuse
me for interrupting, but I think you understand what lies behind
the constant escalation of tensions by many European countries.
It is driven by the serious deterioration in their economic
and domestic political situation.
Just look at what is happening to their economies,
their social policy and the living standards of people
in the major European countries. Under these circumstances, they
desperately need to divert public attention away from domestic problems
and towards external issues.
I have just had to respond
to the questions you asked me. And I believe this is
precisely the kind of response they expected to hear from us,
because they will now seize on it and exploit this argument that
Russia is threatening them with nuclear weapons. They will use it
to distract their citizens from the fact that it is they who are
pursuing an aggressive policy towards Russia and pushing their people
towards a dangerous threshold of confrontation.
We are not threatening anyone. We have no intention
of attacking anyone, whether in 2029, 2030 or 2050. But if we
are subjected to aggression, we will have no choice but to respond.
People in European countries need to understand this clearly
and distinguish between our position and that of their current
political leaders. It seems to me, however, that they do understand
the difference. We can see it in the election results
and in public sentiment across major European countries.
Fyodor Lukyanov: I am beginning to feel
like an accomplice in the domestic political manipulations
of European governments.
Vladimir Putin: I believe they are doing this
deliberately. They are intelligent people who shape their messaging, including
their public statements, in such a way as to produce
the specific domestic political effect they want.
Fyodor Lukyanov: There is one more point concerning
this rhetoric – or the absence of it. A few weeks ago,
the Ministry of Defence published a list of European
facilities involved in manufacturing and supplying weapons
to Ukraine, explicitly identifying them as potential targets. This
was subsequently confirmed on several occasions and at various
levels, including by the Foreign Ministry.
Suppose that, at some point, such a warning has
to be followed up with action, and a strike will be carried out
against one of these major facilities. This would most likely be regarded
as an attack by Russia and could lead
to the invocation of NATO’s collective defence clause. Are we
prepared for that?
Vladimir Putin: Countries supplying weapons
to other countries is nothing new. This is a matter
of military-technical cooperation and does not cause us any concern.
However, other countries’ involvement in direct combat operations is
certainly a cause for concern.
What do I mean? We are fully aware that strikes deep
into Russian territory could not be carried out so smoothly
by the Ukrainian armed forces without space-based intelligence
and technical assistance from Western specialists. This poses
a threat to everyone. It means that these countries are becoming
involved in the war against Russia, which creates additional threats
for the future.
There is nothing positive about supplying weapons
to conflict zones; all countries around the world generally try
to avoid doing so. Supplying arms to conflict zones is considered
improper. For instance, we do not receive weapons from anyone. We rely
solely on our own defence industry and our own economic capabilities.
Ukraine, as I know and as everyone
knows, cannot exist on its own. It is actually losing elements of its
statehood. In my view, this is obvious: it is being governed from outside.
And when someone seeks to fight us through others – in this
case, through the Ukrainian regime, which sends its own people (although
I doubt it even considers them its own) into the line of fire,
effectively to their extermination – when someone starts fighting us
through others, that is, of course, a threat. I am not saying
that we intend to launch strikes tomorrow against the territory
or facilities of the countries supplying weapons
to Ukraine. But this is a threat that we must clearly understand,
assess, and keep in mind.
And, of course, the Russian Armed Forces
and military intelligence must understand where these threats are coming
from. We are monitoring this closely.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you. But Egon Bahr,
of course, had he lived to see the present day, would have been
absolutely horrified to see how far things have gone.
Vladimir Putin: I don’t know; I didn’t know
him personally. Let me repeat: when I read what he had said – how can
I put it in plain language? The Russian audience will understand
me, although it sounds undiplomatic – I was absolutely stunned.
I was amazed at how intelligent and knowledgeable he was, how
far ahead he could see. And how much he thought both about the future
of his own country, Germany, and about the future of Europe
as a whole.
I read out his quotation, after all. He said that
the division of Europe had to be overcome, and he suggested
a way of resolving the problem. One could argue with that; it
was a relevant issue at the time. Perhaps it is no longer quite
so relevant today, but he was thinking about how to overcome that
division. And what did he say? If we failed to overcome it, NATO
would, in effect, absorb the whole of Eastern European region,
leaving the Soviet Union isolated. And that would be bad for the whole
world – that was his point. He was certainly an intelligent man. One
can only marvel at his foresight. He said that this was what would happen.
And that is exactly what happened. His assessment
of the situation at the time and his predictions for the future
cannot but command respect.
Unfortunately, as I have said, no one listened
to him. No one set about working to overcome this division into
blocs. Russia, for its part, made unsuccessful attempts to integrate
into the so-called community of civilised countries, but was pushed
out of it every time. Moreover, they continued to gnaw away
at us from all sides, seeking, as I have already said,
to finish off the disintegration of the historic Empire.
This is what led to the conflict we see today,
because eventually they encroached on Ukraine. We said a thousand
times: don’t do it, stop, stop. But no – they kept going further
and further. And there we are: this is the result.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Do you regret that,
as President, you spent time and effort back in the 2000s
trying to integrate Russia into that system?
Vladimir Putin: No, I don’t regret it.
Otherwise, all of us – not just me, but the entire
country – would be thinking that we had failed to do something, that
we had left something unfinished, that we should have done more, made further
concessions here and there, or proposed something else. But we did
everything; we made every proposal, and we realised that we were not
welcome there. They simply said “no”, that was all. And at the same
time, they continued to hammer away at our entire space, steadily
biting off more and more of it, quite forcefully, rather brazenly
and aggressively. And so, in the end, everything reached
the state we see today.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you.
Colleagues, we will now move on to questions from
the floor. Please signal if you wish to speak.
Let us give the floor to Vadim Voynikov, since we
began with Kaliningrad.
Vadim Voynikov: Thank you very much.
Mr President, my question concerns freedom
of navigation. I represent Kaliningrad, the Baltic Federal
University, and this issue is of particular concern to us.
Recently, alarming developments have been taking place
in the world’s oceans: attacks on underwater infrastructure
and attempts to detain tankers and civilian ships. This,
of course, exposes a whole series of problems, including legal
ones, where certain unscrupulous participants in international relations
abuse the instruments developed under international law, which
for decades have been used and observed in principle by all
states.
I am referring to the fact that some
countries revoke flags, playing along with other states, while others stop
ships without any legal grounds. In other words, these mechanisms are
effectively being abused to serve specific political and economic
ends.
In this connection, I have a question: is
the global majority now ready to adapt these international rules
to new challenges? Of course, much is being said today about
the loss of significance of international law. But
I believe that, apart from international law, we have no other legal
mechanism for resolving these problems. Is Russia ready to put
forward such an initiative? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: We are in favour of freedom
of navigation; we are against all restrictions.
Do we need to invent something new? I do not think
so. We simply need to comply with what already exists. We may invent
something new, but what then? If no one will observe these new rules, who needs
them?
There is the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, is there not? I believe it is
from 1982 or 1986. It is from 1982, is that right? 1982. We simply need
to comply with it. This applies to all areas and all regions
of the world.
You spoke of attempts to detain our ships. Yes,
that is, of course, a violation. I was in the Far
East – you have surely seen it – but the world’s oceans do not
end with the Baltic and North Atlantic regions; there are other areas
of the world’s oceans. And we will act symmetrically –
perhaps in the Baltic and the Atlantic, or perhaps
in the Pacific, somewhere else, in the Indian Ocean,
I do not know. Wherever it is more advantageous for us, that is where
we will act.
Who needs this? No one needs it. But this, too, is one
of the elements of aggressive behaviour towards Russia. It must
stop. We do not do this; we do not attack anyone; we do not seize anyone’s
ships. It must stop.
Regarding the Black Sea – I have already
spoken about this before, but I will repeat it here for this
audience – yes, there are hostilities in the Black Sea. We have
struck military vessels and ships transporting military materiel,
and we have almost never been mistaken in our assessments, because
whenever we hit a target, there were secondary explosions. That means
there was military cargo on board.
But the Kiev authorities began striking our tankers
and other ships carrying non-military cargo – absolutely civilian
goods. As I said, when they started – publicly announcing it
in early June, without a shred of hesitation – they knocked
out 40 of our ships in the first ten days alone, and over
the course of the conflict, they damaged more than 100.
And what happened? We started hitting back. Now, we are being bombarded
with appeals from every direction: “Oh, please stop.” But they were the ones
who started it. So here’s a grenade from a Soviet soldier; take
that – and like it! No, they don’t seem to like it.
It is the same story with our oil refineries. They
started striking our refineries and openly declared their goal:
to damage our economy. Did they succeed? Partially; by our estimates,
we lost about 1 percent of GDP. And they did this deliberately –
targeting civilian facilities. So, what happened? They received a response
in kind.
We began striking facilities that are vital to their
economy. We did not start this. Now, by their own admission, they
effectively have no metallurgical industry left. But that industry is dual-use,
by the way, because the output is used for more than just
rails or construction materials. Guns and everything else used
to be made from metal produced at local plants. But not anymore.
And the budget no longer receives revenue from certain other goods.
They have problems now.
Or we are told: “How about they stop striking your oil
refineries, and you stop striking their ships? Let them export civilian
cargoes of agricultural produce.” But what about our other civilian
cargoes, such as oil and petroleum products? Suppose they stop
the strikes and there is more diesel available – the kind
that is so needed in the United States, for instance. We would have
more of it, but we already have enough diesel as it is. Yet it
wouldn’t reach global markets because bans and sanctions against our oil
and petroleum products are in effect. There are sanctions
on insurance, and freight costs are rising. How, then, would our
diesel reach the global market while sanctions remain? It simply wouldn’t.
And in response, we would be expected to stop striking targets
that are economically sensitive to them. You must agree: that sounds
simply absurd. All of this can be discussed, but the discussion must
be based on a balance of interests.
As for the law of the sea, let me
repeat what I said at the outset: we support freedom
of navigation in all regions of the world
and compliance with all international norms in this area.
I want to conclude by reiterating what
I said at the start: I do not think we need to invent
new norms; we need to observe the ones that already exist.
Fyodor Lukyanov: So, the answer to what is
being blared from every direction – as you put it – is ”no“
for now.
Vladimir Putin: But that is not strictly related
to the law of the sea.
Fyodor Lukyanov: No, not to the law
of the sea. But earlier you mentioned the proposal coming from
every direction.
Vladimir Putin: Oh. No indeed.
Fyodor Lukyanov: No. Thank you.
So, on the subject of the law
of the sea, Professor Dehshiri from Iran is directly involved
in this field.
Mohammad Reza Dehshiri: Thank you, Mr
President. I am from Iran.
Therefore, you know that after unlawful aggression
of the United States and the Israeli regime on Iran,
there were a lot of problems: the aggression of United
States, and then there was the exchange of fire between the two
sides – between Iran and the southern parts
of the Persian Gulf.
Therefore, now the main question is what
the Russian position is about the future of security
arrangements in the region. What is your position
and approach?
Thank you very much.
Vladimir Putin: As for our assessment
of the events that are unfolding, the Foreign Ministry has set
out our position in considerable detail on numerous occasions
and in various contexts.
Most recently, our Foreign Minister addressed this issue
at the UN General Assembly, so there is no need for me
to repeat what has already been said. Our position is open
and public, and we have never shied away from stating it clearly.
As for aggression, I have already touched
on this, but I would like to emphasise it once again. What is
happening in Ukraine is also an act of aggression by the collective
West against Russia, carried out through the Ukrainian nationalist regime.
That, too, is aggression.
We oppose aggression in all its forms. We believe that
all issues should be resolved peacefully, through negotiations. We hope that
the strait will remain open and that the sanctions against Iran,
which Iran is quite rightly seeking to have lifted, will be removed. Once
those sanctions are lifted, there will be no reason to restrict
the passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz –
or, for that matter, through the other strait whose coastline is
controlled by the Houthis. That is our position.
As for Iran’s nuclear programme, our position is
well known and we have made no secret of it. I believe that
Russia played a very significant and substantive role
in resolving the previous crisis and contributed
to the conclusion of the JCPOA. At the time,
an arrangement was reached, with the agreement of our Iranian
friends, under which we proposed that part of Iran’s enriched uranium be
moved to Russian territory. And that arrangement worked. Our proposal
remains on the table today.
We suggested drawing on that positive experience
and transferring enriched uranium from Iran to the Russian
Federation. I should note that initially everyone agreed to this –
the Iranians, the Americans and the Israelis. But later,
however, the United States hardened its position, insisting that
the material should be removed from Iran but moved exclusively
to the United States. Iran, in turn, toughened its stance
as well.
One of our partners, Mr Larijani, who later lost his
life – a great loss, because he was a thoughtful man with whom
it was possible to reach agreements – came to see me personally
and said, “No, we are no longer prepared to send our uranium
anywhere. Instead, we propose that you, Russia, establish a joint venture
in Iran to reduce the level of enrichment, in other
words, to dilute the material there.” I told him that Israel
and the US were unlikely to agree to such
an arrangement, but that the option remained open. That is where
matters stand today.
Nevertheless, our proposals remain on the table.
If all those involved in this process ultimately conclude that this
approach could help ease tensions, even to some extent, we are ready
to move forward with this work.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you. Sergei Karaganov, please.
Sergei Karaganov: Mr President, we are all happy that
we have been acting so resolutely against the current regime
in Ukraine over the past two months. We hope that we will soon
liberate a considerable part of Ukraine from that regime. But this
will again raise the question which we faced after the Great
Patriotic War. I would like to remind you that Ukrainian regions were
restored first and foremost, even before neighbouring regions
in Russia. For example, the Kharkov Region was rebuilt much
quicker that the Bryansk Region. Donbass was an exception,
of course. Should we restore the liberated territories or focus
on our own, much more interesting spheres of development?
Or maybe we should relocate these enterprises to Siberia?
Vladimir Putin: Which enterprises?
Sergei Karaganov: The ones that lie
in ruins now but can be rebuilt.
Vladimir Putin: In our territory?
Fyodor Lukyanov: No, in the Ukrainian
territory.
Sergei Karaganov: In the liberated territory.
Vladimir Putin: You know, we should certainly first
and foremost address our own arising issues. This is an absolute
priority.
But if you mean the territories that should
and will be incorporated into the Russian state, we will have
to rebuild their economy and social sphere. As for what
specifically we will do there, this is a different matter.
Take coal mines, for example. It was not clear what
to do with them when they were part of Ukraine, meaning problems with
their efficiency. We will act out of practical considerations
and the fact that the people who will live in these
territories are full-fledged citizens of the Russian Federation. We
will do everything necessary to improve their standards of living
to the average Russian level as soon as possible
in all spheres, including in healthcare, education, the economy
and people’s incomes.
Overall, we are doing this quite well in Crimea
and in the parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk
republics and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions we control.
As for what to rebuild and which enterprises
to relocate, we will address these matters solely on the basis
of economic expediency.
When it comes to ensuring the safety of our
industry, including defence enterprises, I can assure you that we are
already thinking about this, and when we build new enterprises
in this sphere, we take modern methods of warfare into account, doing
everything necessary to locate these facilities in the safest
areas possible. Their construction is underway.
Vladimir Putin: With regard
to the stabilising aspect of building international relations,
it seems to me that both we and China share a common
understanding that when we speak about Russia as a civilisation-state
or China as a civilisation-state, we primarily mean
the need to protect our traditional values, our history and our
traditions. We will strive to secure respect for our countries
precisely from this humanitarian standpoint.
Naturally, the subjects of international law are
states. At the same time, however, civilisational dialogue between
such states as Russia and the People’s Republic of China is
of enormous importance. After all, above all else, this is communication
in the humanitarian sphere, and that brings people closer. We
see this process, for instance, through a very simple example:
the holding of themed years – the Year of Education,
the Year of Culture and the Year of Cinema. All
of this unites us.
We support the idea of President
of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping. This
civilisational dimension of our relationship is his initiative. During
my visit to Beijing, we signed a joint declaration to that
effect, and, without any doubt, we will work in this direction. China and its
leadership regard our initiatives in this direction with the same
attention and respect. We know this, and we are grateful to our
friends in China. Without question, we will work together to achieve
our shared goals.
The role and significance of China
in international affairs continue to grow. The friendly,
trusting relations between Russia and China – as I have
said many times already – are a highly significant stabilising factor
in global politics.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, you and President
Xi – everyone knows that you share a very strong mutual
understanding. However, you are nonetheless representatives of different
cultures. Have you ever felt a cultural barrier – where you need
to explain to him something that, for example, someone from our
culture would understand immediately, whereas an explanation is required
for him?
Vladimir Putin: You know, I will give you
a very simple example. No, there is no barrier. Moreover, unfortunately,
I do not yet speak Chinese, and my friend, President Xi Jinping,
does not yet speak Russian either. Recently, we were together in India,
and we found ourselves, the two of us,
in the so-called “holding room,” where everyone… Well, that is what
it is called.
Fyodor Lukyanov: It would be interesting to see
this “holding room.” (Laughter.)
Vladimir Putin: Well, it is simply a room
in which the leaders gather before proceeding to greet
the host of the event – in this case, Prime Minister
Modi. He greeted everyone, and each head of delegation proceeds from
there into the main hall.
So, the two of us – President Xi Jinping
and I – were left alone: he and I, without interpreters. (Laughter
in the hall.) You know what is interesting: the moment
either of us said a single word, we understood each another without
interpreters, despite not knowing each other’s languages.
There you have it. Are there barriers? No, there are none. (Applause.)
Fyodor Lukyanov: I just wanted to say that
the words “does not know Russian yet” and “does not know Chinese yet”
are reassuring. However, it is clear that, apparently, there is no longer any
need for that.
Vladimir Putin: As I have already said:
my grandchildren will be my interpreters – they speak Chinese.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much.
Taisuke Abiru is seated next.
Taisuke Abiru: Thank you.
Taisuke Abiru, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan.
Mr President, in mid-August you visited Iturup Island
for the first time and once again confirmed Russia’s position
regarding its sovereignty over these islands. Two years ago,
at the Valdai Forum plenary session, you mentioned Japan
as a natural partner and stated that Russia was ready
to build relations with Japan with a view to the next five
and fifty years.
Incidentally, at the end of August
I also visited Sakhalin and exchanged views with representatives
of the Government of the Sakhalin Region and staff
of a marine research laboratory.
During these meetings, I was reaffirmed once again
in my belief that there remains enormous potential
for cooperation between Japan and Russia in such areas
as the development of natural resources, the protection
of the marine environment, economic science, the development
of the Northern Sea Route and so on.
Now to my question. What significance do relations
with Japan have for Russia within the framework of its long-term
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region? Admittedly, at present it
must be acknowledged that Russian-Japanese relations are in a very
difficult situation. However, how do you see Russian-Japanese relations after
the current difficulties are overcome?
Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: I see Russian-Japanese relations
as good, neighbourly and filled with concrete content,
of the kind you have just mentioned. The economy, ecology, joint
scientific research and so on.
You mentioned my statements regarding Japan (When was
that – two years ago, was it not?). Since then, nothing has changed
in Russia’s approaches to Japan. But Japan’s attitude towards Russia
has changed. It was not we who imposed sanctions on Japan. It was Japan
that imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation. Moreover, we hear
rather harsh statements from some senior Japanese leaders. We have not
permitted ourselves anything of the sort; we have not done this.
We are interested in cooperation with Japan.
At the same time, we are concerned by Japan’s plans
for militarisation – I cannot but mention this. We are concerned
by the policy of creating military-political blocs
in the region – I am obliged to say this. But,
as you put it, after overcoming today’s difficulties, how do we see relations
with Japan? I repeat once again: we see them as neighbourly
and mutually beneficial, and we have areas of mutual interest.
Incidentally, a number of large Japanese
companies, despite all the political chalenges, have continued
to work in Russia. And despite the clearly unfriendly steps
taken by the Japanese government, we not only do not hinder our
Japanese partners but we support them, just as we support all those who
continue to cooperate with the Russian Federation. And we intend
and are ready to act in the same way
in the future. We hope that, on the part
of the Japanese ruling class, the Japanese political
establishment and Japan as a whole, the same disposition
towards mutual, joint work in the interests of both countries
will one day prevail.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, you just mentioned the “holding
room.” It suddenly occurred to me – if you found yourself
in a similar “holding room,” say, at the APEC summit –
not just the two of you, but the three of you, with
President Trump there as well. You would probably understand each other
without words, or with just a hint?
Vladimir Putin: It would be more difficult. (Laughter,
lively reaction in the audience.)
That said, I have quite a good, long-standing
relationship with President Trump. I am grateful to him for his
efforts to resolve the Ukrainian crisis, for instance.
As I have said many times already, I am convinced that he does
it sincerely.
We are grateful to the First Lady
of the United States for her work in the humanitarian
field. I speak completely sincerely, without any irony. This concerns
prisoner exchanges and the resolution of certain other
humanitarian issues. But be that as it may, everything that darkens our
relations with the United States – and these factors that darken
and destroy them did not arise yesterday, or today; they have arisen
over the course of decades. We would very much like these factors
dividing us to become a thing of the past,
and for new prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation
to emerge.
As for a possible trilateral meeting you
hinted at, I know the media are talking about it. We are all
for it. But there is one caveat: we need an agenda. We need
to understand what the agenda would be for any trilateral
meeting, what we would talk about. But in general, any dialogue is
a good thing.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you.
Aleksandar Rakovic.
Aleksandar Rakovic: Mr President,
I am Aleksandar Rakovic, a historian from
Belgrade, Serbia.
How do you assess the prospects for Serbia’s
neutral geopolitical status? This is also important in the context
of the upcoming elections in Serbia. Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: We welcome Serbia’s very restrained
position on a number of key and very sensitive issues.
And we greatly appreciate the fact that Serbia has refrained from
making any decisions on sanctions against Russia.
You know our position on Serbia. It baffles me,
frankly, why over the past decades the collective West has treated
the Serbian people so unfairly and so asymmetrically. They divided
the Serbian people into several parts; Serbs found themselves
in different states. I have just met with Milorad Dodik. They
themselves once drew up the Dayton Agreement, and now no one wants
to implement them. And in other cases, they impose decisions
on the Serbs.
Now the Serbs are a divided nation in Europe –
and forcibly so. This is unfair, and it is bad, because any injustice
leads to difficulties and conflicts. But the current Serbian
leadership – including Aleksandar Vucic, who has served as president
and, I hope, will soon become prime minister – pursues
a restrained policy and shows a willingness to cooperate
with Russia. We certainly welcome this and will respond in kind.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Did Zelensky’s visit
to Belgrade not unsettle you?
Vladimir Putin: Young ladies get unsettled. We don’t
get unsettled – we do politics.
Fyodor Lukyanov: (Laughter.) Thank you.
Mr Gupta.
Arvind Gupta: Good evening, Mr President.
Arvind Gupta from the Vivekananda International
Foundation from New Delhi. Thank you very much for your presentation.
I want to just ask a couple
of questions, and I want to just carry
on the discussion about the civilisation state that you
mentioned. My first question is: given this whole geopolitical environment
that is shaping up, which you described so eloquently, do you see civilisations
bringing people together, or is there now a contradiction between
civilisation state and a nation-state? That’s my first question.
My second question is about India-Russia relations. You
have recently been to New Delhi for a very successful BRICS Summit
and had some very fruitful talks with Prime Minister Modi.
Now, Prime Minister Modi has often talked about that there
should not be wars, and endless wars should end. Did you discuss these
current scenarios with him and other leaders? And did you apprise
them of the gravity of the situation?
My third question is specifically about India-Russia
relations. You paid a very successful visit last year to New Delhi,
and several new ideas were discussed. But one of the issues
between India and Russia is that of connectivity.
We have had some issues pertaining
to the international transport corridor through Iran, where some
projects needed to be completed, which have not yet happened.
The INSTC is probably not working to its full potential. Also, we have
been talking about the Eastern Maritime Corridor connecting Chennai with
Vladivostok. What is the progress on that?
My final question…
Fyodor Lukyanov: Sorry, that’s enough here.
Vladimir Putin: Please, go on. It’s
a dictatorship. Give the microphone back.
(Laughter.)
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank God we have our own
traditions.
Vladimir Putin: I will be brief anyway.
Arvind Gupta: In a nutshell, India
and Russia have vast potential for improving or developing their
relations. In the emerging technologies area, do you think there is
now a potential for maybe an intergovernmental agreement between
India and Russia on emerging technologies, bringing together
semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and such
areas together so that we make rapid progress? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: I will really try
to respond briefly.
As for civilisation-states, we regard them
as not something that divides people, but something that unites
and complements them.
India is a truly striking country in its scale and diversity.
Few people realise, as Mr Modi himself told me, that, out
of a population of 1.5 billion, only 600 million Indians speak
Hindi as their native language. The majority speak other languages,
and everyone lives together. It is remarkable and commands
admiration.
There is something unique about Indian culture –
a blend of distinctiveness and unity – that certainly sets
an example worth following. I believe that by drawing
on the Indian experience, we can build relationships between diverse
nations and countries with different cultures, histories
and traditions. I see no contradiction here.
As for Prime Minister Modi’s position
on ending wars and similar issues, I can say that he is one
of those world leaders who, despite our very warm, friendly even, personal
relationship, consistently raises the question of ending
the conflict in Ukraine. He brings it up at every time we meet.
He takes a keen interest in the matter and has excellent
ideas aimed at finding mutually acceptable – I would like
to stress ‘mutually’ – solutions. In this sense, the Prime
Minister certainly maintains a neutral position while remaining committed
to seeing the conflict end. I simply feel it is my duty
to state this openly. We are also grateful to the Prime Minister
for his ideas – I will not go into details now –
and for his commitment to resolving this conflict, among others,
peacefully and as quickly as possible.
As for possible joint project, work
on the North – South interconnections, as well
as the Northern Sea Route and the Eastern Maritime Corridor
is underway.
For example, just recently a Chinese container
ship and a South Korean vessel made test voyages there. We are also
discussing possibilities with our Indian friends. We advocate the joint
use of such promising international corridors.
As for the Northern Sea Route, shipping
volumes along it are steadily increasing. I repeat: we want to ensure
that this does not cause any sort of conflict. We are absolutely open
to cooperation with any country interested in using these corridors,
not because they create competition for, say, the Suez Canal,
or because of the current difficult situation
in the Middle East resulting from hostilities. No; it is simply that
global trade volumes are growing, and new opportunities must meet new
demands. I believe, and experience confirms this, that this growth
will continue.
As for the North–South Transport Corridor,
I can tell you that this does not depend on us alone. We are ready
to provide the necessary financing. The issue is for our Iranian
friends to complete their part of the work at this stage.
There is no secret here: the land along the proposed route simply
needs to be acquired. I would like to point out that part
of the route is to pass through Azerbaijan. We maintain contact
with President Aliyev, and there are no issues there either. Azerbaijan
agrees to the project’s implementation and considers it
promising. We have allocated the necessary financial resources
and are ready to make this joint effort.
As for the potential for cooperation
with India across various economic sectors beyond just logistics, you are
absolutely right: high technology is the most promising area
for joint work. We are facing specific challenges, such as trade
imbalances, but here, too, we are proposing and implementing measures that
go beyond traditional, linear approaches. Typically, when organising
exhibitions, joint symposiums, trade fairs and similar events,
a country showcases goods it wishes to export. However, with
the agreement of our Indian friends and the support from
Prime Minister Modi, we are organising events at which Indian importers
can present the goods they could bring to the Russian market. We
are ready to continue this work. Anyway, we can see great potential
for cooperation in high-tech sectors.
Thank you.
Karen Hallberg: Mr President, good evening.
I am Karen Hallberg from Argentina, the Secretary
General of the Pugwash Conferences for Science and World
Affairs. Thank you very much for explaining and sharing your views
on several topics.
I want to touch on nuclear weapons.
I have a proposal regarding a trilateral meeting you have
mentioned with the US and China. I wanted to say if, after
your very useful initiative, which was not considered, but the initiative
of extending the moratorium on the New START, which
ultimately did not take place, but it would have been, it was an excellent
idea to reduce risks.
My question is, do you have a plan to lead
or co-lead an agenda for reducing risks in the nuclear
weapons? For example, considering the AI, the risk of AI
in relation to nuclear weapons, the fact that there has
to be a human or important human decision-making in that
loop. Or for example, maintaining communications or reducing
the high alert status of nuclear weapons, etc.
So the question is, do you have an idea
or can you tell me how we can reduce the risk of nuclear
weapons, mainly among the three states that have the largest number?
Thank you very much.
Vladimir Putin: The answer will be brief. It was
not we who withdrew from all the international agreements
and treaties that formed the basis for restraining the arms
race and nuclear non-proliferation. It was not we who abandoned those
treaties. Under one pretext or another, it was the United States that
did so. That applied to START III as well. Well, that is how it is.
It was not we who withdrew.
Moreover, let me inform you – it is probably no secret,
and perhaps it has been mentioned somewhere – that we proposed
to the Obama Administration even then that we resume dialogue
on these matters. At first we heard nothing;
and at the very end, some three months before that
Administration left office, we suddenly received word that the US
Administration was ready for such a dialogue. But then they all left
office, and it all ground to a halt again. We are not against
resuming that dialogue; we never were. We proposed it then, and we are
proposing it now. Yet there is no answer. If there is none – as we
say, if it is a no, let it be so.
Therefore, it is not that Russia has a vital interest
in this – no, because we are developing our nuclear forces: our
Strategic Missile Forces, as I have already said, are nearly 98
percent modern. Not a single nuclear power has that level
of modernity – not one. We also have new, modern systems. There is
the glide vehicle, which appeared several years ago. There is
the missile defence penetration system, an entirely new one,
and intermediate-range weapons – high-tech, the most modern,
which other countries do not yet have either.
Naturally, all nuclear powers are high-tech countries. They
will all have these systems one day. But not yet. For now, only we have
them. However, we understand the threats you speak of. We understand that
there must, after all, be mechanisms of deterrence and that there
must be some agreements. I will not go into the details now
of who has what in their stockpiles, what has been destroyed
and what has not, or which silos are being sealed where. That is
a matter for specialists – technical and military.
That said, we are ready – if the current
administration, and we are receiving signals that interest in this is
in principle reviving – if the current US administration wishes
to do this, we are ready to resume this dialogue tomorrow.
By all means.
You should talk to them; perhaps they will listen
to you. OK?
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you.
Lorenzo Pacini.
Lorenzo Pacini: Thank you, Mr President.
I am from Italy, a country which currently does
not have good relations with Russia. As a European, I would like
to know what conditions Russia would set for a new system
of security for European countries.
Also, assuming a possible post-European Union Europe,
would you leave the European continent to be part
of a greater Eurasia, or to determine itself with its
peoples in permanent competition between the United States
and Russia? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: Italy is part of Europe,
after all, and I am speaking about a Eurasian partnership. So,
naturally, we view – and will continue to view – Italy
as a Eurasian partner.
Whether the EU survives, or whether Italy remains
a member or not – that is not our business; we do not interfere,
nor do we wish to get involved in that discussion. We know that
the moment we do, they would claim we want to break up
the EU – even though we have no desire to wreck anything; we
want to build and cooperate, not destroy.
We have no preliminary terms whatsoever for resuming
or restoring relations with either Europe as a whole
or with concrete European countries. Some politicians argue that Russia
must not be allowed to cooperate with individual countries, that everyone
must act together, and that no European country should be allowed
to establish a dialogue with Russia on its own.
This amounts to a diktat that goes beyond even
what we saw during the Soviet era – something I have mentioned
before. Back then, at least, there was a single state,
and the union republics were part of a unified – and,
in reality, strictly centralised – whole. In the European
Union, theoretically, that is not the case, yet in practice, it is.
Someone is forbidding individual countries from building relations with Russia
today. No one forbids us from doing so; we are ready.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Perhaps, since they are imposing
bans anyway, we should just go ahead and break them up, so it is easier
to deal with individual countries?
Vladimir Putin: No need for that; they will fall
apart without any help from us.
Fyodor Lukyanov: I see. Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: Our colleague from Italy knows better
than we do. After all, every problem starts with the economy. How big is
Italy’s national debt? 140 percent. And the deficit? Well, it is
probably somewhere around four or five percent. No, no, not three –
higher, higher. How much? Well, three. (Remark from the audience.)
No, no, no, that is too high. Actually – as our colleague is pointing
out – it is around three percent. But in other European countries it
is higher; some are closing in on five.
Overall, we understand the economic difficulties facing
European countries – the challenges they confront. We do not want
to criticise or comment on that right now; it is up
to those countries themselves, to a united Europe,
and to the European Commission to decide how
to structure their relations.
In our view, many things have been –
and still are being – done incorrectly, with serious consequences
for the economies of all European countries. Now is probably not
the time for such discussions, but it is a fact. Problems are
mounting. Citizens of leading European nations are feeling the impact
firsthand. Standards of living are falling, and unemployment is
rising.
This, of course, undermines the very foundations
of the European Union. But that is none of our business; we are
not interfering. We are ready to start a dialogue, either with
the EU as a whole, if it wishes, or with individual
countries, without preconditions. However, there should be no preconditions
on their part, either.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, as we started
talking about the European economy, you have recently issued a few
directives to transfer important European assets to our
administration. Of course, they regarded this as something close
to robbery or nationalisation. Where is the truth?
Vladimir Putin: In fact, it is all lies
and provocations. We are not taking anything from anyone, nor are we
stealing or nationalising anything. They suddenly froze our gold
and foreign currency reserves, including the Central Bank’s reserves,
and now they even seem to be using the income generated
by those reserves to fund the war. I think that this is
absolutely unacceptable.
We have not nationalised anything or anyone. Yes, we
are placing certain enterprises under termporary external administration.
Meanwhile, some European countries have simply seized huge enterprises
belonging to us in blatant violation – and I want
to emphasise this – of every conceivable rule. Take Germany,
for instance. That is what the situation is like, do you see?
They took assets from Gazprom, Rosneft, and our other
companies… Look at what is happening with Lukoil. So, what now? We are
creating conditions that would enable us to respond if our companies were
nationalised or subjected to what amounts to outright robbery.
That is the reason behind placing the enterprises you mentioned under
external administration.
Fyodor Lukyanov: So, under a favourable
scenario, they would get them back?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, they would.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you.
Majid Ehsan: Mr President, I am from Pakistan,
Majid Ehsan. Thank you very much for the very comprehensive world
view you have given.
My question is regarding your visualisation
of a multipolar world. What is the most likely framework this
multipolar world, in your view, is going to take shape? Will it be
three poles with the US in the Western Hemisphere, Russia
and China in the Eastern Hemisphere under a new global
system of global governance? Or are we looking at,
in a worst-case scenario, another Iron Curtain between
the Eastern and Western Hemispheres with a Cold War?
Vladimir Putin: As for the new Iron
Curtain, this isn’t now us who are trying to bring down this curtain but
the Western comminity. The West is the one doing this.
The sanctions are numerous: there are thousands and thousands
of them. How many sanctions are there? Several thousand sanctions against
Russia. Meetings with Russian representatives are prohibited, and attempts
to isolate Russia within international organisations are made – all
of this amounts to an attempt to bring down an “Iron
Curtain”. But this time, it is not coming from our side, as it happened
during the Soviet era, but from the West.
We know full well how the Soviet Union’s attempt
to create such a curtain ended: in failure. Any attempt
to bring down such a curtain anywhere, especially in today’s
world, is bound to fail.
As for how we envision a multipolar world, it
cannot be bipolar, tripolar, or quadripolar. It must be diverse
and truly multipolar. Our world is, of course, far more complex than
consisting of two or even three blocs. It must take into account
the interests of all participants in international relations.
And, as we have said multiple times, there is
a fundamental principle: the security of some cannot be achieved
at the expense of the security of others. This is one
of the cornerstones that we believe must underpin the future
world order. We cannot yet tell what that order will look like,
as I have said from this very podium, but we must strive to seek
answers together. At the very least, we need to work together
to find the foundations of this future world order, and do
so without any preconditions. I have just said so when answering
to your colleague from Italy.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you.
Mohammad Marandi.
Mohammad Marandi: Thank you very much, Mr President.
It’s a pleasure and an honour being here. I’m Seyed Mohammad
Marandi from the University of Tehran. I’m very thankful to you
for mentioning Dr Larijani, who was martyred in the aggression
against the Iranian people. He worked very hard in the struggle
against ISIS and Al-Qaeda. He was very concerned about the well-being
of the Palestinian people, and he led the resistance
against the aggression against our country after the martyrdom
of Ayatollah Khamenei.
We will obviously defend our country, and we will
emerge victorious. We recall the children of Minab who were
slaughtered on the first day of war, the children
of Lamerd who were slaughtered on the first day of war,
and the countless people who’ve been traumatised by this
aggression.
But the root of the cause is
the genocide in Palestine, alongside the independence
of the Iranian people. This genocide won’t stop. Every day we’re
hearing about new slaughter, and the determination is
to exterminate the Palestinian people. And those who oppose that
extermination are now being threatened with extermination. What can be done
to save the children of Gaza? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: This is one of the most
acute and sensitive humanitarian issues;
as for the tragedies unfolding in Gaza, we are all fully
aware of and well informed about the situation there.
I will not go into detail. The position
of the Russian Federation on the Palestinian question is
well known; it is not subject to any transient or opportunistic
considerations – it is not. Fundamentally, the Palestinian question,
if we are to speak of the possibility of a long-term
settlement, must be based on all previously adopted resolutions
of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly,
and the cornerstone and foundation of this settlement must
be the establishment of a fully-fledged Palestinian state. That
is all.
As for Mr Larijani, I have already stated
that, alongside all the qualifications and assessments
of a purely legal nature repeatedly provided by our Foreign
Ministry, I consider this to be a grave mistake. Despite everything,
Mr Larijani – with whom I was personally well acquainted – was
a highly constructive individual, ready to seek mutually acceptable
compromises, primarily, of course, in the interests
of the Iranian people.
Therefore, apart from, I repeat, all legal assessments,
this is undoubtedly a grave mistake, because a figure of such
calibre is needed today to seek compromises and solutions capable
of bringing peace to the Persian Gulf region.
Frankly, the entire world is closely following these
events and admires the courage, heroism and fortitude
of the Iranian people, as well as their deep reserve, so
to speak, of high-calibre personnel – both in state
governance and in the armed forces, including
the IRGC – individuals ready for self-sacrifice for the sake
of their nation’s future.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much. I would
like to take this opportunity to note that the Valdai Club was,
of course, profoundly shocked by the assassination of Ali
Larijani, because we all vividly remember how, a decade or even less
ago, he attended one of our sessions and, it must be said, made
a profound impression on everyone with his ability to articulate
a position, his persuasiveness, and his intellect.
This is, of course, a truly tragic loss.
B.Sharma: Thank you very much, Mr President.
My question is about BRICS. There was a very positive and Global
South-centric declaration in Delhi; a number of mechanisms have
also been formulated. But the main countries of BRICS have different
ecosystems and perhaps a slightly different outlook.
One of the intentions that was stated was
to realign the positions of different countries. So, is this
going to be a yearly ritual at the top leadership level,
or are you going to do a little more – to give
a little more push to this great initiative?
Vladimir Putin: As I have said many times,
BRICS was born in Russia. It began as a meeting
of the leaders of Russia, India, and China – known
as RIC – and was later joined by Brazil, South Africa, and the other
countries that are members today. I have just said from the podium
here that a group like BRICS can indeed be as a prototype
for the future global order.
We can see that today it represents almost half
of the world’s population, and BRICS’s share
of the global economy is constantly increasing. This happens year
after year; we can see it, and the statistics confirm it. So indeed,
the most important thing is the principles underpinning
the formation and functioning of BRICS, with all members being
equal and no one dominating. That is what makes it appealing. However, it
does not have the feature that the UN Security Council possesses:
binding decisions. For the United Nations, this is generally
an effective instrument and mechanism.
It is difficult to say today how BRICS will evolve
within the new architecture of international relations, but it is
absolutely clear that it is a useful instrument and mechanism, given
the principles I have just mentioned.
Yet BRICS is not just about formal meetings between national
leaders. Modern financial mechanisms are also being developed within its
framework. When business representatives meet, they can find very interesting,
important and promising joint projects. There is also humanitarian
cooperation across various arts, which is crucial because it brings people
closer together.
For instance, we proposed establishing a new
investment platform within BRICS. This platform would not only help develop
the economies of member states but could also operate effectively
in other countries – those with rapidly growing populations
and developing economies that are striving to raise their people’s
living standards to global levels. This holds great promise, particularly
considering the ongoing urbanisation process in these countries.
Modern settlement systems capable of processing transactions between BRICS
countries and their companies independently of external interference
could be highly valuable and offer significant potential.
Step by step, gradually, brick by brick, all
of this is helping to build a new architecture. Progress will
continue in this gradual manner. There is no point in getting ahead
of ourselves; it could even be dangerous. We need to address issues
and challenges as they arise.
Huiyao Wang: Thank you, Mr President.
My name is Huiyao Wang. I am from the Centre
for China and Globalisation as a founder and president
there.
You mentioned that you are going to APEC. We actually
saw that you had a very successful summit last year with President Trump.
And you had a very successful summit with President Xi this year.
Of course, President Xi has just come back from the United States,
where he also had a very successful summit.
So, I am wondering, you know, when you have
the APEC, there can be this possible trilateral summit. Do you expect
China to play a bigger role, for example, in promoting
peace, making peace, or peacekeeping or as a guarantor,
whatever, so that this can really facilitate the summit to be
successful?
Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: I have no doubt the summit
will be a success. As regards China’s role, first, the use
of pressure, let alone resolving emerging problems through military means,
has never been part of Chinese philosophy or political thought. China
has always sought to resolve issues and problems through peaceful
means. We see this reflected in China’s policies under the leadership
of President Xi Jinping.
Can China play a role now? Certainly. This is primarily
due to its growing economic and military capabilities, as well
as its desire to expand the scope of free cooperation.
President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative is aimed precisely
at this. We are developing this initiative alongside China, aligning it
with Russia’s own initiatives, including the Greater Eurasian Partnership.
We are working together, and this is yielding positive results.
As for a possible trilateral meeting during
the APEC summit, well, as I have already mentioned, that is
certainly possible. To a large extent, this will depend on China
as the host of the event. But I repeat: meetings are
always beneficial as they allow for an exchange of views
and a clarification of positions. The most important thing
is to single out the issues that could lay the foundation
for such a trilateral summit; the key is to define
the agenda for these negotiations.
However, this will undoubtedly depend to a large
degree on the hosts of the event – in this case,
President Xi Jinping.
Taha Özhan: Mr President, thank you. Taha Özhan,
Ankara Institute, Türkiye.
Usually in Turkiye, it’s not one
of the definitions, but when we look at US policies towards
Russia, we say US policy is being hijacked towards Russia by mainly Europe
and mainly some countries. By the same logic, we also say US
policy in the Middle East has also been hijacked for decades
by Israel.
You just answered Mr Mohammad Marandi’s question
in the context of Israel and Palestine,
the Palestinian issue. But what we have arrived at now is that Israel
has attacked five countries at least, and we are experiencing
a threat from Israel directly, from the ministers and other
names, against Türkiye.
And we are talking about more than the Palestinian
issue as an Israeli problem. How do you see this problem
in the near future? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: I would ask you to clarify:
are you referring to the issue of Israel or the issue
of Palestine? I did not quite understand your question.
Taha Özhan: I am saying the Israel problem.
Vladimir Putin: As for the issue
of Israel, that is for the Israeli people themselves
to determine. All matters concerning Israel should be decided
by the people of Israel through the normal democratic
electoral process. As far as I know, Knesset elections are
coming up soon, and Israeli voters will presumably have
an opportunity to express their views on this matter.
As regards the Palestinian issue, I have said
this before, and I will repeat it: it can only be resolved through
the establishment of a fully-fledged Palestinian state.
As for the idea that US policy toward
Palestine is dictated by Israel, I would venture to say that
this is hardly the case. I am aware of Türkiye’s position
on these issues. However, the current US leadership is guided
primarily by its own national interests. Knowing President Trump,
I have no doubt about that. The question of who influences whom,
and how those interests are weighed, is an entirely separate matter.
The same applies to the influence
of European countries on US policy toward Russia. Obviously, they are
NATO allies, so they inevitably influence the US position to some
extent. But the US leadership has its own understanding of how these
relations should be structured. So yes, there is influence – almost
certainly there is, and there always has been. But ultimately,
the United States is guided by its own national interests, particularly
under President Trump.
Incidentally, the same applies to relations
between the United States and Europe. Just look
at the decisions the United States is making regarding economic
cooperation with Europe – ones that, to put it mildly
and without offending anyone, might be described as pragmatic. We can
see what is happening, and we understand it; you know what I am
referring to. So yes, influence certainly exists, but the United States is
guided first and foremost by its own interests.
Previously, under President Biden, I believe
the US government actually exerted greater influence over Europe’s
position toward Russia. However, as events unfolded, the dynamics
eventually began to take on a course of their own.
Now, obviously, the major European countries are taking
a far more aggressive stance toward Russia than the United States is.
While the United States is seeking to end the conflict, many
European countries, as I mentioned earlier, appear to be driving
this aggressive approach. Faced with adverse economic trends at home,
an increasingly precarious position for their ruling political
classes, and changing public sentiment, they now seem to be provoking
confrontation with Russia and fuelling further crises between Russia
and Europe. They are doing so precisely in order to justify
preparations for war and to rally as many supporters
as possible around themselves, thereby enabling them to remain
in power.
The logic is very simple. I am convinced that this
explains a significant part of the reasoning behind
the European countries’ conduct toward the Russian Federation.
However, I think it goes too far to claim that
some outside force dictates US policy in one area or another.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, you have mentioned
national interests. In your speech, you addressed the matter
of artificial intelligence in detail. As we know, it is being
gradually introduced in many spheres of life, for example,
in the military sphere, as you have mentioned. Some kind
of artificial intelligence is also emerging in politics. Would it
perhaps formulate national interests more precisely than people
in the near future, calculating what the country needs based
on vast amounts of data?
Vladimir Putin: You know, my colleagues
and I discussed this topic yesterday, and here is
the conclusion we drew: the potential of artificial intelligence
is enormous. It is undoubtedly a tool that will transform every aspect
of human life in the coming years. And it is developing so
fast that it is difficult to predict the consequences.
Yet, experts estimate the number of connections
between elements of knowledge in artificial intelligence at five
trillion, whereas the number of corresponding connections
in the human cerebral cortex – in the human brain,
I repeat – is estimated at roughly one thousand trillion. Do you
see? Five trillion on one side – in artificial
intelligence – versus one thousand trillion in the human brain.
Furthermore, artificial intelligence consumes many times
more energy than the human brain: tens, perhaps hundreds of times
more, or even beyond that. The human brain consumes a mere 20
watts, while artificial intelligence requires nuclear power plants to be
built nearby, the use of hydroelectric power stations, and so
on. Gas, oil, fuel oil – everything is used.
However, artificial intelligence has its own advantages: it
has access to a vast body of active knowledge and delivers
the desired result more quickly. Therefore, artificial intelligence can
and should be used as a tool in human hands, at least
for the time being. Ultimately, final decisions must rest with
humans. I believe that combining human capabilities with a tool like
artificial intelligence will yield the greatest results.
We must therefore maintain an ongoing dialogue with
the people who will be using artificial intelligence. At the same
time, it would be highly beneficial to establish rules governing
the use of this technology in a timely manner,
in the interests of all humanity.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Do you use chatbots or neural
networks?
Vladimir Putin: I use the Presidential
Executive Office, which makes use of everything humanity has come up with.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Without doubt it is
an unstoppable force. Thank you.
Richard Sakwa: Richard Sakwa, University
of Kent, England.
You mentioned the United Nations earlier, and you
also said that some of its criticism is valid. But at the same
time, you mentioned some ideas of reform, which has been stuck
for many years.
At the moment, there are 54 major wars going
on in the world. The divergence between the ability
of the United Nations to deal with them
and the increasing chaos in the world seems to be
getting larger and larger.
Is it not time now perhaps for the permanent
members of the Security Council and the alternate members
and some other members to maybe do some sort of demarche, some
sort of extra UN congress-conference to break the blockage
on United Nations reform?
We have been talking about it for a long time.
Multipolarity is not the answer as such. It needs a legal
normative framework which the world has agreed on. So how do we move
forward with the United Nations change to improve global governance?
Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: We already have a well-known
answer to this question, and unfortunately, I have nothing new
to add. Reform of the United Nations is possible solely
on the basis of broad consensus. Of course, one could
explore various ways of addressing the issue, such
as by convening a conference, but that would accomplish very
little without first identifying and agreeing on the directions
for reform that can actually be implemented.
I have heard many different proposals on this
matter. The important thing for us is not to lose sight
of what is fundamental. And what is fundamental, strange as it
may seem? First, the permanent members of the Security Council
have the right of veto. Is that a good thing or a bad
thing? You know, when the founders of the United Nations agreed
on this arrangement, they proceeded from the assumption that
the veto (however archaic it may appear) would help prevent conflicts
between major military powers from escalating into open war. If a member
exercises its veto, the proposed action cannot go ahead. But the very
fact that an action can be blocked creates the conditions
for a modus vivendi. That is precisely the point. And there
is a certain logic to it.
Second, there are mechanisms for enforcing decisions
of the United Nations, including through the use of armed
force. The key point is simply to ensure that such decisions are
approved and authorised by the UN Security Council, rather than
being taken unilaterally by one country or a group
of countries, as happened in the case of Serbia
and Yugoslavia. What is required is to ensure compliance [with these
principles].
Why, then, did everyone – pardon
the expression – flout these UN principles? Because no one wanted
to listen to Russia’s stance. They did not even bring the matter
before the United Nations for discussion as they knew that
Russia would veto any such decision concerning Serbia. So, they chose
to act by circumventing Russia. But there must be no circumventing
one another. Every effort must be made, however difficult it may be,
to find solutions together.
At the same time, as I have already
said, certain aspects of the UN’s decision-making mechanisms do
appear archaic. Above all, there must be adequate representation
for the countries that make up the majority
of the world’s population – I am referring to India,
the African countries, and others. That is obvious. India has
a population of 1.5 billion and a rapidly growing economy.
How could it be otherwise? So, we need to work together to find
solutions to these issues.
Feng Shaolei: Mr President, I am very glad
to see you again. I am Feng Shaolei, I came here from Shanghai,
China.
Thank you very much for your presentations today.
I believe history is not over yet. The trials of history must
not be forgotten, especially when we have such astute historical figures
as Egon Bahr, as you pointed out. I believe this is crucial.
That is precisely why, even though we are meeting today amid a very
difficult, indeed terrible, situation, we must not miss this historic
opportunity. Just recently, I read the address you delivered four
weeks ago at the Eastern Economic Forum.
One particular detail caught my attention. You mentioned
that, during your trip, a tiger suddenly appeared on the road
right in front of your car. It did not leave, but simply wagged its
tail. It seemed to me that the tiger was in a good mood.
It would seem to me that joint border management
between Russia and China is improving, and the environment is
gradually being protected. I believe this also gives tigers a chance
to roam freely back and forth.
Allow me to ask a question: what are the key
factors and most significant trends shaping the development and opening
up of the Far East and the Arctic, including
the Northern Sea Route?
Compared with Russia’s previous strategies and policies
in this area, this presents a tremendous historic opportunity
for both neighbouring and distant countries, including China.
As Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang said, we intend to cooperate
more closely with our Russian partners.
I would like to ask for your assessment
of these major, long-term historical processes involved
in the development and opening up of the Far East and the Arctic.
Thank you very much.
Vladimir Putin: First of all, I would like
to welcome you and say that it is a particular pleasure
to see you. After all, Shanghai is a sister city
of my hometown, St Petersburg. We have always enjoyed a special
relationship with this wonderful city, and I hope that it will
continue to develop.
As for the tigers, you may know – or, if
not, I can tell you – that I have been working on tiger
conservation for many years. I was the one who initiated
the so-called Tiger Summit in St Petersburg, a major
international conference on the subject.
It seems that the tiger that stepped onto the road
in front of our car, running ahead and wagging its tail, must
have known – or perhaps been informed – that there was no
threat. After all, I work to sustain the tiger population,
and we have seen results: the tiger population in Russia has
grown significantly, as have the populations of snow leopards
and certain other rare animal species.
Regarding our cooperation and our efforts
to develop the Far East, they are goal-oriented and have been
ongoing for multiple years. It is true about Eastern Siberia, the Far
East and the Arctic. We have established there an effective
and efficient system of preferences for both domestic
and foreign business, for our potential current and future
partners and investors.
Incidentally, the Chinese companies are among
the most actively operating in the Far East. The Government
Commission is about to consider a decision on one
of Russia’s and the world’s biggest copper deposits,
and chances are that the decision will be positive. The deposit
is in Siberia, and Chinese investors will also be able to join.
Concerning the Far East: As I said we have
built an entire system of preferences, and effective
January 1 next year – which is an unpararallelled decision
for us – we are blending all the previously established
mechanisms into a single one that will operate across the entire Far
East: both in the port of Vladivostok, these territories
and so on.
For our citizens … The mortgage rate
in the country is 16–17 percent while in the Far East it
stands at two percent. Birth rate in Vladivostok is higher than
the national average which creates very good, favourable… They still have
a great deal of issues to be solved, very many. But overall,
the goals we set are being achieved. We are trying to streamline
the course of the Far East economy towards solving issues
of hi-tech nature.
We have supported our aviation enterprises and those
that used to manufacture exclusively military aviation equipment. Nowadays
they also produce civilian aircraft.
We have built there one of Russia’s biggest
shipyards – Zvezda, which is building a fleet of superships that
even the Soviet Union did not produce. We have launched
the production of LNG-tankers and super large civilian ships
customised for operating in the Arctic. We are aware that our
Chinese friends are also interested in this domain.
We have built a space launch complex
in the Far East, and it is already operational, launches are being
made. We are developing this complex, and a city has grown next
to it.
We have built there two major enterprises
in the field of gas-to-chemicals and petrochemistry. Their
products – they are extremely sought-after on the world
market – will primarily go to the market
of the People’s Republic of China.
Everything of this has been agreed upon
and everything has been worked out in advance. This only brings
benefits to both our friends in China and our Russian companies.
We have many other areas associated with
the development of the Far East. Still, I also consider
development of the intellectual area, the higher school
important, very important. We have built there a new federal university,
a multidisciplinary one. We are developing there a branch of the Academy
of Sciences, which is dealing with marine biology. And all
of this may and should be a subject of our joint work
and activity.
Finally, we are building one of the largest
cultural centers in Russia there, which will include branches
of the Hermitage, the Russian Museum, the Bolshoi Theater
and the Mariinsky Theater of St Petersburg. I am sure that
this will be a very attractive place not only for the Far East
and Eastern Siberia residents, but also for all our neighbors
in that region. And a venue for cooperation will open there
as well.
For example, several years ago I went
to a theatre, which already worked – we are building now another
one, but I went to the running theatre – a ballet girl
there addressed me in English. I said, “Where are you from?” She
answered: “From the United States.” I asked, “What are you doing
here?” – “I work. I like it here; the level is good, so
I came here.” We can also work with our Chinese friends
in the museum affairs and in the theater business. We
have already started such work. I have already mentioned cooperation
in the humanitarian sphere. So, the field of activity is
enormous.
As for the use of the Northern Sea
Route – I have already said today that a Chinese container ship
made a test passed via the Northern Sea Route. I am sure that we
will begin our joint work and will actively use the Northern Sea
Route in the interests of Russia and the People’s
Republic of China.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mister President, it’s about
tigers – I like cats very much and I know that unlike dogs,
when they wave their tails, it does not always mean a positive reaction,
so he still had mixed feelings.
Vladimir Putin: Next time I will ask.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Absolutely, yes.
Mr President, once we started speaking about
the economy: the Far East is really great, but the overall
economy – despite the amazing resilience we have demonstrated, which
has been acknowledged by the world – but let’s face it:
the situation is not getting better, and many people notice that
taxes are going up, so are the prices, and the business
environment is not improving. To cut it short, the military political
crisis comes at a price. What’s there in store for us?
Vladimir Putin: Speaking at the Duma last night,
I said in broad strokes – and in view of our
format it does not seem reasonable to go into details – that
the key thing is that the Russian economy and its financial
system show robustness. The macroeconomy is absolutely stable.
Yes, there are issues, there are problems we need
to address. Who hasn’t them? If we take a look at any region
of the world, all of them have problems of some kind. It is
also true about Europe we are talking about. What’s happening there? Just
a short while ago, they used to be prosperous. Look
at the Federal Republic of Germany which was considered
to be a wealthy and prosperous country. What is the current
situation there? They have a public debt of 120 percent, Italy’s debt
is 140 percent. The budget deficit is over three percent, around 3.8
to 4 and above, whereas in the United States,
the budget deficit is over five percent, close to six, I think
5.8. This is their budget deficit, a debt. Meanwhile, the Russian
Federation has a public debt of 17 percent, ladies and gentlemen.
Italy’ public debt is 140 percent, whereas ours is 17 percent. The budget
deficit this year is around three percent, and I am sure that next
year it will be two percent.
Indeed, we had issues with inflation, we kicked
the economy into high gear and it got overheated. However, we
intentionally decided to cool it down even though we realised what it
would lead to… It was clear to everyone that if the Central Bank
raised the interest rate, it would lead to shrinking investment.
These were indeed the outcomes. The key thing for us is not
to overcool the economy. Everyone is speaking about that; everyone is
arguing with the Central Bank. Debates are okay, and this discussion
is useful. Yet we had a double-digit inflation of 10.5 percent last
year whereas today it stands at a little over six percent, nearly
a half of what it was, you see? Is this a result? It is. Is it
positive? But of course. In other words, we do face some challenges
but we are overwhelming them. That’s why macroeconomic metrics say that we have
a healthy economy while the financial system and economic
institutions operate in a well-balanced way.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much. Godwin Godwe,
please.
Vladimir Putin: By the way, excuse me,
the main sectors of the economy – yes, with all
the challenges, but they exist and keep operating.
And in Europe, for example, what has happened
to the automobile industry? It is in deep crisis. Their
enterprises are closing. Soon, we will all be driving Chinese cars. Whether it
is good or bad, I don’t know, but they are cheap and good
quality. They say the scale of car manufacturing in China is
bigger than necessary. But what exactly do they mean by “bigger than
necessary”? As long as demand in the market is high. Well,
make your own cars cheaper and better quality. We have always been taught
that the market will set things right. And it has: you can buy cheap
but good. Their car industry [in Europe] is going through tough times,
as are the metallurgical and associated industries, as well
as the chemical industry, pharmaceuticals and everything
related.
Yes, we do have our own difficulties, but not
of the same scale as in the eurozone. I have
already commented on the state of affairs in finance.
So, yes, there are challenges and we see them but we
can also handle them.
Fyodor Lukyanov: We won’t all be driving Chinese
cars?
Vladimir Putin: We are already driving Chinese cars.
Fyodor Lukyanov: But not everybody.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, like the rest
of the world. Except unlike this so-called civilised world, we have
not chosen the path of administrative restrictions or sanctions.
We negotiate. With our Chinese friends, we look for opportunities
to increase their imports to the Russian market. We do
the same with our [Indian] friends. And you know the curious
part? We can see the returns, the positive effect. For example,
the share of Russian industrial products in the Chinese
market is constantly growing. Our Chinese friends meet us halfway; they look
for opportunities and they find them. We try to do the same
with India. When there is a positive dialogue and willingness
to find a solution, we always accomplish that.
Godwin Gondwe: Thank you, Mr President.
My name is Godwin. I come from Tanzania. Africa
and Russia have had a relationship which has experienced its ups
and downs. So my question is: are there new areas of cooperation
that your government intends to pursue with Africa?
Thank you, Mr President.
Vladimir Putin: You know, the modern world is
developing so rapidly and vigorously that some new opportunities always
emerge, including with Africa.
But the crucial thing I want to point out,
and which we discuss with our colleagues, is that Africa is
a continent with great prospects. Its population is very young
and constantly growing. All African states will certainly strive
for this growing young population to improve its living standards.
That, obviously, creates conditions for investment and cooperation.
The most important thing I want to say is
something we talked about with our colleagues yesterday: we want to work,
we work and will continue to work with Africa, but not
for the same goals pursued by the colonisers – not
to profit and steal from Africa, but to develop together.
There are certainly areas for cooperation, and we
will cover them at the upcoming Russia-Africa summit.
Roger Koppel: Thank you very much, Mr President.
I am Roger Koppel from Switzerland, the owner and editor
of Die Weltwoche, Switzerland’s most neutral newspaper.
I was very happy about your remarks about Egon Bahr.
I had the privilege of inviting him to Zurich several years
ago, and we discussed the idea of Germany being a bridge
between East and West.
My question to you is the following: first,
how do you see Switzerland at the moment? Why did you punish one
of our great companies, Nestlé, which resisted many calls in Europe
to withdraw from Russia but still stayed here in spite
of the criticism?
And what is your general advice to small countries
to survive in this very difficult world of competing big powers?
And to conclude, thank you very much for Russia’s great
contribution in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna
to establishing Switzerland’s neutrality. Thank you very much.
Vladimir Putin: You know, on Nestlé, we do not
actually punish anyone; we simply respond to actions taken against us.
I believe – though I do not recall the specific details
right now – that is all there is to it. Certain decisions were made
in relation to the Russian Federation, and the Russian
Federation responded accordingly; there is nothing more to it. We are not
attacking anyone, nor are we taking anything away from anyone.
As for… incidentally, I would be interested
to hear your assessment – since you mentioned inviting Egon
Bahr – your assessment of that political figure. If you could just
say a few words about him, I would be grateful. I never met him
personally.
Roger Koppel: He was an extremely impressive
personality. We met at the centre, the headquarters
of the Social Democratic Party in Berlin. And I mean,
he had this vision that after two terrible world wars, Germany, which had
a Western-oriented policy after the Second World War, had
to extend its arms also towards the East.
And he was the ultimate realist. I mean, he
was not immersed in this moralism and you could say moral imperialism
that is now so all-encompassing in Europe. And I was simply
impressed. He was a very funny person, with a lot of wit, humour
and practical wisdom. And his vision was that Europe, this graveyard
of former empires, could be a continent for peace
and connectivity, and bring, you know, these two big countries,
the United States and Russia, together.
And I hope that Switzerland probably could also
play a part in fulfilling the vision of the great Egon
Bahr. But I think that’s a very good point of departure you
mentioned here, Mr President. We should dare to practise more Egon Bahr,
and I support you in all attempts to bring back Egon Bahr,
especially in Germany. They need, I think, some assistance
and some further education to remember Egon Bahr.
Thank you very much.
Vladimir Putin: Thank you very much for that
assessment. It simply reinforces the opinion I already held
of him – an opinion based, as I mentioned earlier,
only on the archival documents I have read.
You also made another very important point – about
moral imperialism and Europe as a graveyard of empires.
Perhaps that is why so many in Europe want to finish off
the Russian Empire, which ceased to exist long ago? But apparently,
they are not aware of that. I want everyone to know.
Now, as for small countries –
and Switzerland in particular – and what advice one might
offer them: You know, I am far from being in the business
of giving advice. After all, it is not a country’s size that matters,
but those who govern it and take the decisions. What matters is how
responsibly they serve their own people’s interests and how capable they
are of pursuing an independent, sovereign policy. Look at how,
under external pressure, Switzerland was stripped of one of its key
advantages in the global financial system – essentially, banking
secrecy was abolished. And just like that, Switzerland ceased to be
an attractive hub of the global banking system.
Or perhaps you are referring to neutrality –
we certainly welcome neutrality. But if that is the case, Switzerland
should have refrained entirely from imposing any sanctions against Russia. That
is what neutral status implies – not just in words, but in deeds.
Why did Switzerland do this? What did it gain? Nothing at all. Nothing; it
simply lost its status – that’s all there is to it.
Therefore, this is not merely advice but a call
to action: fight for your sovereignty, independence, and genuine
neutrality. It seems to me that everyone who upholds such genuine
neutrality stands to gain. The same goes for countries that can
take advantage of the genuinely neutral position of certain
states, using them as platforms for seeking agreements
and settling acute international and interstate conflicts.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Does Ukraine’s neutral status remain
one of our objectives?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, because when it gained
independence, Ukraine adopted a declaration – I would remind
everyone of this, as it was on the basis of that
declaration that it became independent. The declaration states that
Ukraine is a neutral state. From the outset – from the very
first steps in building the post-Soviet space and the new
Russia, we always took it as a given that Ukraine was a neutral
state. But then, all of a sudden, they included the goal
of NATO membership in their constitution. That is a completely
different matter, not least for the security of the Russian
Federation. And that is also one of the reasons
for the conflict that is still ongoing.
Incidentally, the situation along the line
of contact is evolving rapidly. Over September alone, Russia brought 1,301
square kilometres under its control. That is two and a half times
more than in previous months. And the pace of troop advances
is accelerating.
Of course, we would like to bring this
to an end as quickly as possible. Through peace
negotiations, specifically. What is needed is to stop accusing Russia
of not wanting these talks. Instead, responsible decisions must be made
based on the realities on the ground – both within
Ukraine itself and by its sponsors in the West, primarily
in Europe today.
Rick Sanchez: Thank you, Mr President. What
I really want to thank you for is the fact that there’s
something that you don’t get enough credit for: the fact that you’re
calling on me, and I’m an American journalist, even though I’m
working in Russia right now. But you don’t only call on me; I’ve seen
you call on reporters with the BBC and CNN, where I used
to work.
And I only wish, I only wish, that some
of the other leaders in Western countries did the same
thing and also called on, for example, Russian colleagues
of mine who are reporters in the United States who are left out
of those news conferences. So, kudos to you, sir. I respect the fact
that you do that more than most leaders do in the other parts
of the world, and yet you get the criticism.
But my question is this, and it’s something that
you just referred to a moment ago that I’m curious about. You’ve
talked about Minsk; you were ready to deal. You’ve talked about Istanbul;
you were ready to deal. We’ve talked about Anchorage; you, I think,
had a deal or a compromise that you were all but ready
to agree to.
And in all of those instances, you seem
to be turned down. At the time, it could be argued that
the war or conflict in Ukraine was a tie
or a stalemate, right? Now, right, the situation in Ukraine
is very different. As you just explained, 2.5 times more territory being
gained than we’ve seen in previous months. Most military experts –
not Vladimir Putin, but most military experts – say that right now Russia
is winning the war.
So, my question is basically one that just comes
to mind: given that scenario, given how many times, sir, you have been
turned down, and given what’s going on right now in this
conflict, why should you negotiate?
Vladimir Putin: After a question like that, one
might not even need to answer. (Laughter.) It stems from
a certain excessive naivety that is traditional in Russian
politics – and an optimism about the future.
But seriously, look… By the way, you mentioned
that CNN always gives you the chance to ask questions. It seems
to me that things have changed in the US; CNN does not really
offer those opportunities anymore – or so it looks. Well, that is not
our business; it is yours. We do not interfere.
As for the Minsk agreements, they were
difficult for our partners and for Ukraine, it is true –
that is a fact. I will not go into the weeds right now, but
I will state the main thing. What certain provisions essentially said
was that if Ukraine were to join NATO, the southeast
of the country would have the right to secede. That is
a very rough summary, but that was the gist of it. There was
Article 9, and so on – I will not get into that now; it would
take too long. But evidently, neither the Ukrainian leadership, which
ultimately came to power in a coup, nor their Western sponsors
liked this. And so, they effectively ditched the Minsk agreements
altogether.
Moreover, leading European politicians stated outright that
they never intended to implement the Minsk agreements. That said,
I do think that some of them – even though Ms Merkel said “we
did not intend to” – actually hoped that a peaceful resolution could
be reached. I will not go into the details now; it does not matter.
The important thing is that no one actually implemented them.
We reached an agreement in Istanbul – we
truly did. And I am stating this as a fact, not something
I made up. The signature of the head
of the Ukrainian negotiating team is right there – he initialled
those agreements. That means, on the whole, Ukraine was satisfied
with them. There were further details to discuss, but the fact that
he signed off on them implies general acceptance. After all, he did not
act on his own; he surely did so by agreement and with
the approval of the head of the regime. Yet, they
abandoned this course of action at the insistence of their
Western partners. Later, that same official, who led the negotiating team
in Istanbul, said quite explicitly at a news conference:
“Johnson, the former British Prime Minister, came and talked us out
of it.” So, he talked them out of it. Moreover, he said that “had we
agreed back then, the war would have been over by now.”
Now, Anchorage. Certain proposals were made to us,
and I said we needed to consider them. I came
to Anchorage and said we were ready to accept the proposals
from the United States. Those were not our proposals discussed
in Anchorage but those of the United States.
And I came there to say we would accept them. But that time,
the US side said they wanted to think. Clearly, the issue is
serious, so we did not push them.
As regards your question, I will say something
very delicate that I believe I have never publicly said before. We
hear things like: “You are winning this war; you have done this and this.
Isn’t this enough?” It is not even about a piece of land. Around 11
percent remains under Ukraine’s control in the Donetsk People’s
Republic. What I will say next is important. Ukraine’s highest officials
claim they will be able to hold this remaining 11 percent
in the DPR for a year and a half. Europe claims
Ukraine will be able to hold it for two years. We believe that they
will cede it much earlier, considering our troops’ pace of progress, which
I have just mentioned – they are moving faster, I want
to point out. Here is a question: if these territories will
inevitably be lost, is there any point in holding
on to them – and in sacrificing people, their safety
and their lives?
We’ve been told: “You are already winning, haven’t you
gotten enough?” It is not about a piece of territory. It is about
people. The fact is we need to create conditions not just
for peace but for a lasting peace for many years. We need
security guarantees not only for the part that we agree with –
there are many proposals, including those from President Trump and some
difficult decisions for us. But overall, we understand that we are moving
in the right direction.
If the other side and its Western sponsors –
whose money it is constantly embezzling, as everybody knows now,
and yet they put up with it to make Ukraine fight against us –
agree to conditions that are also acceptable to Russia, then it would
be better to end this situation, prevent any further losses on both
sides and proceed to humanitarian agreements concerning
the Russian language and other matters such
as the treatment of the Orthodox Church.
The international community remains silent while
horrendous things are happening to this church: the clergy are being
murdered, people are being thrown out of churches,
and the churches are being seized. But there’s silence as if
nothing is going on. Why? Because this situation is also exploited
by the Western sponsors – the Europeans in this
case – to resolve the issue of conclusively tearing away
the territories and people from Russia and creating conditions
in which it would be impossible for us to co-exist peacefully
in the future.
All these elements must be excluded, and we are ready
to begin these talks and finish them as soon as possible,
but – and it goes without saying – on terms that are
acceptable to the Russian Federation and the people
of Russia.
But it looks like the other side simply has no interest
in suspending the hostilities. They did send us a tentative
proposal to resume. It wasn’t us who suspended the talks but
the Ukrainian side. Recently, in view of the situation
on the battlefield, they sent us a tentative request
to resume the negotiations. We said okay, after the State Duma
elections. The election is on September 20.
On the 21st, we are ready to start the talks.
And what did they do? They won’t hold their own
elections, and they won’t let us hold ours – they tried
to sabotage them: on September 19 and 20, they attempted
to break through Moscow’s anti-aircraft defence. They launched over 1,600
drones towards Moscow, continuously striking polling stations in other
Russian regions. Six people were killed during the election campaign
and because of the never-ending strikes on our polling
stations by Ukraine – those were members of election
commissions, including a chair of an election commission. Their
homes were targeted specifically. To say nothing about the number
of injured people. And yet, despite the threat, our people
queued up to vote.
I think it is yet another miscalculation
on the part of those who allowed the war to happen.
They believed our society would crumble, our economy would collapse, our
financial system would be crushed; but the outcome came
as a surprise to them. They did not expect this degree
of consolidation and courage on the part of Russian
society, nor the stability of Russia’s financial system
and the economy.
Anybody can make a mistake, but only an idiot
would insist on it. If they see they’re mistaken, they should somehow
change their approach.
We are ready for peace talks, but, again, with due
consideration for the national interests of Russia
and the Russian people.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, and if we make
a mistake, are we ready to change our approach?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, and we do, by all
means. I’ve told you that the American side proposed a way out
of this crisis. Initially, we said no, we need to consider it. Then
I came to Anchorage and changed my stance. I said I agree.
So, we do change it.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, we have been working
here for over three hours. How are you doing?
Vladimir Putin: I’d say it’s time to go home. (Laughter.)
Fyodor Lukyanov: I see.
If I may, I would like to ask you one more
question.
You mentioned it in your remarks, and it has come
up more than once in our conversation – the topic
of historical territories and the role of history
in general. You often speak about this, both with your foreign colleagues
and here in Russia too.
History is a vast universe where, essentially, you can
find anything, even about one particular country. Appealing to it is
slippery ground, because sometimes it’s one thing, sometimes another; some
point applies to one thing, others to another. Yet, unfortunately,
there may well be more conflicts like the one in Ukraine, not just
one or two. You suggest changing approaches. Perhaps this approach needs
adjustment, too? Should we avoid invoking history for every disputed
political issue?
Vladimir Putin: It is not about history. It is
primarily about the present, of course. And when I –
or we – relate current events to history, that matters,
of course. But present developments are more important. That is why
I spoke about the persecution of the Church in Ukraine,
and about the Russian language being banned there – something
unheard of anywhere else in the world. Russian people, who
developed this territory, including the Black Sea region, are designated
there as a non-titular ethnicity. That is what concerns us; that is
where we stand.
And if historical events have shaped the current
situation in a way that demands a response from us, we naturally
recall the past and how it came about. But our primary concern is
what is happening today – and, above all, what is happening to the people.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Mr President, the Valdai Club
certainly enjoys the incredible privilege of meeting with you
regularly, not only to learn your views at a given time but also
to watch, through them, the history around us take shape.
We are very
grateful to you and hope this tradition continues. Thank you very
much.
Vladimir
Putin:
For my part, I would like to thank
the moderator – Fyodor, thank you very much – as well
as all our colleagues who, despite the challenges
of the present day, continue to show interest
in the events unfolding within and around our country.
I hope
that our discussions are meaningful. What we discuss here is heard not only
in our country or yours but also in other nations, especially
those that influence the course of events in one way
or another.
I would
also like to extend special thanks to everyone in the hall.
Why? Because the people here are, for the most part, experts
interested in our country – in Russia. We find this particularly
gratifying; it is a special privilege for us. It is wonderful that
you are here, and thank you very much for your interest
in Russia. We are always at your disposal and ready
to talk; we hope this interest will not wane but only grow stronger. Let
me wish you every success.
Thank you
very much.
Originally published on en.kremlin.ru
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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