Let’s return to Darline Graham’s bill. It has a fairly large number of co-sponsors – 62 senators, including both Republicans and Democrats. Some of the sponsors have previously co-sponsored bills on sanctions against Russia. These include Senators Richard Blumenthal, James Lankford, Ted Cruz, Jeanne Shaheen, and others. US President Donald Trump has periodically expressed support for the bill, including suggesting that it include sanctions against Iran. No such revisions have been made yet. But technically, the issue is being resolved quickly. In its current form, Darline Graham’s bill is quite detailed. It differs from many other sanctions bills, which are more chaotic. The level of preparation here is higher. Let’s look at the main components.
Article 102 – financial and visa sanctions against senior Russian officials. Such sanctions have already been imposed by presidential decree. This section also includes sanctions against foreign entities supplying dual-use goods to Russia. The administration has been actively implementing them since the very beginning of the Special Military Operation. Sanctions against individuals undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and democracy have been imposed on a large scale since 2014 and especially since 2022. Sanctions against Russian ‘oligarchs’. The wording here, stating that one of the criteria for sanctions is a refusal to condemn the Russian authorities’ policies in Ukraine, is striking. However, in general, restrictions against Russian businessmen were imposed both before and after the start of the Special Military Operation based on presidential decrees. Sanctions against sea vessels transporting Russian oil, liquefied gas, uranium, coal, weapons, etc. have also been actively imposed by the Administration, including against shipowners. The EU and the UK have similar practices. Graham’s draft contains a provision stating that the imposition of sanctions by Brussels and London could in itself be grounds for their duplication in the United States.
Article 103. Sanctions against financial institutions associated with the Russian government. The US has imposed such sanctions for a long time. Moreover, both state-owned banks and numerous private banks are subject to sanctions. Article 104 also concerns sanctions against other state-owned companies. Again, the Trump Administration imposed such sanctions even before the Special Military Operation, and did so on a massive scale after it started. Article 105 also prohibits the transfer of funds associated with the Russian Federation. Such transfers are already virtually impossible due to the extensive blocking sanctions against the Russian financial sector. Article 106 also prohibits Russian state-owned companies from listing on US exchanges. However, they are already unable to do so, given that the vast majority of blue-chip companies, or entities associated with them, are subject to blocking sanctions. Article 107 also prohibits investment in Russia. Such bans were introduced by Joe Biden in March 2022. However, if enshrined in law, repealing such a ban would be more difficult.
Further components of the bill are also largely already reflected in the rulemaking and enforcement policies of both the Trump and Biden administrations. The ban on imports of Russian energy products (Article 108) was introduced by Biden in March 2022. The bill also proposes a ban on energy exports from the United States to Russia. However, Russia has no need for such goods from the United States. The ban on the purchase of Russian bonds (Article 109) was also introduced by Biden and the US Treasury Department at the beginning of the Special Military Operation.
Article 110 appears new. It establishes a sanctions mechanism for foreign providers of financial messaging services. It proposes blocking them if they provide services to persons subject to sanctions under Article 103. However, the largest provider (Belgian SWIFT) already avoids working with sanctioned Russian individuals. Furthermore, it is restricted by EU law, which explicitly prohibits the provision of such services to specified Russian banks (Article 5h of Council Regulation 833/2014). Chinese services are theoretically at risk. However, they are also exercising greater caution and are mindful of the legal risks posed by the United States.
Article 111 proposes a ban on the import of Russian uranium and sanctions against the management of Rosatom State Corporation. However, a similar legislative ban already exists in the form of the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act of May 13, 2024 (PL 118-62). The White House has already imposed sanctions on certain assets of the Russian nuclear industry, although the bill lays the groundwork for their escalation.
Article 112, which imposes 500% duties on imports from Russia, appears somewhat odd. It lists goods such as oil, gas, liquefied natural gas, coal, and others. However, their import into the US was banned by Joseph Biden in 2022. Furthermore, energy imports from Russia were halted by the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act of April 8, 2022 (PL 117-109). This raises the question of how duties can be imposed on something that is prohibited from being supplied.
Article 113 expands on the well-known threat of tariffs on third countries for purchases of Russian oil or natural gas. This time, the tariff is capped at 100%. However, the criteria for imposing tariffs are more detailed. For example, they could be imposed on the five largest importers of Russian oil. This version of the draft could well cause concern among buyers of Russian oil. However, such tariffs and their elimination have been implemented before. Therefore, it’s difficult to call this a new risk. Its legislative codification will not bring peace of mind to businesses. But it is no longer a black swan. Article 113 remains a key element of Senator Graham’s draft.
The bill ties the lifting of sanctions to achieving peace in Ukraine. In this case, the president can lift sanctions previously imposed by law, but must justify this decision to Congress. Congress can then repeal the sanctions via a joint resolution. A similar mechanism was previously developed under CAATSA for sanctions imposed by Barack Obama’s executive orders following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014.
Ultimately, the Trump Administration’s main criticism of Senator Graham’s bill will likely be its excessiveness, given that many of its provisions are either applied to or already contained in previously passed laws. This won’t necessarily prevent its passage. The notorious Section 113 could simply resurface in other bills. Or the current draft could be supplemented with sanctions against Iran or other countries. The bill contains no ‘black swans’, but the risks it poses require unbiased analysis and attention.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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