India and Russia approach maritime navigation from different circumstances, but share an interest in dependable access to the seas. Cooperation will be most effective when it combines candid discussion of differences with practical measures to protect legitimate commerce, Sanjeev Chowdhry writes.
Freedom of navigation is commonly understood as a legal principle that enables ships to move through the world’s seas. Its practical meaning, however, becomes apparent when a tanker cannot obtain insurance, a merchant vessel faces attack, a payment cannot be processed, or a crew is unable to return home.
The gap between a recognised right and the practical ability to exercise it lies at the heart of ‘unfreedom of navigation’. A sea route may remain geographically open, yet a voyage can become commercially unaffordable, operationally unsafe or politically uncertain. The consequences extend beyond the maritime domain to the refinery awaiting oil, the factory awaiting materials and the household facing higher prices. A ship may have the right to sail, but its captain must also be reasonable confident that he will arrive safely.
For India and Russia, dependable maritime access is essential, although their circumstances differ. India requires secure shipping for energy, trade and industrial production. Russia needs reliable connections between its resources, industries and international markets. Both countries, therefore, have an interest in resilient connectivity, responsible shipping and predictable rules.
Constraints on maritime navigation
The challenges to navigation can be understood through three overlapping constraints: physical insecurity, regulatory uncertainty and commercial restrictions.
Physical insecurity includes attacks on merchant vessels, piracy, mines, maritime drones and anti-ship missiles. Relatively inexpensive weapons can threaten valuable ships and cargoes, creating asymmetric sea denial around critical passages. The resources required to protect a merchant vessel may far exceed those needed to threaten it.
Regulatory uncertainty arises from competing interpretations of the authority to inspect, board, detain or exclude vessels. Uncertainty about enforcement can influence commercial decisions even before any action is taken. Commercial restrictions, meanwhile, can affect insurance, finance, payments, port services and the availability of shipping.
These pressures reinforce one another. An attack can raise insurance premiums; higher costs can discourage operators; and fewer ships can increase delays. A route can, consequently, become commercially inaccessible without being formally closed. Naval power remains essential to maritime security, but dependable commerce also requires diplomacy, credible commercial services and resilient supply arrangements.
The legal framework
The assessment of restrictions on navigation requires a distinction between inconvenience and illegality. A legitimate safety inspection, a commercial insurance decision and an unauthorised seizure each require a different assessment. Similarly, sanctions and financial restrictions must be distinguished from a physical naval blockade. Their effects may overlap, but their legal character differs.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the principal legal framework. Territorial seas, international straits, exclusive economic zones and the high seas are governed by different legal systems. Authority available in one maritime space cannot automatically be extended into another.
Restrictions on port access, for example, do not by themselves establish authority to obstruct passage through an international strait. Nor does concern about a vessel automatically justify its seizure on the high seas. In each case, the location, conduct, jurisdiction and applicable law must be established. The guiding principles should be responsible conduct, clear legal authority for restrictions and consistent application of the rules.
Regional insecurity and global consequences
Regional conflicts demonstrate how maritime insecurity can affect trade far beyond an immediate confrontation. Developments in the Black Sea, Red Sea and Persian Gulf have highlighted the vulnerability of energy supplies, agricultural exports and shipping schedules to mines, attacks on commercial infrastructure and uncertainty over passage.
For India, instability around the Strait of Hormuz raises concerns about energy security and the safety of overseas diaspora communities. Disruptions near Bab el-Mandeb affect maritime connections between Asia and Europe. For Russia, insecurity along major corridors influences access to customers and the economics of exports.
Diversion may reduce immediate danger, but longer voyages increase fuel consumption, delivery times and uncertainty. The resulting costs are often borne by countries, businesses and consumers with no role in the underlying conflict. Protecting navigation must, therefore, take account of the interests of third countries as well as those directly involved.
Maritime resilience and strategic autonomy
For India, maritime resilience is both an economic and a strategic requirement. A competitive cargo price is only the beginning. Shipping availability, payment arrangements, insurance and delivery reliability determine whether a purchase is dependable.
In this context, strategic autonomy requires independent judgement supported by practical alternatives. India’s partnership with Russia can strengthen resilience within a diversified network of suppliers, routes and relationships. At the same time, India must assess the implications of China’s expanding maritime presence and closer Russia–China cooperation while preserving its own freedom of action.
For Russia, physical access to the sea does not automatically guarantee access to markets. Sanctions-related restrictions affecting finance, insurance, ports and maritime services can complicate trade even when routes remain open. Connectivity with India and other Asian partners, consequently, assumes greater importance.
The defence of legitimate navigation is also strengthened by responsible shipping practices. These include reliable registration, effective flag-state supervision, seaworthy vessels and credible liability arrangements. Labels such as ‘shadow fleet’ cannot replace an examination of a vessel’s actual status and conduct. Equally, concerns about discrimination cannot remove responsibilities for safety and environmental protection.
Seafarers and maritime infrastructure
Seafarers deserve particular attention because the consequences of a maritime incident frequently extend across national boundaries. A ship registered in one country, owned in another and trading between two others may carry an Indian crew. An attack, detention or prolonged investigation can, therefore, affect Indian citizens even when India is not involved in the dispute.
Rescue, medical assistance, humane treatment, timely information and consular coordination must remain priorities. Communication with families is equally essential when uncertainty continues for days or weeks. Crews should not bear the burden of resolving disagreements between governments.
Environmental protection and the security of underwater infrastructure also require cooperation. An oil spill can devastate communities that neither produced nor purchased the cargo. Damage to submarine cables and pipelines can disrupt communications, finance and energy supplies before responsibility is established. Effective arrangements for evidence preservation, lawful investigation, pollution response and repair are, therefore, necessary.
India can also use its diplomatic relationships to support practical arrangements for civilian shipping, seafarer protection and de-escalation, while maintaining dialogue with all relevant parties.
Areas for India–Russia Cooperation
India and Russia can strengthen maritime resilience through practical cooperation across the complete shipping chain.
First, maritime coordination can be strengthened within existing bilateral mechanisms. Diplomatic, legal, shipping, energy, banking, insurance and operational specialists could examine the entire voyage, from contracting and payment to delivery. Designated points of contact could identify problems before cargoes are committed and respond quickly when difficulties arise. The immediate objective should be to identify vulnerable stages of a voyage, clarify responsibilities and establish channels through which problems can be resolved.
Second, both countries can improve confidence in the shipping chain. Vessel identity, registration, safety certification, insurance and acceptance at the destination port should be checked before departure. Contracts should clarify responsibility for diversion, delays and casualty costs. Commercial confidentiality can coexist with sufficient transparency to establish accountability.
Third, an incident and crew-assistance protocol could support rapid communication among authorities, shipowners, insurers and families. A joint tabletop exercise involving a tanker casualty, disputed boarding or sudden route disruption would help test such arrangements. Search and rescue cooperation, counter-piracy training and practical naval interaction could reinforce preparedness.
These exercises should include civilian agencies and commercial operators alongside maritime security organisations. Their decisions often determine whether cargo moves, assistance arrives and crews receive timely support.
Fourth, India and Russia can develop commercially usable alternatives. The International North–South Transport Corridor, Chennai–Vladivostok connectivity and the Northern Sea Route offer opportunities for diversification, although each requires realistic assessment.
The International North–South Transport Corridor combines maritime and overland transport; it does not eliminate all maritime exposure. Its performance depends on infrastructure, customs coordination and regional stability. Northern routes depend on ice conditions, specialised vessels, navigational support, insurance and environmental safeguards.
The objective should be to create options supported by alternative ports, replacement supplies, shipping capacity and appropriate stocks. Shipbuilding, repair and maritime training can strengthen resilience over time. The practical test is whether an alternative can deliver when a normal route is disrupted.
Finally, both countries can advance international cooperation through the United Nations, the International Maritime Organisation and other competent bodies. Priorities should include seafarer protection, flag-state accountability, evidence-based enforcement, pollution preparedness and infrastructure protection. Where legal gaps exist, negotiated solutions should be applied consistently to all.
Conclusion
India and Russia approach maritime navigation from different circumstances, but share an interest in dependable access to the seas. Cooperation will be most effective when it combines candid discussion of differences with practical measures to protect legitimate commerce.
That shared interest must be translated into arrangements that work before, during and after a disruption. The true measure of maritime freedom is whether a legitimate voyage can be completed safely, predictably and affordably.
Freedom of the seas must be sustained by responsibility on the seas. Only then can the right to navigate become the confidence to sail.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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