France’s growing activity on NATO’s eastern flank represents a long-term shift in its foreign policy and reflects a particular emphasis on relations with Poland, even though the project being advanced by Paris faces a number of fundamental limitations, argues Aleksei Chikhachev, Associate Professor at the Department of European Studies, School of International Relations of Saint Petersburg State University, Leading Expert at the Center for Strategic Studies, Institute of Foreign Economic Relations, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
Throughout 2026, France’s military and political ties with the states along NATO’s eastern frontier have repeatedly attracted global media attention. Since April, following Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Gdańsk, reports have circulated
of possible air exercises over the Baltic Sea, during which French and Polish pilots would practise strikes against Russian and Belarusian territory, including nuclear strikes. In addition, in June, French troops joined
the annual ground exercises in the Suwałki Corridor involving Lithuania and Poland. Earlier, several Rafale fighter aircraft had been deployed
to Šiauliai Air Base to take part in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, while Finland has recently joined the list of countries expressing interest in engaging in a nuclear dialogue with Paris.
Taken together, this activity by the Fifth Republic—which may collectively be described as a kind of “turn” towards NATO’s eastern flank—has been unfolding for several years and is driven by several factors.
First, it reflects the shift in France’s foreign policy priorities under President Macron. French diplomacy has come to recognise that Eastern Europe had for too long occupied only a marginal place in comparison with its other strategic directions. Against the backdrop of the erosion of transatlantic ties, on the one hand, and the growing “Russian threat”, on the other, Paris has identified an opportunity to assume the role of protector of the frontline states and to build a new system for containing
Moscow. According to the French logic, this role must be fulfilled first and foremost out of ideological considerations, since the homeland of human rights and the revolutionary ideals of 1789 cannot stand idly by while “authoritarianism” advances from the east. Defending democracy against external threats is perhaps the last major political narrative Macron can still offer
the French public in his final year in office, given the lack of convincing domestic achievements and his declining approval ratings.
Pragmatic considerations are equally important. By becoming more deeply involved in the security of NATO’s eastern flank, France is strengthening its position within the Alliance, much as the United Kingdom is currently doing through its emphasis
on Northern Europe. This is particularly significant because Paris has lost its relevance in regions that long fell under an informal French sphere of responsibility—West Africa and the Middle East—and until recently was confronted with an acute lack of a new arena in which to project its influence. There is also an element of unspoken competition with Germany, whose involvement in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe has historically been far more extensive. Taking advantage of Berlin’s economic difficulties and its preoccupation with the shortcomings of its own armed forces, Paris is moving into areas where it previously had little room for manoeuvre. A further incentive is the rearmament of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which, despite their own limited resources, promises additional orders for French defence manufacturers—with financing for the purchases provided through European funds.
Second, this heightened attention to the eastern flank aligns with a new stage in the evolution of the Fifth Republic’s nuclear doctrine. In March this year, the Élysée Palace introduced
the concept of “forward deterrence”—a grouping initially comprising nine European countries prepared to move further than others in coordinating missile and nuclear matters, conducting joint exercises, and developing a range of military-technical projects in this field. Macron’s proposed list of partners included four countries located in the Baltic region, where Russia and NATO are in direct contact: Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark. In addition to the aforementioned Finland, Norway—another country bordering Russia—joined the supporters of “forward deterrence” in May 2026, with bilateral ties strengthened through the Narvik Agreement. By assembling such a coalition around itself, France seeks to move preliminary discussions rapidly into the realm of practical implementation, demonstrating to its allies—and attempting to send a deterrent signal to Moscow—that its proposals for European deterrence will not remain merely rhetorical. Hence the planning of nuclear exercises with Poland, and possibly the future expansion of “forward deterrence” to include even more states.
Third, it is no coincidence that Warsaw features in almost every French initiative on NATO’s eastern flank. Paris’s turn eastward is, to a considerable extent, a turn towards Poland. In May 2025, the two countries formalised a new phase of cooperation through the Nancy Agreement, covering virtually every sphere of interaction, from defence to culture. Judging by the assessments
of Polish commentators, Warsaw was dissatisfied that the agreement contains neither clear military commitments on France’s part nor formal nuclear guarantees. France’s conventional military capabilities are also viewed
rather cautiously because of insufficient defence spending and longstanding structural problems. Nevertheless, for Poland, elevating military and political relations with the Fifth Republic to a new level strengthens its standing within both the European Union and NATO, while also providing a degree of insurance should the United States seriously consider withdrawing from the continent. Alongside joint exercises, Poland may obtain certain types of French equipment, such as aerial refuelling aircraft and reconnaissance satellites, while offering France domestically produced systems that are in demand within the French armed forces, including man-portable air-defence systems and mine-laying systems.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
Please visit the firm link to site
