On November 6, a discussion on the topic “US Midterm Elections: What They Mean for Russian-American Relations” was held at the Moscow venue of the Valdai Club. Participants discussed the reasons for the Democrats’ victory, its consequences for the American political system, and possible changes in Washington’s foreign policy course.
The moderator of the discussion, Ivan Timofeev, suggested not to overestimate the media noise surrounding a possible confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of power. Democratic control of both chambers of Congress will complicate the advancement of Republican legislative initiatives, but does not deprive the president of broad powers to implement domestic and foreign policy. The electoral process itself, in his opinion, is useful for the US as a kind of “controlled shake-up” that maintains the dynamism of the political system. For China, a Democratic victory may be more favorable, since Republicans more often initiate anti-Chinese bills and generally take a tougher stance. For Russia, however, no fundamental changes should be expected: anti-Russian initiatives in Congress traditionally receive bipartisan support, and a significant portion of sanctions restrictions is already enshrined in federal law. Therefore, a change of majority in the chambers is unlikely to lead to a radical revision of US policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow and Director of the Military Analysis at Defense Priorities, attributed the scale of the Democratic victory primarily to US domestic problems – corruption, inflation, the rising cost of living, and dissatisfaction with the consequences of the Trump administration’s decisions. In her assessment, voters are increasingly less willing to support foreign policy interventions if they have to pay for them with domestic prosperity; they would like the state’s resources to be directed toward solving internal problems. Kavanagh also noted the generational factor, which produces a lack of unity within the Democratic Party on issues of Iran, military spending, China, and the Middle East. In the short term, she does not expect a noticeable improvement in Russian-American relations, but does not consider further deterioration inevitable: a decline in the salience of the Russian topic for the American electorate may over time reduce the political demand for confrontation. A Democratic victory, in her opinion, does not mean an automatic increase in aid to Ukraine or the introduction of new large-scale anti-Russian measures – such steps may be disadvantageous for the party ahead of the 2028 elections. The election result may, on the contrary, push Trump to more actively pursue a settlement of the Ukrainian conflict and develop dialogue with Russia, if he wants to make this part of his political legacy. At the same time, much will depend on the president’s own reaction to the defeat and on the further balance of power within both parties.
Natalia Tsvetkova, Acting Director of the Institute for the United States and Canada, RAS, explained the Democrats’ success in part by the consequences of digital reindustrialization, begun under Biden and continued by Trump. The construction of plants producing semiconductors, batteries, and other high-tech products, supported by large-scale subsidies, led to an influx of workers and specialists from other countries, a change in the social structure of individual states, and a shift of part of the electorate toward the Democrats. In her assessment, the influence of these processes will still manifest itself in the presidential elections. Additional factors were the digital agenda, problems surrounding Iran, and rising fuel prices. Tsvetkova also drew attention to the relations of technology corporations with political parties: companies strive to ensure favorable business conditions and are ready to interact with both sides. The regulation of artificial intelligence and digital transformation is becoming one of the important topics of domestic policy and may give an advantage to the candidate who offers a convincing approach to this sphere. The Democratic Party’s prospects will also be affected by the struggle between several intra-party currents – democratic socialists, industrial pragmatists, and the liberal wing; the outcome of this struggle will determine who can unite the party and occupy the centrist position.
Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director and Research Fellow at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University, emphasized the importance of independent voters, who, according to his estimates, make up about 45 percent of the registered electorate. Many of them supported Trump in 2024 but quickly became disillusioned with him and in the midterm elections voted for the Democrats. Such volatility of the electorate shortens political cycles, so a possible Democratic success in the 2028 presidential elections does not preclude a Republican comeback as early as 2030. Suslov expects that the US will remain a deeply divided country, where polarization, distrust of institutions, and unresolved problems of the middle class and migration will persist. In foreign policy, he does not predict a fundamental change of course in the next two years, but believes that its implementation will become less effective due to the weakening of Trump’s position, a split in the administration, and budgetary constraints. Suslov assesses the prospects for Russia-US relations rather negatively: Democrats may seek the resumption of direct material aid to Ukraine and new anti-Russian sanctions, and congressional investigations could make economic and energy cooperation with Russia toxic for American business. This, in his opinion, will reduce practical interaction between the two countries to a minimum and complicate negotiations on Ukraine. At the same time, Suslov warned against interpreting the Democratic victory as the electorate’s choice in favor of a return to liberal hegemony: in both parties there are forces advocating a more restrictive and less interventionist foreign policy. However, the US will maintain rivalry with China and Russia, a presence in Europe, and a desire to retain international primacy, he believes.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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