Tactical and Targeted Expansion of Mine Warfare in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf
Iran possesses dozens of types of naval mines, explosive traps, and remote-controlled mines that can be rapidly deployed along critical maritime routes, including moored mines, drifting mines, and limpet mines equipped with magnets. During the recent forty-day war—from February 28 to April 7—Iran made limited use of mine warfare to block, control, and reroute vessels within areas under the control of Iranian armed forces.
The Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest point, is approximately 33 kilometres wide, and water depths along primary shipping lanes generally range from 30 to 60 meters. This depth is highly suitable for naval mines, as they can be deployed relatively easily while remaining difficult and time-consuming to detect and clear. However, Iran did not exploit the full potential of its mine-laying capabilities, and deployment was limited to the Strait of Hormuz, without extending into the wider Persian Gulf. Midway through the conflict, the spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters— the highest coordinating body for military operations in Iran—stated that “due to sufficient control and power, there is no need to deploy mines in the Persian Gulf, and all available means will be utilised as necessary to ensure security.
In the event of a new war, particularly under high-risk scenarios such as a potential US ground operation to seize islands like Kharg—the largest Iranian oil export terminal—Qeshm, Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and Abu Musa, it is highly likely that we will witness tactical and targeted expansion of mine-laying operations in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Such operations would increase casualties, operational risk, and force warships to alter their routes.
Tactical and targeted mine-laying, when combined with anti-ship cruise and shore-to-sea missiles, drones, fast attack craft, surface vessels, and submarines—including the recently unveiled light-class “Persian Gulf Dolphins” submarines—could significantly enhance the operational capabilities of the IRGC Navy (covering the western Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (covering the eastern Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman). This integrated approach would enable a robust defence against potential US attacks on the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian islands within the strait and the Persian Gulf.
Disruption or Destruction of Submarine Fibre Optic Cables in the Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf
A submarine cable consists of multiple strands of fibre optics encased in protective layers of steel and polyethylene. According to authoritative TeleGeography maps and the Submarine Networks database, at least five to seven major cable systems pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Based on global routing data (BGP), approximately 60 to 70 percent of Iran’s internet traffic is routed through terrestrial pathways to the north and west (Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan), while only 30 to 40 percent enters via southern submarine cables.
For the Arab countries along the southern Persian Gulf coast, however, the situation is markedly different. These states are heavily dependent—over 90 percent—on maritime cable routes through the Strait of Hormuz due to limited and insecure terrestrial alternatives. If, for any reason—natural disasters, ship anchoring, maritime accidents, or deliberate actions—several major cables in the Strait of Hormuz were simultaneously severed, this would constitute a digital catastrophe for the Arab states. Their internet infrastructure would experience severe outages or widespread disruptions, leading to cascading consequences, including stock market and financial trading disruptions, e-commerce interruptions, banking transaction failures, and other critical impacts.
Based on this pronounced vulnerability, in recent weeks some Iranian officials and media outlets, within the framework of the new legal set-up governing the Strait of Hormuz and the collection of transit fees, have called for the imposition of initial and annual renewal fees on foreign companies, the requirement for technology giants (Meta, Amazon, Microsoft) to operate under Iranian law, and the exclusive maintenance and repair of submarine cables by Iranian companies.
Although this proposal has not yet been formally approved, it clearly indicates a significant shift in strategic thinking: the collection of fees from the Strait of Hormuz should no longer be limited to shipping and energy, but also extend to other sectors, such as submarine fibre optic cables. Accordingly, in the event of a large-scale and intense war, particularly if Iranian energy and technological infrastructure is attacked, it is plausible that the Iranian armed forces could target submarine fibre optic cables in the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf. Such actions would aim to increase pressure on Arab states hosting US military bases and inflict economic and operational damage on major American banks and corporations in the region.
Counterattacks on Energy Infrastructure, Power Plants, and Desalination Facilities
In the event that US President Donald Trump’s previous threats regarding the widespread destruction of all Iranian power plants and bridges—and his characterization of Iran as being in a “Stone Age”—are realized, Iranian political and military officials have repeatedly stated that retaliatory strikes against energy infrastructure, power plants, and desalination facilities in Israel and the Arab states hosting US military bases would be executed.
Beyond the extreme vulnerability of oil and gas fields and refineries in the Arab states and Israel, the heavy dependence on desalination facilities constitutes a critical strategic vulnerability. While Iran relies on desalination for approximately 3 percent of its water supply, Israel obtains 80 percent of its drinking water from just five desalination plants. Similarly, Bahrain relies on four desalination facilities for 60 percent of its drinking water, and the UAE depends on five major desalination plants, including the Jebel Ali facility.
Iran’s electricity generation and distribution network, by contrast, is dispersed and relatively diversified, with roughly 100 power plants nationwide. The energy supply is not concentrated in a few facilities; the largest power plant in Iran, with a capacity of approximately 75,000 MW, accounts for only about 3 percent of the total national electricity output. In such a network, any localised damage or disruption can be mitigated by transferring electricity from other plants and through load management, allowing at least partial control over potential fluctuations or outages.
In contrast, Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf have more centralised and dense power networks, meaning that an attack on a single power plant could eliminate up to 20 percent of electricity production. Accordingly, should prior threats from Donald Trump against energy infrastructure and power plants materialise, particularly on a large scale, the Iranian armed forces are likely to conduct extensive counterattacks targeting energy infrastructure, power plants, and desalination facilities in Israel and Arab states hosting US military bases.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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